The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo

DRC has committed to reduce its emissions effectively, efficiently, and equitably from deforestation and degradation (REDD+). The country experiences complex relationships between drivers, agents, and institutions of deforestation nationally. The REDD+ policy arena is influenced by both governmental and non-governmental actors whose number have increased in the policy arena over the years; however, weak coordination among these actors remains an issue. Since 2009, the DRC has announced several reforms relating to land tenure, land-use planning and agricultural policy, to create an institutional environment that motivates the implementation of REDD+ in the DRC. By 2019, none of these reforms had materialized, due to both political changes and a lack of finance, capacity, and political will. Between 2013 and 2019, little progress has been made on REDD+ in the DRC, as a result of conflicting interests among actors both at national and decentralized levels; information asymmetry; elite capture and corruption; and the pre- and post-election situation. To date, the effectiveness of REDD+ activities in the DRC remain unclear, due to the absence of rigorous impact assessment. However, efforts can be observed on the field where there is increased number of participants to forest policy process compared to REDD+ early years; and several ongoing projects are testing policy options within and across levels. If these efforts are sustained, they can contribute in putting in place conditions to achieve REDD+ objectives.


Executive summary
For participating countries, many questions remain on how to effectively, efficiently and equitably reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+). Understanding the complex relationships between drivers, agents and institutions nationally is vital to ensure effective implementation of REDD+. This report is an updated edition of the initial REDD+ Country Profile in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), first published in 2013. It aims to inform decision makers, practitioners and donors about the opportunities and challenges of implementing REDD+, and to support evidence-based REDD+ decision-making processes. This second edition provides updates on REDD+ policies and progress between 2013 and 2019, as well as analyzing any factors that have led to changes. Through reviews of literature, national and international data and legal documentation, as well as selected expert interviews, this updated edition provides contextual analysis on conditions that are currently affecting the REDD+ policy environment in the DRC. It examines five areas: (1) drivers of deforestation; (2) the institutional environment and revenue distribution mechanisms; (3) the political economy of deforestation and forest degradation; (4) the political environment of REDD+ (actors, events and processes); and (5) implications of the country's current REDD+ design in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and equity in the DRC.
The DRC's annual deforestation rate is among the highest in the Congo Basin, estimated at around 0.2-0.3% during 2000-2015. The State continues to cite this percentage in international conventions, such as the convention on biodiversity in October 2019. Direct causes of deforestation in the DRC range from the development of road infrastructure, to agriculture, uncontrolled logging for fuelwood, and industrial logging to open up transport routes. There are many indirect reasons underlying these direct causes, including economic factors, proximity to transport routes, demography, sociopolitical and biophysical factors. A lack of data on forest degradation means the country did not include degradation in its Forests Emissions Reference Level document, submitted at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in January 2018. The government intends to revise its national REDD+ strategy in 2022 with more precise and up-to-date data on these drivers, combined with results from its REDD+ pilot projects. Stakeholders claim, however, that there has been no change in the internal dynamics of each of these main drivers between 2013 and 2019.
The DRC has signed 29 international conventions and enacted more than 40 national laws, decrees and orders around the protection of the environment. However, weak implementation of these international agreements persists. An unstable political context has created major challenges for the DRC's newly-created provinces, in terms of them being fully operational and playing an active role in REDD+. As such, their role in REDD+ to date has been limited, with any progress mainly being driven by the central government that is central to decision making processes. The decentralized governance architecture is different from one province to the next, adding complexity to attempts to design a tool to make sure resources flow from national to provincial and local governance structures. Since 2009, the DRC has announced a number of reforms relating to land tenure, land-use planning and agricultural policy, to create an institutional environment that motivates the implementation of REDD+ in the DRC. However, by 2019, none of these reforms had actually materialized, due to both political changes and a lack of finance, capacity and political will. The DRC's 2002 moratorium on new forest exploitation titles has been the focus x of increasing political interest. With the exception of a few controversial forest concessions granted under contested circumstances, this moratorium has not yet been officially lifted. Yet no assessment or evaluation has been conducted into the impact of this moratorium, in terms of reducing forest loss inside forest concessions or improving forest management. One of the most significant changes in the forestry sector came in 2016, when community forestry, a concept established in the 2002 Forest Law, came into action with the release of an implementing decree and the development of implementation tools. By September 2019, 64 Community Forests had been established all over the country. However, the focus to date has been on community access to these Community Forests, with almost no supporting mechanism in place to enable this access to happen. The implications of this new forest management tool for REDD+ still need to be fully investigated.
The current REDD+ Framework Strategy aims to align with a national sustainable sectoral development strategy which runs until 2035; this covers environment, energy, rural development, hydrocarbon, mines, territorial planning, infrastructure and land tenure issues. However, since 2013, underlying drivers of deforestation and degradation have not yet been addressed. Reforms are taking place within the agriculture and mining sectors in terms of sustainable development and environmentally friendly production, but little has been done along the lines of zero deforestation practices. Drivers of deforestation like hydropower development and fuelwood collection are not well studied. Weak coordination across sectors and ministries has persisted since 2013. This prevents any drivers of deforestation and degradation that stem from sectors outside of forestry from being addressed.
The DRC's commitment to the Paris Agreement targets is an emission reduction of 17% below business as usual by 2030, at an anticipated cost of USD 12.54 million. The contribution of REDD+ to this amount is not clearly stated, but is seen by the government as critically important. National REDD+ policies have not progressed since 2013. Although the REDD+ Framework Strategy was published in 2012, national stakeholders consider it incomplete. The National REDD+ Strategy was expected to be finalized after being piloted in different areas of the country; however, there has been no rigorous impact assessment of these pilots. The REDD+ policy arena in the DRC is influenced by both governmental and nongovernmental actors; however, weak coordination among these actors remains an issue. A further challenge is the lack of clarity around whether the National REDD+ Coordination or FONAREDD is responsible for managing REDD+ finance; the National REDD+ Coordination is officially the main technical REDD+ coordination unit, but it cannot currently approve projects funded by the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI), managed by FONAREDD. There are more than 100 civil society organizations (CSOs) working in the DRC; yet their role and rights regarding land and forest resources are not fully recognized in the current legal framework. Most REDD+ actors have been inactive recently due to unstable political and financial commitment to REDD+, as marked by the scarce state budget specifically dedicated to it. Though efforts have been made to improve governance, indicators pointing to the DRC's poor governance of REDD+ have resulted in a slowdown of funding for REDD+ in the DRC. In 2019, with CAFI as the main source of funding, the disbursement rate was low, as the country failed to meet its targets for the implementation of REDD+ activities. Inclusive participation of all stakeholders in the REDD+ decision-making process was still seen as voluntary by actors in 2019.
The DRC has adopted a National Payment for Environmental Services as its REDD+ benefitsharing mechanism. Several REDD+ pilot projects, such as Maï-Ndombe REDD+ Jurisdictional Pilot Project, will benefit from this distributive mechanism. However, to date how this national REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism should be organized and implemented is unclear. As a REDD+ country, the DRC expected to receive financing for its REDD+ activities from various sources, including public funding, private sector investments, international green funding and the voluntary market. Its national target for these activities was USD 1 billion during 2013-2016. Half of this was amount was intended to support the redirection of traditional land-use investments toward REDD+ objectives, using the National REDD+ Fund as the financial mechanism, managed by the Ministry of Finance. Investments targeted by the DRC within the framework of REDD+ include both 'business as usual ' investments that are aligned with the objectives of REDD+, and investments that are specifically intended for REDD+. However, little data is available on how these investments are being used and their actual impact. The DRC has now developed national social and environmental safeguard standards for REDD+, and a Safeguards Information System is being designed and will be included in the national REDD+ registry. Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of forest land uses within REDD+ is still under development in the DRC. This is challenged by the different definitions of forest that are in use to report on actual forest cover and forestry land, the lack of data on forest cover, and the lack of technical capacity among REDD+ stakeholders.
Our first DRC country profile, published in 2013, concluded that the DRC's main REDD+ shortcomings were poor governance, an absence of state authority in many areas of the country, and a lack of domestic capacity, including financial and human resources. This second edition highlights that, between 2013 and 2019, little progress has been made on REDD+ in the DRC, as a result of conflicting interests among actors both at national and decentralized levels; information asymmetry; elite capture and corruption; and the pre-and postelection situation. Enabling conditions for REDD+ in the DRC, such as good governance, transparent data, and effective policies and measures to address the drivers of deforestation and degradation, are not yet fully in place. To date, the effectiveness of REDD+ activities in the DRC is also unclear, due to the absence of rigorous impact assessment.
The first REDD+ DRC Country Profile was published in 2013 (Mpoyi et al. 2013), four years after the DRC first engaged in REDD+ in 2009, and immediately after the country's National REDD+ Framework Strategy was approved in 2012. Since 2012, the political and socioeconomic context has changed rapidly, and so have REDD+ policies. This second edition of the DRC REDD+ Country Profile aims to provide updates on REDD+ policies and progress between 2013 and 2019, as well as analyze factors that have led to these changes. The outline and structure of this report follow the global GCS-REDD+ methodology design as developed by Brockhaus et al. (2012). REDD+, which stands for countries' efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, was acknowledged in the Paris Agreement as a potential mechanism for mitigating climate change. To date, 55 countries have included REDD+ activities as part of their Nationally Determined Contribution submissions (Pham et al. 2019). However, for participating REDD+ countries, many questions remain on how to effectively, efficiently and equitably formulate and implement these REDD+ activities. Understanding the complex relationships between drivers, agents and institutions across the nation is vital to ensure effective implementation of REDD+.
In 2009, the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) initiated a Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD+). The aim of GCS-REDD+ was to equip policymakers and practitioner communities with tools, information and analyses so they could design effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ policies. The study this report is based on forms part of the first module of GCS-REDD+, which examines national REDD+ policies and processes in 14 countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with the aim of providing a better understanding of the national context for REDD+ development. Under this first module of GCS-REDD+, CIFOR together with its partners in 14 countries has published a series of REDD+ country profiles  Mpoyi et al. (2013) 145 million ha Debroux et al. (2007) 155 million ha 67% De Wasseige et al. (2009) 145 million ha Blaser et al. (2011) 152 million ha MEDD (2015aMEDD ( , 2015b 155.5 million ha 67% Davis et al. (2009) Source: Summarized from Mpoyi et al. (2013) 2 Analysis around the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation

Forest cover and historical background
With a total surface area of 2,345,409 km², the DRC is the largest forested country in the Congo Basin. The first version of this country profile highlighted that forest cover estimates for the DRC vary greatly, and no systematic study has provided exhaustive information about the country's forest cover situation (Mpoyi et al. 2013). These forest cover estimates are summarized in Table 1. The most recent estimate, on which the country based its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), is 152 million hectares of forests (MEDD 2015a;2015b). The differences between the forest cover estimates are largely due to diverse methodologies and definitions of forest cover; in most cases, authors used land area, minimum tree height and canopy cover to formulate their estimates. The official definition of forest in the DRC is based on Ministerial Decree 5094/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/ JEB/08 from 22 October 2008, which states that "the DRC defines forest as a forested area of more than 0.5 hectares, with trees up to three meters high, with tree cover equal to or greater than 30%, or with trees capable of reaching these thresholds in situ." The DRC's Forest Reference Emission Levels (FREL) document, as delivered to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in January 2018, proposes the use of an operational definition of the forest. According to the DRC government, this definition is supposed to reduce any estimate errors for activity data, while being more relevant to forest cover monitoring at the scale of the main direct drivers of deforestation (MEDD 2018). The document also notes, however, that there are discrepancies between the government's official and operational definitions of forest land. In its operational definition of forest land, the country distinguishes between planted forests and perennial agricultural plantations, the latter being considered forest. By cross-referencing this official definition with definitions included in the DRC's Guide to Forest Stratification (2007), it appears that planted forest lands, including cocoa, rubber and Acacia plantations developed for agroforestry or forest regeneration purposes, are included in estimates of forest cover. However, in the context of REDD+, oil palm plantations in the DRC are not considered to be planted forests. The implications of this operational definition of forest in the DRC, in terms of REDD+ areas, are poorly understood because of the scope of the FREL. The FREL

Figure 1. Map of WWF's 'ecoregions' in the DRC
Source: Olson et al. (2001) document does not include 'biomass per forest layer' in its inventory, nor does it include other emissions or absorption sources such as litter, dead wood and organic carbon in the forest floor. Mpoyi et al. (2013) also highlighted that definitions of forest and deforestation in the DRC are interpreted differently by different groups of actors.
Forests in the DRC are located in three main regions Debroux et al. (2007). The first is that of the dense rainforests in the plains, with a total surface area of about 86 million ha in the Central and Bas-Congo Provinces, where swampy forest is located. The second region is the mountains and high plateaus of the Albertine Rift, extending across parts of Maniema, Katanga, North Kivu and South Kivu. The third region is the dry forest and forest-savannah mosaic that is distributed across the country, covering the former Orientale, Équateur, Katanga and Kasai provinces, as well as parts of Bandundu and Bas-Congo Provinces. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) map of 'ecoregions' (Figure 1) used by Olson et al. (2001) provides a simplified overview of plant cover distribution in the country. By overlaying this on top of existing maps, it appears that the densest forest in the DRC can be found in three provinces: Équateur, Bandundu Table 3.
Although some areas fall under multiple forest types, exhaustive classification will only be available after completion of the forest-zoning process, part of a countrywide land-use planning reform funded by the World Bank. This is expected to enable the DRC to design a national land-management policy and guidelines for allocating land for various uses.
The rates of forest cover loss in the DRC for 1990-2015 (Table 4) are low compared to rates in other tropical forested countries. However, deforestation is increasing (MEDD 2018).  MEDD (2015) in its FREL. More recently, Tyukavina et al. (2015), in their review of the gross forest cover loss, estimated it at 65% more than the rate calculated by Hansen et al. (2013) for 2000-2012, seen in Table 4.  Year The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo | 7 The average national forest loss of 420,000 ha during 2000-2005 that is reported by Ernst et al. (2012) conceals disparities in deforestation rates across the country. As can be seen in Figure 2, deforestation hotspots in the DRC are located near large cities like Kinshasa or Lubumbashi, where population density reaches 1000 inhabitants/km². Mpoyi et al. (2013) show the impact and distribution of deforestation and forest degradation as it is visible on the ground, indicating that the deforestation figures cited in other literature had been underestimated. To address the lack of field data for evaluating forest loss, several authors have used satellite observations to give more accurate information. As a result of improved methodological approaches, the estimates of Harris et al. (2017) are higher than those calculated using the approach of Hansen et al. (2013) (see Figure 3).
The orange bars relate to data from Hansen et al. (2013). The blue ones reflect the results of an updated algorithm by Harris et al. (2017), which integrates Landsat 8, 5 and 7 imagery data. Defourny et al. (2011) define deforestation as forest cover reduction due to anthropogenic actions, as opposed to degradation, which is the result of biophysical factors without human input. The UNFCCC requires the DRC to establish a definition of forest that takes into account the country's specific circumstances (IPCC 1997). If based on the forest definition presented in section 2.1 above, under the national definition degradation could be defined as a reduction of forest cover; while deforestation is defined by a threshold in the reduction of the forest cover.

Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation
Understanding the importance and impact of the various factors driving deforestation in the DRC will help the country to prioritize its different REDD+ actions (Geist and Lambin 2001). In the context of its climate commitments, the DRC's 2015 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) document reiterates the country's position as published in its document about the potential for REDD+ in December 2009. The INDC document states that "deforestation and forest degradation are mainly caused by commercial (40%) and food (20%) agriculture, and by cutting firewood (20%)". In the context of REDD+, the DRC holds that consensus around these figures was achieved by comparing the results of qualitative (UNEP 2011;GTCR 2012) and quantitative studies (Defourny et al. 2011), with consultations conducted by the National REDD+ Coordination. Section 2.2.1 distinguishes between these direct and indirect (underlying) causes of deforestation to understand forest cover dynamics in the DRC. Consensus around these causes is summarized in a synthesis document (GoDRC 2012), and confirmed in the National REDD+ Strategy in 2012 (MEDD 2015) and the 2018 FREL document. The DRC's FREL adds no new information on direct or indirect causes, but rather proposes an adaptation of the previous classification, following Geist and Lambin (2001). The main changes are to the structure of this classification, as presented in Table 5.
Although numerous studies have examined drivers of deforestation and degradation in the DRC (Megevand et al. 2013;Mpoyi et al. 2013;CAFI 2015;MEDD 2015aMEDD , 2015bTchatchou et al. 2015), when the FREL was produced in 2018, no up-to-date study was available regarding the current status of these drivers nationwide. REDD+ actors participating in our national consultation workshop felt this was key to prioritizing future actions across the DRC's various landscapes. Studies conducted by Tollens (2010), Peltier et al. (2014), Tyukavina et al. (2018), Lubamba (2019) and Molinario et al. (2020) suggest that, in many parts of the DRC, deforestation is due to the expansion of smallholder cropland, firewood collection, construction and swidden agriculture, yet forestry and mining have greater potential to damage forest cover than local community practices do.

Direct causes
The DRC's national forests emissions reference (FREL) document published in 2018 builds on previous analysis around direct causes of deforestation and forest degradation. It highlights that the main direct causes of deforestation and forest degradation (illegal, legal or non-regulated) are: swidden agriculture; artisanal logging; industrial logging; carbonization, fuelwood; Table 5. Changes to the classification of direct and indirect causes of deforestation and forest degradation in the DRC mining; and bushfires (MEDD 2018). The internal dynamics of each of these causes, as presented by the studies mentioned above, remain the same, but their order of importance is altered in the conclusions of the FREL document, as summarized in Figure 4.
Agriculture. The trajectory of the DRC's agriculture sector is punctuated by the abandoning of the old plantations due to sociopolitical unrest in the country. In 2017, the World Bank estimated that agricultural production contributed 20% to the gross domestic product (GDP). To date, less than 10% of the estimated 135 million ha  of land deemed to be 'agricultural', is being fully utilized for that purpose (Devey 2012;USAID 2019). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID 2019) describes the DRC as a "Feed the Future" aligned country, meaning a country with an important agriculture capacity if fully exploited. The agro-pastoral community is estimated to be made up of almost 14 million households (Devey 2012) and 70% of the employed population is engaged in agriculture (USAID 2019), yet production remains low. This situation was expected to change with the implementation of the National Agricultural Investment Plan. Yet MEDD (2015a) reports that agriculture is the main driver of deforestation in the DRC. This perspective is supported by Tyukavina et al. (2018) and Molinario et al. (2020), who report that forest loss in the Congo Basin is dominated by increased clearing by smallholders. Many studies, including the 2009 McKinsey Report, however, have predicted that 2015, 3.2 million ha of land would be deforested for the development of industrial agricultural projects, including palm oil plantations. Over the same period, it has been estimated that another 4 million ha will be deforested and 2.4 million ha of forest degraded to make way for large ranches in the Central Cuvette's bush savannah. Addressing the drivers of deforestation and degradation in the DRC therefore depends upon effective policies and measures that will reduce the impacts and expansion of such large-scale industrial agriculture projects. The extent to which these predictions are true, and large-scale agricultural projects have impacted deforestation in reality, is yet unclear due to a lack of confirmed data for this time period.
Wood utilization. Charcoal production, illegal logging, industrial logging and fuelwood are the main uses of wood that impact forest cover in the DRC. The forestry sector is marked by industrial (formal) and informal production. Industrial production has grown continuously since 2008 (Eba'a Atyi and Bayol 2009). However, industrial timber production has never exceeded 500,000 m 3 annually (Mertens and Belanger 2010). The informal sector has also grown, with production levels now three to four times more than the industrial sector (Lescuyer et al. 2014;World Bank 2015). The informal sector supplies a growing domestic market. This sector is not governed by the same rules of taxation, traceability, work conditions and requirements as the formal industrial sector, warranting special attention by policy makers to make sure its impacts can be better understood. In neighboring countries, forest products are largely used as a source of energy, as well as for construction and furniture in large urban centers (World Bank 2015). This increases deforestation in forests that are near to cities, and along borders where forest products, especially products intended for export, are shipped from nearby forestlands. Forest Monitor (2007), Benneker (2012) and Lukumbuzya and Sianga (2017) note that countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya import 75% of the total timber harvested by small-scale operations in the DRC's eastern forests.
Fuelwood collection is another important driver of deforestation and forest degradation in the DRC (Marien 2010;Ernst et al. 2012;MEDD 2015). Fuelwood production is on the rise to meet the growing needs of an increasingly urban population (Tollens 2010;Trefon et al. 2010;FAO 2011;Schure et al. 2011Schure et al. , 2012. Formal legislation that regulate access to forests by those involved in the fuelwood trade are scarcely enforced, while informal bodies are used by less privileged and rural actors. To reduce the impact of fuelwood collection on forest cover, sustainable alternative solutions have been suggested by international development partners like the FAO and the World Bank, as well as government agencies like MEDD. Possible solutions put forward include forest plantations, widespread use of improved charcoal cookstoves, and an increase in the production and distribution of low-cost electricity. New strategies are needed to promote the positive aspects of informality, while supporting initiatives that contribute to long-term resource sustainability and meet the increasing urban demand, given the lack of alternative energy sources (Schure et al. 2014).
Mining. The impact of mining on forest cover is significant, as illustrated in the Kasai region, where hundreds of hectares have been deforested and degraded within a few decades for diamond mining and fuelwood. Construction of infrastructure and mining operations are expected to grow in the medium term as two public companies from China have signed a USD 9 billion contract (Global Witness 2011) giving them rights to exploit the DRC's mineral resources. Recent reports argue that these contracts, billed at the time as the "deal of the century", were flawed (Landry 2018). The deal between the DRC government and the Sino Congolaise des Mines has failed to meet expectations in terms of monetary revenues, as the DRC has received no substantial payments to date nor will do in the foreseeable future. A decade of exploitation has seen no benefits for local communities either (Landry 2018;Larrarte and Claudio-Quiroga 2019). The Chinese companies continue to mine, and the impact on forest cover is yet to be estimated.

Indirect causes
Population growth. The population of the DRC is expected to double almost every 20 years, with knock-on impacts on demand for firewood and land for agricultural and urban expansion. This makes population growth the main indirect cause of deforestation. It has implications for the expansion of cities and their infrastructure, and will also increase demand for 'makala' (charcoal), used by most of the urban population.
The authors of the FREL (MEDD 2018) note that legal and institutional gaps strongly contribute to uncontrolled exploitation of forest areas. As the population moves and concentrates in certain areas, there is an increasing need for timber and fuelwood, resulting in an intensification of forestry operations (Schure et al. 2012). Such population movement has also led to an increase in demand for farming land. In some regions of the DRC, the average population density of forested areas is less than one inhabitant per km 2 . In contrast, population density is over 1000 inhabitants per km 2 in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and other major urban centers. Wars in the east of the country have led to significant migration to the west, both from Rwanda and Burundi and within the DRC, with serious impacts on forest cover.

Road infrastructure.
Roads increase access to intact forest landscapes, reducing their protection from anthropogenic influence (Kleinschroth et al. 2016). According to the Ministry in Charge of Public Works, the DRC has 153,209 km of road infrastructure, which includes 21,140 km of national highways, 21,124 km of main provincial roads, and 17,245 km of secondary provincial routes, of which about 3,000 km are paved (MdInf 2020). Departmental Order N°79/BCE/ TPA/60/004/79 of 28 February 1979 sets the total road managed by the Road Office at 58,129 km. Road expansion in the DRC is minimal and when it happens, it is mainly related to forest and mining development zones, where operators need roads to access sites and transport their products. Mining and forest operations and concessions contribute to fragmentation and make enclosed forest more | 11 accessible (Mertens and Belanger 2010). They also facilitate the inflow of laborers who settle in previously uninhabited forest areas.
Institutional and economic aspects. According to the National Emissions Reference Level, conflicts at a political and governmental level also impact forest cover. This is closely linked to economic crises, the lack of employment opportunities and poverty. For years, deforestation in the DRC has been correlated with the presence of refugees in the region. An estimated 2 million immigrants from Rwanda and Burundi moved into the DRC's eastern provinces. Their need for firewood leads to deforestation of an estimated 89 ha per day in the Virunga National Park. They also constitute a large labor force for small-scale forest operations to meet these needs. A recent study (Reyniers et al. 2015) showed that sharecropping -when landowners allow tenants to use their land in return for a share of the crops produced on the land -is on the rise in the DRC and contributes significantly to forest cover degradation. Between 2000 and 2015 on the Batéké plateaus, it accounted for 15% of all forest cover degradation -more than double the national average.

Biophysical factors (forest fragmentation and degraded forests).
It is easier for local communities to access and exploit fragmented and degraded forests as it requires less effort to access, burn and cultivate or carry out operate artisanal mine activities on them.
Other factors. A range of other factors impact on forest cover, including distance to roads and waterways, and the presence of protected areas. The Congo River has a vast network of navigable tributaries and rivers, which serve to transport harvests. The presence of a large number of roads, and their short distance to navigable waterways, provide opportunities for both small-scale and industrial forestry. The former provinces of Équateur, Bandundu, Orientale and Bas-Congo are the main starting points for the forest production supply chains that use these routes. Though the roads are in bad condition, they have facilitated the intensification of forest exploitation.
In short, the various sources cited agree on the direct causes of deforestation being the development of road infrastructure, agriculture and uncontrolled logging for wood fuel, as well as industrial logging activity and associated transport routes. These direct causes result from underlying factors or indirect causes, such as economic factors, proximity to roads, demography, sociopolitical and biophysical factors. The consensus given in the national FREL document is that the indirect or underlying causes of deforestation ranked in order of importance are: (1) population growth; (2) institutional aspects; (3) infrastructure development and urbanization; and (4) economic aspects, such as unemployment and poverty (MEDD 2018). Though they are known, the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation vary by region, and correlate to both infrastructure development and demography. They are also largely influenced by national policy choices over ways to use land so as to achieve economic development.

Potential for mitigation
Discussions about the DRC's mitigation potential were initiated with the development of the DRC's INDC, submitted to the UNFCCC in 2015. Here, new trends in the DRC's GHG emissions were presented, including those from the forestry sector. A scenario for 2000 to 2030 anticipated that the DRC could reduce its emissions by 17%, at an anticipated total cost of USD 12.54 million, with a clearly identified contribution from the forestry sector (MEDD 2015a). The INDC also shows how this potential to reduce MtCO 2 e is distributed across the different sectors of agriculture, land use, land-use change, forestry and energy. The sustainable management of timber exploitation has potential to reduce emissions by 8.4 MtCO 2 e, while afforestation and reforestation could reduce 1.5 MtCO 2 e. The rehabilitation of mining and oil quarrying could reduce emissions by a further 0.6 MtCO 2 e, and the fight against bushfires could result in a 0.2 MtCO 2 e reduction (MEDD 2015a). Actual and anticipated forest CO 2 emissions reduction in the DRC is presented in Table 6.
Many stakeholders argue that these initial expectations were too ambitious, particularly in the context of weak private sector mobilization, political instability and insufficient national workforce to enable reforestation across the country. According to one source, investments like those of a Chinese multinational company focused on agricultural research (fertilizer factory and presidential model farm in N'Djili) and large-scale agricultural development (biofuel production) could transform over 100 million hectares of non-forest arable land without putting any additional pressure on the forest (Putzel et al. 2011). The DRC's INDC does not specifically present REDD+ as the mechanism for reducing its emissions from deforestation, instead highlighting it as an important milestone relating to the DRC's mitigation potential. Of particular relevance to REDD+ is a 2017 publication by scientists at the University of Leeds, UK, which details the 'rediscovery' of peatland in the Cuvette Centrale, at the border between the DRC and Congo. The discovery of this peat swamp forest completely redefines the global estimation of peatland worldwide and has led to new interest in the DRC's forests and their potential for greenhouse gas mitigation. Most of this area is covered by oil and gas concessions (for exploration and/or extraction), timber concessions and concessions for oil palm development and, to a lesser extent, agricultural use. It is partly covered by a Transboundary Ramsar Site, declared in June 2017 Miles et al. 2017).
To reach the DRC's mitigation potential, the following conditions must be fulfilled: (1) finalization of institutional reforms, mainly on cross-cutting issues, involving the Ministries of Agriculture, Rural Development, Industry, Mines and Hydrocarbons, Land Use Planning, and Energy; (2) national-level deployment of a series of incentives to encourage private investment, especially the development of a strategy that involves the private sector in REDD+; (3) development of funding mechanisms keyed to the mitigation potential; and (4) finalization of the baseline studies, production of legal instruments and implementation of the resulting institutional reforms. Laporte et al. (2007), estimated the reference level for emissions from deforestation and degradation in the DRC at 200 million tons of CO 2 between 2008 and 2036, divided between community land uses, logging and the development of palm oilbased biofuels, with an estimated deforestation of 23 million hectares. The country relied on a set of national initiatives to develop emission factors. The completed Directorate of Forest Inventory and Management-Japan International Cooperation Agency (DIAF-JICA) Forests project strengthened the national forest resource monitoring system, to promote sustainable forest management and REDD+ in the DRC. The ongoing Maï-Ndombe Jurisdictional REDD+ Program is implementing a green development model at the provincial level, by providing alternatives to deforestation and awarding performance-based payments for climate change mitigation activities, poverty reduction, sustainable management of natural resources and biodiversity protection. The third initiative is the Forest Carbon Map and Model light detection and ranging (LiDAR) Forest Biomass Mapping Project. This project is being developed by WWF, with the aim of producing a map of national forest biomass through an airborne laser system, to quantify forest carbon stocks. These projects are still in the early stages and their results are expected to provide more research-based and realistic estimates of the DRC's mitigation potential under REDD+.
In the context of REDD+, the DRC has initiated a comprehensive national forest monitoring system (MEDD 2018). The first national FREL is essentially focused on deforestation over a reference period of 2000-2014, with a grace period of five years or more, depending on the availability of more accurate data. The only gas included in the DRC's FREL is CO 2 . The country emissions estimates are presented in Table 6 for the reference period 2000-2019. A change in emissions is anticipated, however despite the projections in the INDC document the forestry sector's mitigation potential remains unclear, and its contribution to the national emissions reductions efforts therefore remain undefined.  COMIFAC) agenda and tried to adapt to the country's socioeconomic conditions. However, a common criticism is that the Code seems to focus on timber as an exploitable resource and dedicates most of its provisions to regulating this exploitation, with less attention given to other aspects of forest ecosystem management. Since the Code was announced, many calls have been made for its provisions to be enforced so it is properly implemented.
The Code aims to: (1) guarantee public consultations prior to the allocation of forestlands; (2) recognize communities' customary rights to forestlands and respect traditional usage rights; (3) conserve and sustainably develop ecosystems; (4) support community forestry; (5) allocate forest concessions transparently; (6) include all stakeholders in forest management; and (7) provide alternative uses of forest resources and spaces including non-extractive forest uses like conservation concessions, carbon sequestration and bioprospecting rights (Debroux 2007). By 2011, about 40 application decrees, including the Constitution of an Independent Observer, had been adopted to oversee implementation of the Forest Code's principles (Mpoyi et al. 2013). In 2014, the Decree on Conditions for the Granting of Local Communities' Forest Concessions was adopted, followed by the 2016 Decree on With fast-changing international rules around REDD+, national institutional frameworks are required to be innovative enough to adapt and tackle the related challenges (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2010). They need to put in place coordinated sectoral policies, design legal frameworks that clarify land and carbon rights, and ensure well-targeted, equitable distribution of the benefits generated by REDD+. Governance -especially forest governance -should be strengthened in the fight against corruption, as well as institutional and technical capacity building around REDD+.
The arrival of REDD+ in the DRC has opened discussions on reforms aimed at establishing an institutional framework that clarifies associated rights, including land and carbon rights. The same is true for measures to strengthen governance and design systems that ensure equitable distribution of the benefits expected from REDD+ implementation.

Governance in the forestry sector
The forestry sector in the DRC is under the responsibility of MEDD. However, actions of this ministry are largely influenced by decisions taken in other sectoral ministries, like the Ministries in Charge of Territorial Administration, Finance, and Agriculture. They are also influenced by the overall political environment. The DRC's sociopolitical context is generally marked by a situation of poor governance that covers virtually all development sectors, including the forestry sector (Oyono and Lelo Nzuzi 2006;Trefon 2008). In 2017, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation ranked the DRC 48 th out of 54 African states on its general governance index, with a score of 8 out of 100, well below the Central Africa regional average of 50. Specifically looking at good governance, the country ranked 50 th , and Community Forestry that led, in 2017, to the finalization of a national strategy on community forestry. Community forestry is the country's most recent innovation in forest governance to date. The conditions for implementing the strategy are still under negotiation, but a targeted communication and local capacity-building exercise is ongoing, with the active participation of civil society.
Despite all the measures described above, however, forest governance remains weak (Counsell 2006;Global Witness 2007;Greenpeace 2007Greenpeace , 2010aHoare et al. 2008), as confirmed by more recent studies, such as those by Aquino and Guay (2013) and Tegegne (2016).
There is ongoing debate around the attribution of new forest titles while a moratorium, issued in 2002, remains in force. The moratorium covers any new acquisitions of the right to industrial timber exploitation, including those occurring through the exchange, relocation or rehabilitation of old titles. Many concerns have been raised by actors in the forestry sector (See Box 1).

The moratorium principle
The moratorium on the allocation of new forest titles in the DRC is based on Ministerial Order CAB/MIN/ AF-F-T/194/MAS/02 of 14 May 2002, which suspended the granting of new forestry titles. This decree was renewed by Article 2 of Decree 05/116 of 24 October 2005, which published the forest title conversion process and terminated unconverted titles. This Article states that any request to convert former forest titles in forest concession contracts must be requested from the Ministry in Charge of Forests, with a copy of associated documentation also being sent to the Secretary General in Charge of Forests. The moratorium is based on the idea that the country suspends the allocation of new logging titles over a certain period. However, all titles that are still valid continue to run, provided they successfully undergo conversion to a forest concession contract.

The stakes
Debate around the moratorium relates to the status of any titles returned to the State, and the decision to reallocate these titles.

The status of forest titles returned to the State by companies
The status of forest titles that have not been converted is clear -these titles fall within the domain of state forest and are subject to the moratorium. What remains uncertain is the status of converted titles that have been returned to the State by the logging company. In some cases, these titles fall under the moratorium, while in others, they are reassigned to a different company for exploitation.

The decision to reallocate concessions returned by companies
The reallocation of new forest titles in the DRC under the moratorium was conditional on the prior fulfillment of three conditions. The first was a legal framework to guarantee that forest concessions are allocated via public tender, in accordance with the provisions of Article 86 of the 2002 Forest Law. The second condition was the conversion of old forest titles into forest concession contracts, in accordance with the provisions of Article 155 of the Forest Law. To this end, an Inter-ministerial Committee was set up by Presidential Decree 06/141 of 10 November 2006, appointing members for the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Conversion of Forest Titles. The conversion process lasted almost seven years. It was completed on 29 December 2009, with the submission of a report by the Inter-ministerial Commission on Appeals Under the Procedure. The third and final condition was a three-year geographic planning of future allocations. Only this last condition remains a point of debate as some actors believe this step to have been fulfilled, while others do not.

The implications for forest governance
In 2015 and 2018, the Minister in Charge of Forests decided to allocate new forest concessions on the basis that these were not under the moratorium, as they were concessions returned to the State by forest companies unable to exploit their forest titles for various reasons. Concessions were granted to two companies -Société la Millénaire Forestière (SOMIFOR) and Forestière pour le développement du Congo -in August 2014, and more recently to Chinese companies This decision has caused outcry among national and international organizations, who have highlighted how this violates the moratorium. Their arguments reflect different interpretations of the 2002 Forest Law and its implementing texts, the ambiguity of which results in tensions between those who support the possibility of reallocation and those who advocate for the moratorium.
The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo | 15 The adoption of the 2002 Forest Code has not led to any changes in logging practices, many of which are still in violation of the law. Global Witness (2007), Counsell (2006) and Greenpeace (2007) paint a rather negative picture of forest governance in the DRC based on their observations, namely the violation of the provisions of the law, legal confusion between sets of laws, ineffectiveness of the forest verification and control system, irregularities in the logging title granting process, a lack of respect by logging companies for their social contracts with local communities, weak exploitation capacities, and a lack of appropriate human and material resources. These observations have since been confirmed by Hoare et al. (2008) and Greenpeace (2010b), who highlight many disturbing aspects of forest exploitation in the DRC with consequential impacts on social peace.
Nonetheless, some achievements have been made in terms of reducing emissions from deforestation. For example, a Cooperation Agreement was made between the DRC's Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (MECNT; now the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD)) and the World Resource Institute (WRI). This agreement aims to build capacity in cartography and geospatial forest monitoring (Mertens and Belanger 2010). This agreement will also cover aspects such as developing a process for zoning forestland and reviewing MEDD's programs.
The Voluntary Partnership Agreement-Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (VPA-FLEGT) is considered key to fighting illegal logging in the DRC and promoting forest sustainable management (REM 2011). However, the VPA-FLEGT process in the DRC is yet to produce expected outcomes.
Compared with other COMIFAC countries, forest governance in the DRC remains weak. Reasons behind this include armed conflicts and the 'politicized' process of converting old logging titles, as well as the limited government attention to forest issues, as described in later sections of this analysis.

International commitments
Figure 5 presents institutional development within the DRC's forestry sector. The DRC has signed and ratified 29 international conventions on the environment (Box 2). Although these are now part of national legislation, the country still has a long way to go before their terms are fully integrated through appropriate reforms and revisions of existing texts. Many principles resulting from this international framework are included in the 2002 Forest Code and the 2011 Law on Fundamental Principles of Environmental Protection in the DRC, such as the need to have consultation and participation in decision making, the equitable sharing of benefits from natural resource exploitation, the recognition of customary rights, the possibility for local communities to register and be delivered land titles, and access to justice for local communities in case of environmental damages.
At the international level, the DRC is member of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), which is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. As all members of UNFF, the DRC submits a periodic report on the state of forest governance in the country, however its last report was submitted almost a decade ago in 2010, and focused primarily on the issue of funding for the forestry sector. The DRC's commitment to the international forestry framework has not significantly evolved since 2013, and apart from the Paris Agreement and the DRC's INDC, declaring its emissions reduction objectives and the sectors to be targeted, the country has made no specific forestryrelated commitments at an international level. However, the DRC has expressed several general commitments that the country is aiming to accomplish over time such as (i) commitment to an investment program in the forestry sector (2010) (MEDD 2015b). According to INERA staff, there were fewer than 10 stations working in 2019 and those still functioning do not meet the requirements of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). According to the last national climate communication document, only the system at N'djili Airport in Kinshasa meets current WMO requirements. No system is available to gather data securely, which means that the institutions in charge are unable to provide accurate analyses, produce exhaustive meteorological and climaterelated information on the country, or to confirm satellite data with field observations. As a result, the DRC is unable to meet its commitment to transfer climate-related data to international agencies and contribute to global efforts.

Commitments to provide climate information.
By committing to provide climate information, the DRC promised to exchange scientific, technological, socioeconomic and legal data on climate change both at national and international levels. MEDD (2015b) highlights that the DRC is not part of the world meteorological communication system because of its current situation, although it still tries to share its available information with the world network. The partnership with INERA allows MEDD to benefit from the 27 agro-climatic stations used for agricultural research as part of a pilot project within the national adaptation plan, known as the National Action Program for Adaptation to Climate Change/Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation (aux Changements Climatiques)/ Adaptation du Secteur Agricole (PANA/ASA). MEDD also benefits from data from the Congolese Nature Conservation Institute (Institut Congolais de Conservation de la Nature, ICCN), which owns climatological equipment in the protected areas under their control. However, the weakness of intersectoral collaboration and the lack of data from other development sectors hampers the country's capacity to fulfill its commitment to provide exhaustive climate information. As an example, the 2019 World Trade Report (WTO 2019) lacked the main data on the DRC needed to produce a full exhaustive report section on the country. As such, the DRC cannot rely on available information to anticipate impacts and inform neighboring countries of the potential impacts of its various emissions. It is also unable to effectively monitor the biodiversity of the whole country. Because of the porosity of the borders it shares with nine countries, the DRC cannot provide international conventions with statistics on the total quantities of products imported according to the Montreal Protocol. The DRC was among the first countries to submit a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) within the framework of the Paris Agreement, however it remains difficult to anticipate the country's capacity to provide information on its adaptations to climate change, in fulfillment of the conditions of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.
Commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The DRC has committed to processes that aim to reduce its emissions and enhance carbon stocks, i.e. the REDD+ program (see Chapter 4), but a systematic assessment on the impacts of these processes is lacking (Malchair 2 016).
Commitment to take measures for adaptation to climate change. The first adaptation project, known as the National Action Program for Adaptation to Climate Change/Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation (aux Changements Climatiques)/Adaptation du Secteur Agricole (PANA/ASA), designed in 2009, was mainly oriented toward the agriculture sector and benefited from USD 3,148,000 in funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Global Environment Fund (GEF) and the national government. The results of this project were presented in the project's final report by PNUD et al. (2015), but the measures anticipated in the report have not since been taken.
Commitment to international and national cooperation on climate change. The DRC has made strong commitments to enhance international and national cooperation in terms of addressing climate change. However, the DRC's cooperation with its neighboring countries is less visible as each country struggles to handle its own situation. Likewise, cooperation between central and provincial levels of government, both across and within provinces, remains challenging.

Commitments to climate change funding.
While REDD+ actors argue that the fight against climate change in developing countries should be financially supported by developed countries Kengoum 2019), the DRC aims to internalize, as far as possible, the costs of fighting climate change, committing, for example, USD 3 million of 'in-kind support' to the PANA-ASA project (PNUD et al. 2015). In line with this approach, the DRC is prioritizing existing bilateral funding mechanisms, and continues to create new financial mechanisms, like FONAREDD. This commitment includes a regular inventory of needs and funding received. A few studies have tried to compile these data, but have been limited to specific policy processes, such as REDD+.
Commitment to improve national climate governance. This commitment involves encouraging the participation of non-governmental actors in policy-making processes related to climate change. REDD+ and related processes like VPA-FLEGT require this participation and set conditions for it, including the participation of indigenous communities with their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Improving national governance also entails recognizing the identity of local communities and indigenous peoples. Local communities are recognized by law in the DRC, but the fight to recognize Pygmies is still underway.
The State also aims to resolve conflicts related to environmental management, by establishing mechanisms to facilitate access to information. These mechanisms are still under discussion, and most conflicts are resolved using traditional administrative or judicial procedures. Access to information is still challenging, as the DRC has not signed or ratified the 1998 Aarhus Convention which establishes certain public rights to the environment, with a particular focus on access to information and justice.

Sub-regional commitments via COMIFAC and other international environmental initiatives
On 31 December 2009, the DRC parliament ratified the 2005 Treaty on the Conservation and Sustainable Management of the Forest Ecosystem of Central Africa and a related convergent plan, as well as a sub-regional agreement on forest control in Central Africa, sub-regional directives for the sustainable management of non-wood forest products of plant origin in Central Africa, and sub-regional directives for the participation of local indigenous peoples and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in the sustainable forest management of Central Africa. The DRC also attends meetings of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP), launched in 2002; this brings together governments, donors, international organizations, NGOs, scientific institutions and private sector actors working with the Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC), so as to promote the conservation and sustainable management of the Congo Basin's forest ecosystems. The DRC participates to share its experience of REDD+, as well as to get the input and support of other stakeholders. Since 2013, the DRC has been involved in many initiatives aiming at protecting its forest cover. The most important are the following: • Agreement on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). To allow the agreement to be signed in 2013, a Technical Commission for VPA Negotiations with the European Union (EU) was actively engaged in preparatory activities (e.g. finalizing the legality framework and legality verification procedures, negotiating sessions with the European Commission). Negotiations were then suspended by the European Commission for political reasons, including the decline of the European-DRC timber market, and the question of land conversion, which is the main factor behind deforestation. As an approach to respond to the challenges of forest governance in the DRC, however, the Voluntary Partnership Agreement remains relevant. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) has provided funding for the FLEGT process in the DRC to resume. This funding supports a FLEGT facilitator and uses the Technical Commission's work for negotiations (Sansa 2017). However, the increasing exports of wood to non-EU member countries not bound by the EU FLEGT process could negatively impact the efficiency of this instrument in terms of improving forest governance. • National framework for the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The country has produced a national monograph of biological diversity, a national strategy and an action plan. More importantly, the current New Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) (2016-2020) clearly mentions the synergy between REDD+ and biodiversity conservation.
• The process of formulating a land policy document. The DRC has not finalized a land policy document since its independence. A National Land Reform Commission (La Commission Nationale de la Réforme Foncière, CONAREF) has now been set up and, since 2014, has been engaged in reforming land sector governance overall. A National Land Policy document is one of the three main deliverables of this process; the remaining two deliverables are the drafting of a revised law on land and its main implementation texts, and the modernization of the land administration process. In June 2018, a national forum, gathering over 400 participants from all provinces and representing all stakeholders in the land reform process, was held in the former Bukavu and South Kivu provinces. This resulted in the formulation of different options for the National Land Policy. An expert write-shop has subsequently been held in Kinshasa to transform these options into a draft National Land Policy document. A countrywide consultation exercise on this document is currently underway, as a prerequisite for adoption, before it is submitted to the government. The vision of policymakers is that this land policy document will be useful for at least the next 100 years. • Other efforts to improve forest governance.

Box 2. International environmental conventions that have been ratified by the DRC
Over the last 15 years, a legal review of forest titles has been conducted, and a number of texts have been produced to support implementation of the 2002 Forest Code. The legal review of forest titles involved reviewing the consistency of existing forest concession titles, and examining the effective implementation of contract terms signed with regards to these concessions. To ensure effective implementation of the 2002 Forest Code, over 40 implementation texts have been signed and adopted. To improve transparency, the DRC recruited an independent observer of forest exploitation operations (Resource Extraction Monitoring, REM) and a specialized company, Société Générale de Surveillance, to establish a strong control system for timber extraction and marketing, and a timber traceability chain. However, in the DRC as in many African countries, environment-related policy reforms take a long time to achieve (Karsenty 2016). One reason is that the policies are intended to be implemented over long periods of time, as is the case of the DRC's Land Policy which will apply until 2100. This may impair the ability of sectoral policies to adapt to fast-changing sociopolitical contexts, resulting in policy documents that are outdated, sometimes before they are even completed or effectively implemented.  The results of these elections show that 20 out of 26 provinces are now controlled by candidates from the presidential majority. In the same way, many special commissioners, initially in charge of provisional administration, were then elected as governors of the provinces where they acted as temporary administrators.

Decentralization
For some analysts (Luntumbue 2016), the reform was initiated without considering new financing needs. One of the problems that arose is the distribution of resources among the new provinces. The division of territories is also not totally unanimous. Some indigenous peoples' associations demonstrated in December 2014 to oppose the merging of their entity with the new Lualaba province (Makal 2014). Another controversy relating to the delineation of border boundaries was between the provinces of North and South Kivu, where there is disagreement about accessing resources in adjoining areas of the two provinces.
Ultimately, province autonomy has not been effective. The logic for accessing central government resources remains that of competition. Political patronage seems to be a determining factor in the capacity of a province to mobilize resources from central government or draw central government's interest toward development issues in the decentralized provinces. Generally, the stronger the governors' personal connections with actors in central government -from a purely political perspective -the more they are able to draw financial resources to their province. This situation leads to inequalities in the treatment of different provinces by central government, resulting in strong disparity in the level of development among provinces and in the capacity of new provinces to assume their administration and the management of their development.

Decentralization in the forestry sector
Decentralized forest governance is at the core of the DRC's 2002 Forest Code. The Constitution and laws on decentralization (Table 8), and the Forest Code (Table 9) distribute responsibilities between central, provincial and local governance, breaking down forest management into exclusive and shared remits.    Mpoyi et al. (2013) also discuss the difficulties of implementing decentralized forest governance in the DRC and highlight a lack of common understanding around the provisions of the law. Provinces complain that key decisions over forest-land classification, such as the creation of protected areas or changes to industrial use are taken at the central level, while resulting conflicts are left for them to manage. There is permanent tension between the three levels of governance.
Provincial and local-level management of natural resources is not uniformly structured across the country (Kengoum 2014). The influence of the Governor's Office is significant in forest management decisions, to the detriment of sectoral administration in charge of the environment and/or forests. The experience of community forestry decision making speaks for itself. In some provinces, most decisions concerning the allocation of space to communities for community forestry have essentially been taken by the cabinet of the governor in the province, to the detriment of the technical services mandated for this.

Financial decentralization and revenue-sharing
Financial decentralization. According to the DRC's Constitution and law, decentralized government units have separate finances, to ensure the financial autonomy of decentralized territorial entities. This means that certain costs previously borne by the central government are now transferred to the provinces themselves. To remedy any inequalities arising from the development of provinces and decentralized territorial entities, the Constitution stipulates that 40% of national revenue is withheld at source and put into a national equalization fund (Caisse nationale de péréquation) for redistribution.
As well as altering the costs borne by the provinces, analysis by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) (2017) concluded that establishing the new provinces has likewise altered the distribution of revenue from natural resource exploitation. It is now the responsibility of the newly-created provinces to ensure revenues from natural resources effectively contribute to the development of their provinces. As the new  (26) provinces become established, how viable the sharing of resources is, becomes a question. The most financially endowed provinces are those which existed under the previous structure of provinces, whereas newly-created provinces lack infrastructure, and sometimes resources, to generate the income needed for their development (Luntumbue 2016). It is expected that the national equalization fund will help improve their capacity to generate their own income from various sources, including the exploitation of natural resources. However, the functioning of this fund is unclear and it is difficult to determine the real contribution it could bring to the development of the new provinces.
It is clear from the Maï-Ndombe REDD+ Jurisdictional Project why support to the provinces is necessary; despite their weak administrative capacity, particularly where newly-created provinces are concerned, they need to maintain full ownership over the forest emissions reduction program for REDD+ to be effective(World Bank 2018) as they will receive some of the payments resulting from emission reductions made within the provinces.

Benefit-sharing schemes in natural resources management
Various benefit-sharing schemes could provide insights to inform the design of a specific REDD+ revenue-sharing structure. The DRC government has experience in systems relating to natural resource access, likewise the legal frameworks of the DRC's mining and forestry sectors also have experience in sharing revenue that could be applied to REDD+. In both, social corporate responsibility is focused around the local communities closest to the title being exploited. Responsibilities include road construction and improvements, the renovation and equipping of hospitals and schools, and transport. Both forest and mining legal frameworks put in place a fee according to the land being allocated, of which 40% is paid to the decentralized territorial entities that supply the wood or mining products, and 60% is paid to the Public Treasury. By law, the 40% must be specifically used for social welfare investments in local communities.
One point of note, however, is that the taxation provision of the 2018 Amended Mining Code has increased the tax base from that in the 2002 Mining Code, with average rates of taxation now between 48-72% for copper/cobalt, and 55-95% for gold, far above international norms. According to Lassourd (2018), this could negatively impact the development of the mining sector and lead to conflicts as companies call for enforcement of the 2002 Mining Code's Stability Clause.
Although the DRC's oil sector is not legally obliged to share its revenue and contribute to local development, the sector has also employed successful revenue-sharing schemes, e.g. Muanda in Bas-Congo. As reported by Mingashanga (2009), the oil company PERENCO paid local communities up to USD 240,000 a year, of which USD 150,000 was automatically allocated to social development projects negotiated with surrounding communities. This arrangement resulted from an agreement dated 9 August 1969, between the DRC and Chevron, which later sold out to PERENCO. It is not clear today whether this continues to function, but it is a success story that has lessons for REDD+.

Land governance, carbon rights and indigenous rights
Land governance is an important issue in discussions on REDD+ (Davis et al. 2009). Cotula and Mayers (2009) highlight that a lack of clarity in land tenure rights could jeopardize expected results. Sufficient knowledge about the context and dynamics in the DRC is therefore key.

General framework for land management
Land management in the DRC is organized according to Law No.073-021 of 20 July 1973, amended and completed by the 18 July 1980 Law. These laws put the State as owner of all lands (Article 53). Land in the DRC is structured as presented in Table 10.
According to the legal framework for land tenure in the DRC, only a registration certificate delivered by the authorized civil servant, namely the 'Conservateur des Titres Immobiliers', proves legal ownership of land and its immovable properties, as well as the existence of the various land concessions. As highlighted above, rights to land (ii) rights to rural lands that belong to local communities under customary law; and (iii) rights to rural land concessions. The dynamics underlying these scenarios make local communities' rights over land in rural areas precarious, as customary law gives individual community members usufruct rights, but not ownership rights to the community lands (Vermeulen et al. 2011). This precariousness is exacerbated by the fact that land law in the DRC is not yet part of a clearly formulated policy, however since 2017, momentum has been building to equip the country with a land policy document that incorporates emerging dynamics, such as REDD+ implementation.

The framework for forest management in the DRC
The 2002 Forest Code organizes forest management in the DRC. It distributes forest into various categories (Table 11) and sets out conditions for the access and exploitation of various forest resources. Article 22 of the Forest Code recognizes the State's property rights and also acknowledges customary land rights in the various categories of forests. As such, the State is committed to consulting local communities and indigenous peoples, and compensating losses that may result from the creation of certain classes of forest, like protected areas and permanent production forest. Local communities are entitled to request and obtain forest concessions under the legal framework, as described in Section 3.4 of this document. Management of the process that converts forest lands to other uses is a clear concern of the Forest Law. Article 52 requires that any actors that cause deforestation must provide compensation and support the costs of reforestation, of equivalent quality and land area to the initial forest cover. Activities concerned include mining, industry, urban development, tourism and agriculture, after a permit is issued and related tax is paid. Half of this tax is dedicated to reforestation initiatives.

Rights of indigenous peoples
Although the country did not sign the 1989 International Labor Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169, in 2007, the DRC signed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the main international instrument related to the rights of indigenous peoples. At COMIFAC level, the DRC has signed sub-regional directives on the participation of local and indigenous peoples and NGOs in the sustainable management of forests in Central Africa.
Pygmies are the main indigenous peoples in the DRC; they are hunter-gatherers who were among the first communities to settle in the Congolese territory (Bahuchet 1996). Despite this, the DRC government does not officially recognize Pygmies as an indigenous group and does not accord them specific status. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in any sectoral law governing natural resources in the country. The Constitution advocates for equality among all citizens, but this fails to resolve the inequality and discrimination experienced by Pygmies in rural areas.
Debate around the recognition of Pygmies as indigenous peoples in the DRC continues, due to the efforts of national NGOs and indigenous organizations backed by international partners, including UN institutions. Despite their absence from the Constitution, Pygmies are recognized as indigenous peoples in the Forest Code and other sectoral laws. Mpoyi et al. (2013) describe efforts to bring this issue into the debate around forest management in the DRC. Ultimately, local communities and indigenous peoples are entitled to a number of rights provided for by national forest regulations, rights upon which REDD+ will have to rely when defining indigenous peoples' rights, as shown in Box 3.

National management of carbon
The status of carbon within the REDD+ mechanism remains a preoccupation in the DRC. Various studies and tools under development, that are meant to provide a clear view on this issue, have not reached conclusions about how carbon will be treated under REDD+ within the DRC. An important question is who owns the carbon rights. At a national level, the debate has not evolved since the first version of this document. The logic governing discussion remains that of

Box 3. Indigenous peoples' rights to customary ownership of land and forests
The right to establish and live on their land The right to exploit according to their customary laws The right to derive personal economic benefits from land and forests The right to be consulted in all land and forest management processes The right to access justice in claiming damages, in cases of failure to consider the safeguards provided for by laws and regulations The right to derive their livelihood resources from forest biodiversity The right to give consent to all customary land-allocation processes The right to participate in decision-making processes that would affect their lands/forests, or themselves as communities The right to prior, fair and equitable compensation in the case of expropriation for public purpose and, as such, should be treated in a similar way to any other product resulting from production activity. The DRC continues to vacillate between carbon as a natural resource and carbon stock as the result of an investment or effort. Because of this, any reduced emissions credit is to be issued to the investor, through the national REDD+ registry. At the international level, learning from the experience of other countries, a right-based approach is being adopted. Loft et al. (2015) use a framework that combines benefit sharing, carbon rights and implementation costs to assess the national carbon rights legislation of various countries, including another country in the Congo Basin. They observe that the experience of the REDD+ countries studied demonstrates a clear connection between carbon rights and land rights. As such, efforts to clarify any rights to carbon cannot be disconnected to broader tenure reform, as well as administrative capacity to implement the legal framework. The question therefore is not just one of policy, it also depends on the politics of land tenure.

Social forestry: Policy processes, institutions and their relevance for REDD+
Social forestry in the DRC has shown great potential since community forestry tools have been put in place (Vermeulen and Karsenty 2014).

Community forestry
Community forestry is not a new concept in forest management, but its implementation in the DRC is relatively new. Three texts now give it a legal basis. The first is Article 22 of the 2002 Forest Law, which provides for community forestry when it recognizes the customary possession of forests by local communities, and the possibility of securing the 'forest concessions of local communities'. The second is the Prime Minister's Decree Number 14/018 of 2 August 2014, defining a system for allocating forest concessions to local communities. The third is Ministerial Order 025 which lays down specific provisions relating to the management and operations of local communities' forest concessions. As a whole, community forestry is guided by a national strategy, which is the result of a process that culminated in August 2017. The DRC is the last of the COMIFAC countries to put in place a comprehensive legal framework for local communities to manage their own forests. Through these various texts, local communities can now hold forests of up to 50,000 hectares indefinitely, and for multiple uses.
The national vision of community forestry in the DRC is to give local communities and indigenous peoples a special position in local forest governance, and to recognize and strengthen their rights with the purpose of sustainable and equitable management, including improvement of their living conditions (MEDD 2018). The community forestry model differs from other models of forest management, by recognizing the multiple uses of community forests, and letting communities' customary rules apply to their management. In doing so, the DRC is bringing community forestry closer to a traditional model of natural resource management, which is globally recognized as improving the sustainability of natural resources.

Policy processes for the community forestry strategy
The process of setting up the institutional and regulatory framework for community forestry in the DRC took about 15 years, from adoption of the Forest Code in August 2002 to formulation of the strategy on community forestry in August 2017. A major tool for this reform is the Multi-stakeholder Round The concept of the Multi-stakeholder Roundtable in the DRC was formulated in 2015, as a proactive response of civil society organizations (CSOs). It is a unique national platform for consultation, coordination and dialogue among various community forestry actors, including women's organizations, indigenous peoples' groups and national authorities (RFUK 2018). Its purpose is to enable dialogue, experience sharing and joint learning, bringing together different stakeholders in community forestry to make decisions by consensus (MEDD 2018). The Multi-stakeholder Roundtable is coordinated by the Centre d'Appui à la gestion durable des forêts tropicales and is supported by Rainforest Foundation UK, WRI, USAID, DFID and MEDD, with technical support via the Community Forestry Division.
The Multi-stakeholder Roundtable ensures that any risks relating to the implementation of community forestry do not distort the objectives of the concept. Risks listed by MEDD (2018) include: (i) limited technical and operational capacity in central, provincial and local forestry administrations and accompanying NGOs to promote the development of community forestry; (ii) insufficient financial and technical resources to support the process at all levels; (iii) a push by technical and financial partners for community forestry resulting in a disproportionate number of local communities' forest concessions and a complete lack of control of the process and its development; (iv) inequitable and unfair sharing of benefits arising from implementation of community forestry projects in the DRC; (v) insufficient public participation, characterized by the absence of a proven dialogue and effective coordination between actors; (vi) capture of the benefits of community forestry by elites, and the subsequent marginalization of the main beneficiaries; (vii) proposed legal architecture that may be constrained by local realities; and (viii) a resurgence of conflicts as a result of implementing community forestry.

Actors within social forestry
The Community Forestry Division, a subunit of the Directorate General of Forests within MEDD, oversees implementation of community forestry. However, many stakeholders are involved in community forestry in the DRC, including local communities, indigenous Pygmy peoples, women, youth and other vulnerable and marginalized groups, local and provincial governments, CSOs, donors and other technical and financial partners, and private-sector companies (MEDD 2018).
Despite the wide variety of stakeholders, only local communities can apply for a Community Forest.
Article 1 Point 17 of the Forest Code, reiterated by Article 2 Point 3 of Decree No. 14/018, defines a 'local community' as a population traditionally organized on the basis of custom, united by clan or parental solidarity ties upon which its internal cohesion is based, and which is attached to a determined territory. Such a definition makes it necessary to clarify the specific situation of Pygmies as indigenous peoples. Their situation remains difficult because the current legal framework does not distinguish them specifically from local communities. Indeed, the Constitution advocates for equality between all people in the DRC and declares any discrimination illegal. In doing so, it gives indigenous peoples the same rights, over both forest and land, as those vested in other citizens. Yet, some risks remain that could be barriers to indigenous peoples' access to community forestry. Beyond the de facto discrimination that exists and is experienced within the villages, the Forest Code distinguishes local communities from indigenous communities. As such, it opens the door to discrimination against indigenous peoples in the implementation of community forestry legislation. Reforms should mitigate this specific risk.
Decentralized local governments are also involved in community forestry, with actors including chiefs of sectors/chieftaincies, and mayors of urban/rural councils (bourgmestres). They oversee the assessment of applications for community forests by local communities, and monitor the management and exploitation of these concessions.
Provincial governments are responsible for ensuring compliance with local procedures and providing decision support to the provincial governor. The role of the provincial forest advisory council, as well as that of the provincial Minister in Charge of Forests, is not specified by texts relating specifically to community forestry. But in practice, it is expected that it is the latter who transmits applications to the provincial governor, who is the designated authority for deciding upon and, ultimately, awarding community forestry concessions.
The technical and financial support role of NGOs and other partners is clearly recognized. Among the tools to facilitate community forestry, a power of attorney model is planned. This would allow communities to delegate others actors to act on their behalf in the processes of attribution, The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo | 29 management and monitoring local community forest concessions. The involvement of privatesector companies in community forests is limited by the fact that only exploitation using artisanal means is allowed. However, conservation and forest carbon stock enhancement activities may be of interest to such entrepreneurs.

Implications of community forestry for REDD+ equity in the DRC
Community forestry's maximum authorized area of 50,000 hectares, higher than that of all other countries in the sub-region, is an argument in favor for implementing REDD+ in the DRC. At scale, sustainably-managed community forest areas offer opportunities for both forest conservation and sustainable forestry. Many conservation NGOs are interested in supporting eligible local communities in the context of establishing community forests for conservation activities. Yet, community forestry also poses the risk of drifting from its original purpose. Most local communities are not yet prepared for the management of community forests so as to derive the socioeconomic and environmental benefits that the model is supposed to offer them over time. As a result, traders could enter into negotiations with communities, using community forestry as a tool to circumvent the moratorium on the allocation of new titles. Similarly, there is concern that in the provinces, the technical role of the provincial governor in the process of allocating and managing community forests is strongly influenced by the governor's politics. The conclusions of Wong et al. (2016) about social forestry remain relevant in the DRC context -understanding who is bearing the cost, integrating the realities of the specific context, and ensuring an inclusive process -will be key to achieving effective and equitable REDD+ outcomes in social forestry. It is expected that these documents will be legal validated. The OSCEP is specifically responsible for fighting corruption. However, the DRC remains hostile to an Act on the Declaration of Assets, which was rejected as being against the Constitution when submitted to the National Assembly.

The political economy of deforestation and forest degradation
The failures of the national control systems -of both parliaments and state institutions -in the fight against corruption and mismanagement of public funds, led civil society to suggest that a citizen verification mechanism was needed, involving citizen participation and mechanisms for monitoring carbon-generated revenue. This raises the issue of whether REDD+ revenue will become public or private funds, or both, depending of the beneficiary and type of payment system. As shown by Assembe -Mvondo (2015), transparency in the initial phases of REDD+ has been weak. This is feared to continue during forthcoming REDD+ activities, as the country struggles to provide existing institutions with enough resources to play their role in addressing the issue of corruption across forest and REDD+ related sectors.
Understanding the various socio-economic and political dynamics that influence the tackling of drivers of deforestation and forest degradation is key to realizing REDD+ successfully in the DRC.

The political context behind current corruption, its impact on forest governance and prospects for REDD+
The 2017 'Doing business' report ranks the DRC 187 th out of 190 countries in terms of the world's most important reformers for business climate.
In the same year, the DRC ranked 161 st out of 180 countries on a corruption perception index (Transparency International 2019). This confirms Gambino (2011)'s observations that the DRC is perceived as a country in which it is highly risky to invest. Responsible for this persistent trend are the endemic practices of corruption confirmed by Trefon (2010)'s analysis of the forestry sector.
President Kabila's proclamation of "zero tolerance for corruption" highlights political will in the DRC to improve the governance of its business environment. Actions followed that aimed to ensure effective implementation of the 2002 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, however no expected results were apparent in 2013 (Mpoyi et al. 2013

Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation -the context and impact on the REDD+ process
The DRC has gone through difficult periods since gaining its independence on the 30 June 1960. Each head of State transition has been marked by instability, affecting the whole country's governance context (Mpoyi et al. 2013 It is in this context, marked by political instability, that the REDD+ process has developed and continues to evolve in the DRC. Despite all, the DRC remains at the forefront of Congo Basin countries engaged in the process of setting up an institutional framework for REDD+. Most of the population in the DRC lives in forested areas or in areas that have been created by clearing forests. Local livelihoods are strongly connected to the exploitation of natural resources. Forest resources constitute 70% of the population's subsistence, which is based on small-scale agriculture and non-timber forest products. A breakdown of net revenue between the four main categories of actors by Lescuyer et al. (2014) shows that rural population earn more than 50% of their revenue from working in sawmills that clear timber from forests in the DRC. Because of a lack of infrastructure (roads, seaports, navigable waterways) and the biophysical configuration of the country, most forested spaces in the DRC cannot be exploited (Mpoyi et al. 2013), meaning the informal sector dominates forest-related activities. Figures provided by these authors in 2014 no longer reflect the reality in 2019, and are likely to have increased. Lescuyer et al. (2014) report that consultation meetings were held in 2013 and 2014 in Kinshasa and the former Orientale and Nord Kivu Provinces to discuss formalizing the sector. Actors agreed on the need for short-and/or medium-term revision of smallscale chainsaw milling regulations, to capture the reality on the ground, improve producer practices and ensure legally-produced wood was traded on national markets. Since these meetings were held, no major decision regarding these revisions has happened. The charcoal sector is facing similar issues; around 90% of the local population depends on charcoal for cooking (Schure et al. 2012). Mpoyi et al. (2013) highlight that there are significant numbers of informal workers on low salaries across all sectors. As the low salaries of these informal workers leave them vulnerable to criminal and paramilitary activities, this has negative impacts on forest cover in the DRC, as authority is weak in central and decentralized authorities that govern over these activities and dynamics.

A forest policy driven by economics
Forest regulation in the DRC is clearly oriented toward providing the international market with timber products. Various internal and external factors have led to revision of the 2002 Forest Code. From an internal perspective, the objective was to balance the forest's ecological and social functions, for forest administration to "substantially contribute to national development" and for local communities to actively participate in forest management and ensure legitimate benefits from forests. From an external perspective, the Code was revised to comply with international environmental framework requirements. This was largely supported by international partners who acknowledged the neopatrimonial management of the country's forests during the Mobutu regime (Debroux et al. 2007;Sakata 2007;Trefon 2008), which led to abusive exploitation of forest resources, biodiversity and financial losses by both local communities and the State. For many actors, the reform led to a legal framework where the focus of forest resource management is now more on the distribution of forest revenue rather than on biodiversity protection (Karsenty 2005(Karsenty , 2006Greenpeace 2007Greenpeace , 2010b.
The 2002 Code brought a new dynamic to the forest economy by providing a political framework for forest management. This framework has been strengthened by the signing of Order No. 025/ CAB/MIN/ECN-DD/CJ/00/RBM/2016 of 9 February 2016, on community forestry in the DRC. By introducing a sustainable management system, public authorities are trying to reconcile goals that are usually contradictory, in terms of the ecological, economic and social roles of forest resources. This vision is visible in the distribution of forest into domains with specific roles, as described earlier.
Today, the industrial forestry sector is competing with the informal sector in the DRC. The latter supplies both the growing domestic demand, and that of certain neighboring countries (Benneker 2012;Lescuyer et al. 2012). In this situation, it is difficult to carry out a clear evaluation of the production of artisanal forest operations. As a result, there is an information gap on the real economic value of forest in the country. However, Lescuyer et al. (2012) estimated it at over 2.4 million m 3 of wood per year. This figure is over six times the volume produced by the formal sector.
Population movements described by Mpoyi et al. (2013) from Katanga to Kasai, and the hinterland east to west displacements, along with increasing population growth (Table 13) also continue to put pressure on forest resources.

Sectoral policies leading to deforestation
Agriculture, energy and mining policies all have significant impact on forests, and if not aligned with forest policy objectives, can lead to deforestation and forest degradation.

Agricultural policy
Current agricultural policy in the DRC has developed over many years and remains highly connected to the national rural development policy. Nowadays, agricultural policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is separate from the Ministry in Charge of Rural Development, although both were previously under the same ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.
The agricultural sector in the DRC has decreased in importance in recent years. Agricultural GDP per inhabitant dropped by 40%, although it still accounts for 40% of GDP and employs 70% of the population (Mpoyi et al. 2013). The ambitious agricultural sector objectives of the 2017-2021 PNSD have since been replaced by the revised 2019-2023 PNSD. The strategy of the 2013 National Agriculture Investment Plan (Plan National D'Investissement Agricole/PNIA), implemented between 2013-2020, is based on five programs: (1) promotion of sustainability across the agricultural sector and agri-business; (2) management of food and nutritional security and strategic reserves; (3) agricultural research development, dissemination, and professional training for various actors; (4) governance, gender, human and institutional capacity building within agriculture; and (5) adaptation to climate change (MeAdD 2013). The PNIA aligns to the provisions of Law No. 11/022 of 24 December 2011 which sets the reference framework that all agricultural activities must align and comply with. The objectives this law sets for the agriculture sector are to: (1) facilitate the optimization of potential; (2) stimulate agricultural production through the introduction of a special customs and tax regime; (3) revive agricultural exports to generate significant resources and new investments; (4) stimulate the domestic agricultural processing industry; and (5) attract new renewable energy technology.
Two institutions have been established to support rural development initiatives. The first, created in 2017, is a national agency for establishing and coordinating the centers for integrated development; the second, created in 2018, is the Pilot Committee of the Territorial Development Project. The objective of the Pilot Committee is to ensure coordination of government interventions at the provincial level and avoid any overlap and duplication of state actions. The national agency is more focused on the coordination of rurally-implemented initiatives that are related to natural resources exploitation. At the time of our data collection, these institutions were not fully operational, and so results remain to be seen.

Energy policy
Energy policy in the DRC is split into electrical and domestic energy. Electrical energy largely relies on the country's enormous hydroelectric potential while domestic energy relies mostly on fuelwood and charcoal, with 99% of the population using wood and charcoal for cooking (Kengoum 2014. As highlighted by Mpoyi et al. (2013), energy demand in the DRC was estimated to be 8 million tons of oil equivalent in 2007, almost entirely supplied through four energy sources: (1) wood, 85%; (2) electricity, 6%; (3) petroleum products, 8%; and (4) charcoal, 0.1% (Kasemuana 2009). Management of these sources is distributed between two different ministries: the Ministry in Charge of Energy and the Ministry in Charge of Environment and Sustainable Development.
The DRC's electricity potential is based on the capacity of the Congo river. This is estimated at over 100,000 MW, distributed across 780 sites in 145 territories and 76,000 villages (Table 14). This potential represents 66% of Central Africa's potential, 37% of the Africa's, and 6% of the world's total potential (ANAPI 2016). Despite this potential, access to hydroelectricity within the DRC is very low (9.6%).
As one of the cleanest forms of energy, the hydroelectricity potential of the DRC, if well governed, has great potential to reverse the curve of population pressure on the forest, in terms of its demand for wood energy. The vision of the DRC's energy policy is to provide the entire country with hydroelectricity. According to the program ending in 2030, in which renewable sources of energy are promoted, a total of 55 hydroelectric sites will be developed at a cost of USD 650 million. According to Mpoyi et al. (2013), the DRC could replace much of the DRC's 85% fuelwood energy use with hydroelectricity, to reduce pressures on forest resources. Promoting the energy sector within the framework of REDD+ in the DRC is then key to achieving national emissions reduction objectives.

Mining policy
The DRC is richly endowed with important mineral resources. Mining operations and mineral production in the DRC contribute a significant amount to national GDP and have increased over time (Table 15). Mining area expansion due to increasing interest and capacity (Jackson 2001;Heydenrich 2008;International Alert 2009;Jacquemot 2009; Geenen and Stefaan 2016) might put further pressure on forests.
In 2002, the country adopted a Mining Code, with the support of the Bretton Woods institutions (Mazalto 2008). The preamble explains changes to the old law of 2 April 1981, and clearly states that the state regulator will incentivize private investment in the mining sector (Mazalto 2009

Pressure from international demand
Developed countries are working hard to secure their supply of raw products. The DRC has a vast reservoir of natural resources, and must deal with multiple competing demands from international companies. Exports provide the DRC with the resources needed to achieve its development objectives. Dependence of the DRC on the international market remains relatively high, increasing from 11% in 2000 to 36% in 2013 (World Bank 2015). The mining sector (including oil), represents 90% of exports from the DRC (Direction Générale du Trésor 2020).
Most exported natural resources are directly exploited by foreign companies that are granted titles. Today, European companies compete with Chinese companies, with Chinese companies importing half the DRC's stocks of cobalt production in 2016. It is expected that China will continue investing in the DRC to secure the market (MINFINRDC 2016). The export value of mining products in the DRC has grown in recent years as data from 2005 to 2015 shows (Table 16). International demand is also putting pressure on the forest resources. There is growing discourse about the 2002 moratorium. Some actors suggest that it has weakened the contribution of the wood sector to the national economy in the DRC. A recent debate regarding timber exportation, reported by Radio France International, discussed a National Investigation Agency interdiction on the export of unprocessed timber logs (Fages 2017). This interdiction did not comply with the 2002 Forest Code. The 2002 moratorium has reduced timber exports from the DRC, and it is expected that lifting this moratorium will increase timber demand from the international market. Recent developments in the DRC are marked by a failed attempt to reform the Forest Law, with the ultimate goal of lifting the moratorium on the allocation of new forest titles. Pressures on the DRC's forests are increased by Chinese companies trying to take hold of the mining, agriculture and forestry sectors. These pressures add to difficulties in the VPA-FLEGT negotiations between the DRC and European Union.
In summary, the biggest threat to forest cover is through its conversion to other land uses such as mining, agriculture and energy. Neglecting to consider these land uses may hinder successful implementation of REDD+ in the country. When looking at the political economy of deforestation and forest degradation, there appear to be conflicting objectives between the REDD+ mechanism and sectoral policies that promote investment and economic development over biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management. This highlights a lack of intersectoral coherence and coordination. This situation makes for challenges in the establishment and implementation of REDD+: for REDD+ to succeed in the DRC, considerable investment is needed in mining and the energy sector so as to change the energy profile of the country, as well as in the agriculture sector to encourage practices which contribute to REDD+ activities. These sectors do not fall under the responsibility of the Ministry in Charge of the Forestry Sector, and the present level of intersectoral cooperation and participation in REDD+ is insufficient to induce the needed changes.

Forest companies and corporate social responsibility
Forestry revenues for local and indigenous communities are not limited to those from community forestry. The development of local and indigenous communities also depends on the contribution of forestry companies, through negotiated corporate social responsibility investments that directly benefit nearby communities. The 2002 Forest Law, Article 89 outlines "a special clause relating to the construction of socioeconomic infrastructures for the benefit of the local communities, especially: i) construction, road development; ii) repair, equipment of sanitary and school facilities; and iii) facilities for the transport of persons and goods." The practicalities of this clause are specified in Article 17 of Ministerial Order 036/CAB/MIN/ ECN-EF/06 of 05 October 2006, which lays down procedures for drawing up, approving and implementing management plans for timber forest concessions. The text states that the concessionaire must consult local communities, with a view to reaching an agreement on the specifics of the social obligations, or other elements of the management plan that directly concern the local population.
Such a clause is important for people-centered forest governance. When implementation conditions are fulfilled, it allows a more equal relationship between forest concessionaires and communities bordering exploited titles. A study carried out by Tsanga et al. (2020), which looked at 19 forest concessions, highlighted an absence of conflicts relating to forest companies' compliance with the social obligations set out in the 2002 Forest Law.
A decade after the DRC committed to REDD+, REDD+ implementation has tested the country's capacity to reinvent natural resource management policy. It is particularly challenging to coordinate the actions of diverse actors, from national to local level, on complex issues in a country marked by political instability. • An Inter-ministerial Committee, consisting of the ministries in charge of the environment, agriculture, land tenure, urbanization, rural development, land-use planning, finance, mining and energy. Together they plan implementation of the National Committee's decisions and share responsibilities. This Committee is also in charge of identifying and recruiting national and international expertise for the successful implementation of REDD+. • The National Coordination team, which is headed by a National REDD+ coordinator. Their role is to manage REDD+ on a daily basis, formulate propositions for experts and recruit as necessary. They coordinate the process and ensure coherence with other existing initiatives and donors to facilitate a participative approach to the REDD+ process.

REDD+ actors, events and political processes
The same 2009 Decree places REDD+ in the DRC under the Ministry in Charge of Environment and Sustainable Development, primarily under the Division of Sustainable Development (DDD). Under the DDD, the national REDD+ coordination is structured as in Figure 7.
The financial mechanics of REDD+ in the DRC is built around the National REDD+ Fund, which is part of the National REDD+ Strategy. Under the Ministry in Charge of Finance, this fund channels REDD+ investments, payments for environmental services and financial resources from REDD+ carbon credits. The structure of the Fund is as presented in Figure 8.

REDD+ actors
Nationally, REDD+ policy in the DRC involves various groups of actors: The DRC government. Close to 20 ministries participate in the REDD+ mechanism, led by MEDD. Thirty thematic working groups have

The REDD+ policy environment: Actors, events and political processes
The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo | 41   been established with responsibility for making analyses and proposing practical measures that can contribute toward the national REDD+ strategy. These groups are multi-stakeholder initiatives, supervised by ministry representatives. They ensure that their proposals are in line with the government's directives for each ministry concerned. Table 17 lists the ministries involved.
Although these ministries are part of thematic working groups, their specific role as far as REDD+ is concerned remains unclear, as no framework, including the National REDD+ Framework Strategy, gives a clear indication. These thematic working groups are an innovation in the policy environment. They seek consensus about the National REDD+ Strategy through a consultative process where stakeholders discuss and formulate norms and recommendations that can only be challenged via the same consensual process. This platform was established with the intention of building trust among actors in the policy domain.
MEDD oversees REDD+ activities in the DRC via the General Secretary for the Ministry in Charge of Environment and the National REDD+ Coordination. However, coordinating government action remains challenging as far as REDD+ is concerned. These challenges have increased more recently; the legitimacy of the National REDD+ Coordination in overseeing REDD+ daily activities is questioned by the REDD+ community, and the Minister in Charge of Environment rarely intervenes. The change in government has led to changes in both government structures and individuals. It is hoped that the newly-appointed government will be able to collaborate with the coalitions set up by the former president to meet REDD+ objectives.
Civil society. Civil society involvement in REDD+ has undergone many transformations over the years. Representatives were originally involved in the Climate-REDD Working Group (RCWG), which has now evolved to become the Renewed Climate-REDD Working Group. The group aims to structure and support CSO participation in REDD+ and the country's negotiations on climate change, as well as to monitor compliance with international and national REDD+ models (Mpoyi et al. 2013). There are many influential civil society networks in the DRC; these include networks of  Civil society dynamics are not challenge free. Conflicts around finances remain at the center of many observed disagreements, including those that split the RCWG. Similarly, as Kabamba (2017) highlights, civil society in the DRC is characterized by the rapid proliferation of new organizations, which is a clear obstacle to any attempt to coordinate action throughout a territory as vast as the DRC. However, networks of indigenous peoples' organizations -like REPALEF and the National League of Associations for the Indigenous Pygmy of Congo (Ligue Nationale des Associations des Autochtones Pygmées du Congo, LYNAPICO) -mobilize their own funding. Since 2013, REPALEF has received USD 2 million from the World Bank through VERITAS, an organization which represents REPALEF because they lack proof of their financial capacity to manage such significant financial resources.
Financial partners. In its early phases, REDD+ in the DRC benefited from the financial support of the United Nations-REDD Programme (UN-REDD+) via specialized institutions working closely with the World Bank and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF); these institutions included the UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The main donor at this stage was the Norwegian Government. Today, CAFI funding of USD 200 million is the main resource supporting REDD+ in the DRC. Many organizations, such as the WWF, working in the field have their own funding sources that are additional to the official support to the government.

The emergence of other financial partners.
In the investment phase of REDD+, certain financial partners like the UNDP emerged to support the implementation of projects to test tools developed by the National REDD+ Coordination, under the National REDD+ Framework Strategy. Six governments provided financial support in the REDD+ investment phase in the DRC, under the CAFI initiative: this totaled totaling USD 200 million, which comprised of USD 190 million through the Fund's financial mechanism, and USD 10 million of additional financing, including USD 4 million from the French Development Agency (AFD). Of the back of this, CAFI supports eight integrated REDD+ projects in the provinces of Maï Ndombe, Kwilu, South Ubangi, Équateur, Mongala, Bas Uele, Tshoppo and Ituri (FONAREDD 2018 However, as the process moved on, these actors did not invest in REDD+ as expected. Only Ecosystem Restoration Associates Inc. (ERA-Congo), a subsidiary of Wildlife Works Carbon (WWC), have invested in a REDD+ project. WWC is specialized in investing in the carbon market, but it is not a company with the same profile as the companies represented by the FIB and FEC.

Main events
The DRC initially planned its REDD+ calendar in four phases (Figure 9). These phases were aimed at achieving coordination, providing overall supervision, education, information, communication and consultations, mobilizing communities and implementing REDD+. The DRC has now completed the phases of initialization (Phase 0) and readiness preparation (Phase 1), and is anticipating Phase 2, the investment phase, with implementation of the Maï-Ndombe Jurisdictional REDD+ Project, validated by the FCPF in 2016.
The REDD+ preparation phase in the DRC was supposed to lead to the design of a set of tools to support REDD+ implementation (Kabengele 2017). Some of these tools have been completed: the National REDD+ Fund, the Forest Investment Plan, and the National Forest Emission Reference Level document. However, other tools are incomplete, because the National REDD+ Coordination, which is overseeing development, lacks funding. This is the case for the safeguard information system, the national REDD+ registry, the national forest monitoring system, the complaint and grievance mechanism, the benefitsharing mechanism, the social and environmental safeguards and the final national REDD+ strategy. Currently, the country is operating with a National REDD+ Framework Strategy.

Events in the investment phase (2011-2015)
The investment phase was initially planned for 2011-2015. However, the process which began with the two missions presented in Table 20, was extended beyond the two-phase process anticipated. The first phase was a joint Forest Investment Program (FIP) mission between 2011 and 2013. The second phase, between The context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo | 45

Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) prevalidation and validation workshops
February 2010 • Formulating R-PP • Pre-validating R-PP for implementation in the next three years All stakeholders

R-PP finalization, approval and publication
March 2010 • R-PP approval by the UN-REDD+ policy board and FCPF participant committee • R-PP published on 15 July 2010 All stakeholders Source: Adapted from Mpoyi et al. (2013) Mpoyi et al. (2013) 2014 and 2017, targeted implementation of measures to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. REDD+ has resulted in the ongoing implementation of investment projects to tackle direct and indirect drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in the DRC. These investments include sectoral projects with a national footprint, and integrated projects at province level. In both cases, they focus on land-use planning to sustainably manage forest resources and reduce poverty.  (Kabengele 2017). As of the end of 2019, this investment phase is ongoing and results from the field are still expected. Reasons this phase has not been completed include issues relating to the coordination of governmental action, and a lack of available study results from the National REDD+ Coordination, needed to complete the required REDD+ tools so the DRC can move from a National Framework REDD+ Strategy to a full National REDD+ Strategy.

Result-based payment phase
The result-based payment phase is where actors' efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation are rewarded. The position of the DRC government in this respect is that carbon is not a royalty but the result of action measured, notified and verified. For the 2018 -2019 phase, payments are based on performance recorded in Certified Emissions Reduction Units, issued with reference to a baseline emission level. Carbon credits are thus negotiated on a specifically identified market. The forward-looking payments will come from the World Bank's Carbon Fund and the regulated or free market. It is expected that, for the period 2018-2020, a profit-sharing plan will be designed, which also considers noncarbon benefits. Private-sector investors' share of these benefits is capped at 25% under the DRC's Emission Reductions Payment Agreement (ERPA), but this will not be the case for all projects. A complaints and grievance mechanism is also planned, which will be backed by a National REDD+ Registry (Kabengele 2017).

Participation in and access to REDD+ information
Participation in REDD+ in the DRC is organized to ensure both governmental and nongovernmental actors are consulted on the various phases of the process. Participation has evolved over time and a comprehensive assessment of participation in REDD+ related events across the whole territory is not possible. However, after the Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) was designed without the consultation of stakeholders (Mpoyi et al. 2013), stakeholder participation in all REDD+ decision-making stages has been made a key condition for the validation of early phase documents, such as the R-PP, the National REDD+ Framework Strategy and the idea notes of sector-based and integrated projects testing REDD+ options. As such, ensuring a consultative process is largely dictated by the need to comply with the international requirements of environmental democracy. Globally, there has been an increase of stakeholder participation in national REDD+ events (Kengoum 2019). Two concerns remain, however: the efficacy of this participation; and access to REDD+ information by actors. In the current situation there are four scenarios for information sharing: (1) information exists but is not always accessible to most actors; (2) information does not exist and needs to be produced, e.g. socio-anthropological data, statistics, studies; (3) there is inconsistency in access to information; and (4) mechanisms to access information are neither effective nor efficient, and there is no transparent system for disseminating information. Participation is a big challenge in a country where the State has always excluded actors like CSOs from policy making (Mpoyi et al. 2013).
Since validation of the National REDD+ Framework Strategy, it has been noted that although processes are now participative, many actor groups show insufficient capacity to effectively contribute to policy making.
CSOs and indigenous organizations primarily participate in the REDD+ process through two networks: the RCWG, created in 2009, and the more established REPALEF. These two bodies were each granted via the CAFI initiative USD 2 million to build the institutional and organizational capacity of their networks. Key outcomes of their participation, as reported by Grounded and Ndobe (2013) and UNDP-RFN (2018), include their bringing important issues into the REDD+ policy debate, from tenure rights for local and indigenous communities, to participatory land-use planning, community land management and good governance. Four challenges still face civil society in its participation in REDD+, however: • the diversity of civil society both at national and province levels, and the subsequent need to build capacity; • a lack of clear vision and objectives for civil society's participation in the process of defining policy options, for example during development of the R-PP and the National Strategy, as well as during strategic studies like on the drivers of deforestation; • weak governance, as seen through all meetings being held in Kinshasa, for example, which left organizations from the inner provinces feeling excluded from the process. • lack of technical capacity and poor communication, with the existence of two networks making report coordination even more difficult.
A lack of financial autonomy and insufficient funding from independent sources seem to be the underlying reasons for most of these shortcomings. This is the major factor diverting the considerable existing expertise away from national CSOs toward international NGOs and other institutions, which offer more attractive remuneration. The USD 2 million that was granted to RCWG and REPALEF for institutional and organizational capacity building of their networks is expected to help overcome these challenges as the capacity building programs are still underway.

Future options for REDD+ policies and processes
Preparation of the DRC's National REDD+ Strategy, initiated in 2012 following endorsement of the REDD+ Framework Strategy, is conditional on all the activities described above being successfully implemented. These activities are expected to generate the information needed to develop the REDD+ policy options. In the absence of a finalized strategy paper, the different already documents produced on the various aspects of REDD+ outline future options for REDD+ policies and processes. Here we outline these policies and processes using the following categories: eligible activities, funding options, monitoring systems, benefit sharing, participation mechanisms and institutional arrangements.

REDD+ eligible activities
The National REDD+ Framework Strategy was endorsed in November 2012 as part of the DRC's Development Strategy. It is built on seven intervention pillars that address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation: governance, land tenure, energy, demography, forests, agriculture and territory development planning (Table 21).
Pilot programs are implemented to test certain activities at scale. They aim to provide information and feedback to enrich the strategy on specific issues. The DRC FIP outlines some priority intervention zones. A total of eight integrated programs are now being implemented throughout the DRC, in Maï-Ndombe, Kwilu, Ituri, Bas Uele, Tshopo, South Ubangi, Mongala and Équateur. These are an integral part of the programming cycle approved in 2016 by the National REDD+ Steering Committee.

Funding REDD+
The DRC has developed a REDD+ Investment Plan. The first edition of this plan covered 2013-2016 with a primary aim of resourcing the fund. The country has now committed to several financing mechanisms to realize its REDD+ potential. Provincial-level integrated REDD+ programs were endorsed in 2013, and the Investment Plan was revised earlier in 2015 to serve as a programmatic framework for REDD+ investments in the DRC. The primary objective of the investment plan is now to invest USD 1 billion during 2016-2020, through a 'portfolio' approach to implementation, which will resource both national sector-based programs and integrated subnational programs. A fundamental characteristic

Agriculture
Reduce the impact of agriculture on the forest, while contributing to food security and making agriculture a pillar of the DRC's economic growth.

Energy
Reduce the contribution of unsustainably produced fuelwood, while continuing to respond to the national energy demand.

Forest
Sustainably manage forests to respond to the timber product demands of domestic, regional and international markets, while minimizing the impact on the ecosystem services provided by these forests.

Governance
Ensure good governance of the REDD+ process for an effective, cross-cutting, transparent, responsible, pragmatic, equitable and sustainable REDD+ that is based on results, information, consultation, appropriation and participation of all stakeholders.

Demography
Control the high rate of population growth to reduce pressure on forest ecosystems and actively contribute to national economic and sustainable development.

Land-use Planning
Promote an intersectoral land-use plan and design population activities, equipment and communication plans to effectively contribute to sustainable development with reduced impact on forests.
7. Land tenure Support the coordination of policy design and implementation and land access security to attract REDD+ investments and contribute to permanent reduced emissions for all stakeholders, including project stakeholders and rural households.
Source: GoDRC (2012) | 49 of REDD+ funding in the DRC is that it is dominated by international grants. Domestic resources have been particularly scarce in previous phases (Johns 2015). To date, most funding has been concentrated on preparedness and investment activities, to prepare the strategy papers that will facilitate the REDD+ mechanism becoming established across its various levels of intervention.
The main funding partners for REDD+ in the DRC are the CBFF, FCPF, UN-REDD Program, European Union and the Forest Investment Program, as well as CAFI in later phases of the national process to establish REDD+. NOVACEL and WWF also provided funding for their on-site activities.
CAFI was launched on 19 September 2015, in a side meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Its aim was to support six Congo Basin forest countries, including the DRC, to act on the drivers of deforestation in an integrated and crosscutting way. CAFI funding supports a National Investment Plan, carried out by a government entity in charge of the coordination of funding and reforms. CAFI's commitment in the DRC is USD 200 million: USD 190 million through the National REDD+ Fund and USD 10 million through additional financing. The first payment of USD 120 million had been made by 31 December 2018. However, the second share has not yet been disbursed because it is subject to the midterm evaluation of activities financed by the first payment. The secured resources were divided into 15 programs, approved in 2016 by the REDD+ National Steering Committee (Table 22).
The National REDD+ Fund (FONAREDD+) oversees the financial aspects of REDD+ implementation in the DRC with the functions of: mobilizing and collating the different sources of funding; coordinating and ensuring transparency and national ownership; and preparing the country to access the Green Climate Fund. Funds mainly support stakeholder involvement, clarification of tenure rights, safeguards, the planning of forest carbon projects, and improved forest and land governance (Mbot'ekola and Michel 2015).
However, given the current governance context, donors, and more specifically CAFI, have chosen a different financing model, which is based on financial resources being managed by United Nations agencies. Contracts are awarded after a call to tender for the implementation of integrated REDD+ projects, and recruited agencies are awarded the financial resources that they manage. The National REDD+ Fund oversees procedures for the selection of the projects and approves payments before they are disbursed to the beneficiaries. This is the model chosen for the management of the USD 200 million allocated by CAFI to the DRC. As of June 2017, a total of nine programs were being implemented, with funds managed by contracted UN agencies (Table  23). The Ministry of Finance, which coordinates FONAREDD+, does not manage its financial resources. Despite these advances, defining strategies to mobilize the private sector and other donors remains difficult, and it is challenging to identify alternative funding for FONAREDD+. The involvement of Active Women for Sustainable Development (Femme Active pour le Développement, FAD), private investments and indirect financing were expected, but these sources now appear to be slow to commit.

The MRV system
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) are key conditions both for the evaluation of performance and for future payments. A robust but flexible system at both national and sub-national levels is a condition for an effective REDD+, and the definition of a reference level is key to this.
The DRC proposed an MRV action plan for 2015-2018, with the objective of providing details of the activities the country intends to develop within the framework of its National Forest Monitoring System, following IPCC recommendations for REDD+. This monitoring system is based on five pillars ( Figure 10).

Feeding into the DRC's National Forest
Monitoring System, the National GHG Inventory will combine forest soil monitoring data and a national carbon forest inventory. The National GHG Inventory for the 'Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses' sector will follow the reporting requirements of UNFCCC Annex 1. To support sub-national implementation, a 'wall-to-wall' operating system based on remote-sensing satellite data will be put in place. The National GHG Inventory will be integrated with a communitylevel inventory (Kayembe 2017). Finally, to enable verification and transparency, results and data will be distributed using a dedicated web portal.
There is a clear link between the National Forest Monitoring System and the GHG inventory. The National Forest Monitoring System covers The FREL is the result of the cross-fertilization of three tools: the satellite land monitoring system, the National Forest Inventory, and the National GHG Inventory. Although due to a lack of comprehensive data this national document does not include forest degradation, it is complete and operational on deforestation. The year 2000 is taken as reference year because of the availability of converging data on deforestation; this year is also chosen by the DRC as the reference year for the NDC. Carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is the only GHG retained within the framework of this first reference level document, in which an operational definition for 'forest' is proposed. Sovereign data from aerial and biomass surveys was used in the calculation of the CO 2 emissions and absorptions (MEDD 2018 (MEDD 2018).
It is difficult to confirm the projections given in the FREL, as differences in contexts and methodological considerations could influence some indicators used in the calculation. To address this, the FREL will be revised in the medium term to: (1) reduce errors around activity data; (2) increase the number of plots to improve biomass estimates by forest layer; (3) integrate other reservoirs such as litter, dead wood and soil organic carbon; and (4) explore the possibility of integrating forest degradation (MEDD 2018). National experts in this process, including DIAF staff within the MEDD, have benefited from numerous training sessions. The ongoing support of technical and financial partners is essential, however, given the high technology costs involved and the low level of national funding for REDD+.
Provincial-level use of the MRV system is currently weak. Many projects (mainly CAFI-integrated projects) are implemented at provincial level, but several relating to reducing deforestation are not integrated into a provincial MRV system. With the current creation of new provinces, a new administration system will be needed to monitor forest resources. A big challenge for the DRC is thus gradually putting in place provincial institutions that can feed into the MRV system, either contributing to the national system directly or monitoring forest resources and GHG flux at provincial level.
Another important aspect in terms of the sustainability of the MRV system is how to strengthen universities' capacity to contribute to the MRV process. The University of Kisangani, for example, is working with FAO to generate MRV information. However, the country needs to strengthen links between universities and the national institutions in charge of the MRV so they can be useful, for example, in assessing peatland areas: the University of Kisangani and the University of Kinshasa are currently working on mapping the extent of the peatland coverage.

Benefit sharing
The DRC has not yet defined a consensual mechanism for sharing revenue from the implementation of REDD+. It is expected that

SNSF
such a mechanism will be based on experiences and lessons learned from the country's integrated REDD+ programs. Once fully implemented, the Maï-Ndombe REDD+ Project, for example, will provide insight into future options.
One potential benefit-sharing plan was discussed during a participatory consultation held in Kinshasa on 25 January 2017. The revenue-sharing mechanism proposed is largely influenced by the nature of the funding it receives, which comes from public sources (PIF, CAFI), private sector and the FCPF Carbon Fund. This revenue-sharing plan foresees that a certain amount will be reinvested into the activities of the Mai-Ndombe program, while another portion will be redistributed among the project's various beneficiaries. The involvement of the World Bank, which wishes to buy part of the reduced emissions so that their revenues also benefit local and indigenous communities, justifies a 25% cap on the share allocated to holders of large-scale private projects (Kabengele 2017). Payments will be made in both cash and in-kind carbon credits, and only actors whose activities are implemented to the social and environmental standards of REDD+, will be entitled to benefits. In-kind carbon credit payments to private project sponsors could be freely marketed on available markets/platforms.
Several points still need to be clarified in this REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism (Mpoyi et al. 2013): (1)  In conclusion, the result-based payment element of REDD+ has not yet been implemented, and there is no evidence that this will be possible in the near future given the current political conditions, marked by power transitions and governmental debate as political parties divide into new coalitions.

Proposed participatory mechanisms
As already highlighted, the governance structure for REDD+ must ensure the participation of all stakeholders. The main challenge for effective participation in the DRC is decentralization of the process to the provinces, and therefore ensuring effective participation of all stakeholders in the field. The configuration of ministries at provincial level is totally different from that at national level, and an understanding of how responsibilities are distributed is key to ensuring all actors participate. Yet the National REDD+ Coordination, in charge of overseeing the process, lacks decentralized units in all provinces. Some provincial coordinators have been appointed, but not all provinces have a coordinator. No policy options for participation have been developed and tested at scale as yet, and experiences from ongoing field projects have not been assessed. The main consensus, for the moment, is about the importance of free, prior and informed consent for the participation of local and indigenous communities. A framework for the FPIC in REDD+ in the DRC has been developed by the National REDD+ Coordination, and was validated in 2015. It provides a 13-step process document submitted to the FCPF. However, according to REDD+ actors participating in the national consultation workshop, the participation of sectoral agencies at province level is a key issue that remains to be solved.

Policies and institutions
Many sectoral reforms have been initiated with the objective of aligning sectors that have an impact on forest cover with REDD+. These reforms do not involve all areas of land use, or all those that directly affect the use of wood resources. Some reforms that have been completed, while some are underway or under consideration. This section assesses their implications for policy coherence and actions targeting reduced forest emissions in the DRC.
Major sectoral reforms are key to achieving REDD+ and these have been under discussion.
The following sectors are under consideration: sectors related to land use, including land tenure, agriculture, land-use planning, rural development, mining, hydrocarbons; and sectors that have a direct effect on the use of wood resources, including energy, economics and industry. The ongoing sectoral reforms in the DRC aim to: (i) integrate the DRC climate change commitments within all sectors and harmonize the political, legislative, regulatory and institutional frameworks of all sectors; (ii) put in place mechanisms to ensure effective and enhanced cooperation to respond to the challenge of coordinating cross-cutting issues. Land reform in the DRC led to the design of a national land policy document, with financial support from UN-HABITAT/GLTN. However, the process is still to deliver its results, as consultants have not yet been recruited. It is still unclear what options have been adopted to meet the challenges of the current policy, legal and institutional framework. Land insecurity therefore persists.
Despite the evolution of the DRC policy environment to include REDD+, the conclusion to this section is the same as that of the first edition of this study by Mpoyi et al. (2013). Actors in the REDD+ policy domain in the DRC still have different objectives, intentions, interests and agendas. There is a fear that REDD+ in the DRC is a 'prisoner's dilemma' game. Ostrom (1990) conceptualized the 'prisoner's dilemma' in game theory, as a non-cooperative game in which all players have incomplete information. In this specific case, the most complete information about a sector is kept by the sectoral ministries; this is not always shared with other sectoral decision makers. By avoiding individualistic strategies, government actors may become an important enabling factor for implementation of a successful REDD+ mechanism.
6 3Es (effectiveness, efficiency, equity) and co-benefits of REDD+ from the National REDD+ Coordination being excluded from the Technical Committee of the National REDD+ Fund, which selects projects to be implemented within the framework of CAFI funds, despite the National REDD+ Coordination institutionally managing REDD+ on a daily basis. Another issue pointed out by stakeholder interviewed was that of weak sectoral collaboration and power plays amongst government agencies. For example, it is challenging for the Ministry in Charge of Environment to influence policy decisions on REDD+ as far as other sectoral policy reforms are concerned. MEDD had great difficulty resisting government will, particularly that of the Ministry of Hydrocarbons, to declassify Virunga Park so as to allow the exploitation of oil.
The National REDD+ Coordination also faces difficulties in carrying out its mission because of an absence of sustainable financial resources. It is short of funding, and has had to reduce its team by more than 70% since December 2016. This situation has had a significant impact on progress for the REDD+ process, as the Coordination oversees strategic studies. Institutional arrangements have an obvious impact on this. According to some governmental actors interviewed, the institution was created with a view to preparing the country for REDD+, and since the country has gone through this phase, subsequent phases correspond more closely to the mandate of FONAREDD+, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of activities related to the investment phase of the process. There is an urgent need to reassess the role of these institutions if REDD+ is to move forward in the country.
The level of progress with regards to administrative decentralization does not favor REDD+ either. The newly installed provinces have not yet been endowed with the means and infrastructure needed for smooth operation. This does not support

Effectiveness
The many achievements and reforms initiated across sectors between 2012 and 2018 have led the DRC to be viewed as a model for REDD+ in the Congo Basin. This is the case for forestry, agriculture, energy, mining, land-use planning and, more recently, land tenure. When the process started, many observers supported the idea that there was sufficient national expertise and capacity for effective MRV in the DRC (Eba'a Atyi and Bayol 2009; COMIFAC 2012), and there are now projects in the field which will provide insights to inform the design of a final version of the National REDD+ Strategy. However, development over years has also revealed some weaknesses, related to the complexity of REDD+ as it has evolved. The main drivers behind deforestation and forest degradation are known, despite weak consensus about their respective importance. However, addressing these drivers is challenging because many of the main drivers, like mining, play an important role in bolstering national GDP and economic growth. Secondly, governance of the REDD+ process in the DRC is organized around a hierarchical structure, with a National REDD+ Committee, an Inter-ministerial Committee and the National REDD+ Coordination at the top, as the frameworks for political consultation. Their mission is to discuss and resolve crosscutting issues. However, at this highest level the REDD+ governance structure does not contribute to governmental coordination of initiatives for REDD+. The absence of many ministries, such as the Ministry of Rural Development, or the Ministry of Finance that oversees the National REDD+ Fund, is problematic. For instance, the absence of the Ministry of Finance in the National Committee may at least partly explain the difficulties in collaboration between the National REDD+ Fund and the Ministry of Environment. This fragmented collaboration can also be seen processes like REDD+, whose financial results are not meant to be immediate. Faced with difficult access to funding from the central government, the governments of these provinces might leverage other income sources, which could have an impact on forest cover. Provincial REDD+ institutions also still require resources (information, capacity, logistic) to fully operate. Delays persist and impede the functioning of projects implemented at local levels, since the connection with initiatives at national level is weak and inconsistent in some cases. The recruitment of provincial coordinators has so far not allowed the DRC to ensure both local participation and horizontal REDD+ coordination. The available levers, including the Provincial Governors' Conference, have not been mobilized in the context of REDD+. Governors' services are currently only active in a few provinces where large-scale projects are being implemented, like Maï-Ndombe. Meanwhile, they are still trying to put in place the minimum infrastructure to operate in the newly-created provinces.
As far as land tenure is concerned, despite efforts to establish the coexistence of legal and customary rights over land and resources, state administrators and local leaders still face difficulties in understanding the issues at stake, leading to land-tenure insecurity and conflicts over property.
Institutionalizing and implementing legal pluralism over land management is key to ensuring success in the implementation of REDD+. The objective is securing permanence in REDD+ results, as carbon rights and benefit-sharing mechanisms depend on how property over land and resources is interpreted and understood.
The availability of data is also a critical issue for REDD+ effectiveness in the DRC. The Directorate of Inventory and Forest Management (DIAF) benefits from the support of international cooperation for its operations, especially from JICA and other institutions such as the Observatory for Central African Forests, OSFAC and WRI. However, the levels of investment, and levels of preparation and deployment of human resources, are still far below the real needs of the country for an efficient and effective forest inventory.
There lacks an identifiable authority in charge of statistics, and there is low availability of adequate human resources for the production of national data. As a consequence, from the beginning of the REDD+ process, there has been a lack of robust data on which to build national and local capacity for the Greenhouse Gas Inventory. Development of the DRC's national forest emissions reference level document also encountered this difficulty. This absence of related data is used by the authors as justification for the limitations of the document, and its exclusion of degradation. Combined data are not available at the national level, as the existing data are mostly fragmented, limited to specific projects, area or provinces. As such, if improvements to the forest reference emission level document are not made, MRV capacity will be limited to deforestation. In doing so, the potential to evaluate the produced benefits and co-benefits of REDD+ will be limited. In this context, there will be difficulties in demonstrating REDD+ results.
In conclusion, REDD+ in the DRC is not yet able to tackle the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. However, it has already learned many lessons on how to move forward with the process and avoid the mistakes of early phases.

Efficiency
FONAREDD+ is in charge of managing international payments for emission reductions in the DRC. It controls the use of resources for REDD+ through the different fiduciary agencies selected by the donors. Donors have expressed reservations about the country's capacity to ensure effective governance of resources for REDD+ in the DRC. This insufficient capacity encompasses providing national contributions; meeting international management standards like fiduciary safeguards; transparency mechanisms at all disbursement levels and within operations; government involvement at all levels, including civil society and local and indigenous communities; and independent verification mechanisms.
Though hundreds of millions of dollars have been disbursed to nationals and international organizations to support implementation of the early phases of the REDD+ process in the DRC, neither the State nor any national organizations have yet had the opportunity to build and test their revenue management capacity for such a mechanism, thus raising fears about the country's fiduciary governance capacity. In the absence of an evaluation of funding already received, stakeholders interviewed claimed that there is still | 57 no proof that the country can effectively manage REDD+ funds and ensure equitable benefit sharing of REDD+ costs and revenues. For these reasons, donors, and more specifically CAFI, have chosen a different financing model, which is based on financial resources being managed by United Nations agencies. Contracts are awarded after a call to tender for the implementation of integrated REDD+ projects, and recruited agencies are awarded the financial resources that they manage. The National REDD+ Fund oversees procedures for the selection of the projects and approves payments before they are disbursed to the beneficiaries. This is the model chosen for the management of the USD 200 million allocated by CAFI to the DRC.
Studies have been conducted by the National REDD+ Coordination with the aim of determining a benefit-sharing mechanism that considers cost and benefit options, but these have not yet tested on the ground. Stakeholders interviewed also claimed that the unclear legal framework on carbon ownership, rights and profit sharing might hamper REDD+ implementation in the DRC. REDD+ project proponents in the DRC each apply cost-sharing and benefitsharing mechanisms in their respective projects, which they define themselves in consultation with project stakeholders, including government agencies, and local and indigenous communities. Experiences from projects that are underway will ultimately be of great value to determine future REDD+ policy options.
Socioeconomic advantages resulting from the implementation of REDD+ projects remain limited to investments in project areas, such as building schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. However, these are not directly related to the financial flows that result from the trade of carbon due to reduced emission or enhanced absorption. There is no evidence that communities, or even provincial entities, have the capacity to handle these if project holders stop their funding. Appropriation and the long-lasting effect of this infrastructure on local socioeconomic development thus remains uncertain.

Equity
REDD+ has brought a new dimension to the relationship between the State, civil society, and local and indigenous communities of forest areas. The development of a FPIC tool, and the requirement from donors to consult these communities as a condition for the validity of projects and funding, has built more of a culture of consultation. Some issues with this remain, however, and several CSO interviewees pointed out their limited involvement, mostly in the validation of policy documents in order to legitimize their content and processes with donors.
The development of tools to ensure participation in REDD+ in the DRC focused on both vertical and horizontal aspects. Tools for participation are related to environmental and social safeguards and specific frameworks, as well as the Safeguards Information System and the Complaints and Grievance Mechanism. However, the concerns of local communities described by Resosudarmo et al. (2012) remain relevant. Communities are not interested in REDD+. The discourse is mainly focused on forest, and the ongoing projects do not provide enough information on how they will compensate revenue loss by these communities during REDD+ project implementation. There are inconsistencies in information as the local populations are mainly informed by REDD+ project holders in a context where CSOs do not have the means to carry out large-scale information campaigns. As a consequence, local communities are informed enough to ensure their equitable participation in negotiations about the conditions of REDD+ projects and revenue sharing, but most communities in REDD+ project sites do not know what the opportunity cost of the project implemented in their area is.
The position of indigenous communities is also unclear and uncertain. There are several policies acknowledging their claims but in practice, they remain marginalized and their claim to the forest resources on which they depend for a living is precarious at best.

Conclusion
The DRC has engaged in REDD+, with the aim of tackling the main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, for a decade. However, addressing the drivers of deforestation and degradation is challenging because the main drivers of deforestation and degradation are driven by global trade investment as well as national demand to increase economic growth. Stakeholders from national to local level have participated in REDD+ and the process has evolved against considerable political uncertainty. Lessons have been learned from what has been achieved, in terms of assessing the causes of deforestation and forest degradation, achieving intersectoral integration and coherence of land-use legal frameworks to address drivers, and sharing benefits among all stakeholders.
Realizing REDD+ entails putting together and implementing a mix of both technical, sociological, legal and political parameters. The different phases of REDD+ (preparation, investment and implementation) in the DRC have not been implemented as initially planned. There are many reasons that studies to identify policy options have not been completed. These include difficulty in accessing data, a lack of financial resources for the National REDD+ Coordination in charge of overseeing the preparation phase of the process, and political and governance challenges linked to transitions in government. As such, the 2012 National REDD+ Framework Strategy has not been transformed into a full strategy. Achieving reforms to ensure legal intersectoral integration and coordination on land-use to tackle drivers of deforestation and forest degradation is difficult, through a mixed top-down and bottomup approach with the current decentralized administrative model. Implementation suffers from weak governance; the absence of State authority in certain areas of the territory; insufficient domestic capacity to trigger sectoral policy reforms consistent with REDD+ objectives; and a lack of autonomous human, material and financial resources. There is also limited analysis and evidence on REDD+ funding and REDD+ payment distribution, and their impact on both forest cover and household incomes. Future research is required to address these knowledge gaps. REDD+ in the DRC will not be quick, but this does not mean REDD+ in the DRC is dead. REDD+ is progressing and the country is learning from the challenges of the initial phases of this new and complex mechanism.