CHAPTER ONE

Negotiating More Than Boundaries in Indonesia

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In Malinau, East Kalimantan, Indonesia, the poor and the more powerful increasingly compete for the same land and forest resources. Swidden farmers, hunter-gatherers, timber companies, mining companies, and local government make diverse demands on the forest, yet coordination of forest management among these different land users has been weak. During Indonesia’s implementation of decentralization reforms between 1998 and 2001, when demands on the forest increased and local coordination was at its lowest, social conflict and forest degradation increased dramatically.

Malinau is not unique. Large forest landscapes everywhere are under increasing pressure from diverse and incompatible demands. In this chapter we argue that, unless appropriate mechanisms are in place for forest users to coordinate among themselves, large forest landscapes such as those in Malinau are at risk from escalated and entrenched social conflicts, increasing social injustice, open access competition for resources, and even willful destruction of forest resources. Because of recent reforms, stakeholders in Malinau face an additional challenge. They must make a transition between the top-down, more coercive coordination by forest departments in the 1970s to 1990s, when conflict was rarely openly acknowledged, to more deliberative and pluralistic coordination, where self-organization, transparency in government, conflict management, and greater citizen participation guide decisionmaking (Anderson et al. 1999; DiZerega 2000; see also Chapter 2).

We present here the findings that led us to these conclusions. We focused on village-to-village coordination, because it has received little attention, yet is fundamental to multi-stakeholder processes. We wanted to know whether the principles guiding more formal and complex multi-stakeholder processes were relevant to intervillage coordination, where fewer people were involved and they lived together with greater familiarity, more of a moral economy, and stronger kin obligations. We asked the research question, what conditions facilitate coordination of interests within and among villages? We were also curious to learn more about
local people’s concepts of conflict and agreement and how these might be changing during the reform period. The work focused on village boundary demarcation as a means of land use coordination and as a tangible source of conflict about which agreements could be negotiated.

Below we present a review of current thinking about coordination processes, our study methods, and a history of village-level coordination efforts in Malinau as the context for our study. We then present the results of the study, with data about sources of boundary conflict among communities and how they sought to overcome that conflict. We conclude with several recommendations.

Current Thinking about Coordination

What constitutes “good coordination” in forest management? During the last two decades, proponents of community management have often advocated that the state should decrease its involvement as the primary coordinator of local management (Poffenberger 1990; Sarin forthcoming). Where government coordination has been weak, however, local entrepreneurs and strongmen often gain control over the forest at the expense of communities (Barr et al. 2001; Dove 1993; Kaimowitz et al. 1999). A new paradigm is emerging in which coordination occurs through pluralistic processes that take into account the interests of different stakeholders. In these multi-stakeholder processes, the central challenge is “how a society composed of formally equal citizens could be ordered, so that those having access to more political resources, luck, or talent would not use their advantages to exploit others weaker than themselves” (DiZerega 2000).

To answer this challenge, current thinking indicates that coordination should be grounded in negotiations that involve all relevant stakeholders, identify their interests, facilitate effective communication and learning, create a neutral space for interaction, and seek to achieve consensus (Allen et al. 1998; Borrini-Feyerabend 1996; Fisher 1995; Porter and Sälvesen 1995; Röling and Maarleveld 1999; Röling and Wagemakers 1998). Iterative cycles of conflict and adjustment are likely to occur, and conflict should be managed (Lee 1993; Ramírez 2001).

Experience with decentralization and comanagement agreements between states and communities indicates, however, that some of these recommendations are unrealistic. Seeking to achieve politically neutral negotiations and collaboration can work against politically weak communities and the vulnerable groups within them (Anderson et al. 1999; Antona and Babin 2001; Baviskar 2001; Contreras et al. 2001; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Sundar 2001; Wollenberg et al. 2001a).

We argue that a more realistic view of coordination requires modification of the principles commonly used to facilitate negotiation. First, in contrast to certain current beliefs about conflict mediation, evidence strongly suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible and undesirable, for people engaged in negotiation to define stakeholders’ interests clearly. Interests are many-layered, and we tend to construct our interests in response to specific contexts and for strategic purposes (Baviskar 2001; Leach and Fairhead 2001). Especially where trust among groups is low, it
may be unwise for any group to reveal its true interests or to assume that other
groups are communicating their interests honestly. Baviskar argues that we can best
infer interests from how people act, not from what they say.

Second, as proponents of pluralism would argue (Anderson et al. 1999; Bickford
1999; Rescher 1993), consensus is impossible, and participants in a multi-stakeholder
process should treat agreements as inherently unstable. Complete agreement is
impossible because differences in experience prevent even two individuals from
ever having the same desires (Rescher 1993). As only temporary states of coordina-
tion can occur, coordination is best thought of as a process of on-going accommo-
dation and negotiation involving multiple actors. Agreements are not the end of the
process, but rather are a set of guidelines providing legitimacy for new actions.
People negotiating contractual agreements and management plans should therefore
build in flexibility to accommodate adjustment and acknowledge these as tempo-
rary measures (Wollenberg et al. 2001b). Boundary agreements should acknowl-
edge flexibility in rights allocated across borders. Facilitators of coordination should
work with the plurality of institutions with which local actors interact, and not just
through single user groups or local forest departments (Leach and Fairhead 2001).

Third, some parties consistently enjoy disproportionate control over coordina-
tion. Weaker groups’ interests are routinely excluded, represented ineffectively, co-
opted, or negotiated away (Anderson and Grove 1987; Hecht and Cockburn 1989;
Parajuli 1998). The exercise of power is thought to depend on who assumed the
convenor and facilitation roles (or controlled these roles), who was represented in
the process, and who has the greatest capacities for communication and negotia-
tion among participants (Ramírez 2001; Steins and Edwards 1999). Government
agencies have often assumed this role in forestry by working in an “expertocratic”
mode that relies on opinions of professionals rather than wider citizenry (Rossi
1997, 237). In these situations, the interests of disadvantaged groups are often masked
under the guise of agreements (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; see also Chapter
11). Well-intentioned efforts to expand participation in forest management by in-
cluding marginalized groups can actually work to their detriment, unless certain
checks and balances and accountability measures are used. Multi-stakeholder ne-
gotiations are likely to be more just if they acknowledge existing power relation-
ships—rather than assuming that negotiations can be neutral—and enable weaker
groups to work politically in more effective ways.

From the points documented above, we suggest that more strategic principles4
for multi-stakeholder processes are necessary. These require facilitators to manage
in ways that are sensitive to power differences. Participants need to be aware of
their options and willing to demand them. Any group or coalition that facilitates
will seek to meet its own self-interest to some extent, so it is necessary for the
participants to collectively agree on norms, rules, and sanctions that encourage
socially responsible facilitation. Basic principles include the following:

- Improve the preconditions for disadvantaged groups to participate and nego-
tiate effectively. This principle includes (a) seeking out possibilities for allianc-
es among select stakeholders, rather than trying to achieve an apolitical agree-
ment among all stakeholders; (b) enhancing the power, urgency, or legitimacy
associated with certain stakeholders to increase the likelihood of their being noticed and involved in decisions (Ramírez 2001); and (c) enabling excluded stakeholders to work through parallel arenas to challenge decisions.

- **Ensure accountability of coordination decisions to interest groups through effective representation** (facilitating proximity of leaders to their constituencies, elected leaders, and delegates and fostering an ideology of civic dedication), transparency (third-party monitoring, public meetings and reporting, participatory processes), and checks on power (legal appeals to existing decisions, separation and balance of decisionmaking power across several authorities, enabling civic education and social movements) (Ribot 2001).

- **Evaluate the legitimacy of negotiation processes, decisions, and agreements.** This means analyzing the reasons for each group’s participation or nonparticipation in negotiations, determining each group’s form of representation, identifying the roles of convenors and facilitators, and understanding the historical context for such agreements. It also means treating legitimacy as partial and contingent rather than assuming that an unproblematic legitimacy is ensured through open negotiations.

- **Acknowledge the fluid and complex nature of interests, agreements, and coordination processes and encourage people to communicate, debate, and negotiate.**

To test the applicability of these principles and refine them, we examined the extent to which they were relevant to village-to-village coordination about land claims in Malinau. We report our findings below.

### Methods

The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) used action research to examine negotiation among stakeholders over forest land claims and coordination of land use in the 27 villages of the upper Malinau River in East Kalimantan (see Figure 1-1). Action research enabled us to conduct research that generated local impacts, thus mutually benefiting CIFOR and local stakeholders, and also enabled us to observe directly how these impacts occurred. The methods and focus of the work evolved in response to local needs in iterative stages.

In 1999, CIFOR conducted a systematic survey of stakeholders, land tenure, and forest-related conflict in the 27 villages of the watershed and organized a five-day community workshop involving representatives from all villages to identify a mutual agenda for collaboration between communities and CIFOR (Anau 1999; ACM-CIFOR 1999). The survey and workshop demonstrated that all the communities had a strong interest in demarcating village boundaries through mapping. They also revealed high levels of conflict among villages and between villages and companies about a range of forest-related issues, especially land claims.

In response to the high interest in documenting boundaries, CIFOR trained village-level committees in participatory mapping and, from January to July 2000, facilitated conflict mediation and mapping among the 27 villages. CIFOR created a core team of nine trainer-technicians that included six Malinau community members.
Figure 1-1. Map of Malinau, East Kalimantan, Indonesia
This team documented and analyzed the types and causes of conflict over boundaries (Tim Pendampingan Pemetaan Partisipatif 2000). Communities frequently asked the team to mediate their boundary conflicts, which allowed the team to directly observe the types of conflicts that occurred and the strategies communities used to achieve agreements. The team also examined the types of agreements produced to understand who was involved in producing the agreement and whether the agreement was legitimate and acceptable to community members.

Twenty-one villages produced draft maps. Because of the long-term nature of boundary adjudication and the role of local government in approving boundaries, CIFOR and the Malinau District government agreed that local government would be better placed to continue and complete the mapping. Since 1999, CIFOR has worked with communities to facilitate their negotiation with the district government. As of December 2003, however, the local government had yet to even begin demarcating village boundaries.

A History of Coordination Efforts among the Villages

Struggles over land and forest in Malinau have been longstanding, even if the reasons and means of managing them have changed. We can trace the shifting authorities that worked to overcome these struggles and served to coordinate control over land during the last several centuries.

Traditional Authorities

At least until the early 1900s, intergroup warfare was common and a major influence on territorial control. Minor customary leaders (kepala adat) and their circle of close advisors controlled access to land, managed conflicts, and coordinated decisions within their ethnic group, while major customary leaders (kepala adat besar) helped to coordinate these matters at larger scales. Minor and major leaders formed alliances to oppose common enemies, especially unfriendly groups that ventured into their territory. Evidence suggests that in the upper Malinau, the kepala adat besar for the Merap ethnic group was the reigning local power, together with the local Tidung sultanates, for most of the 20th century. Settled rice farming communities like the Merap sought control over defined territories, while others (e.g., the Punan) were more concerned with access to key resources, such as sago palm.

Where they existed, territories seem to have been conceptualized in terms of a central settlement point or a river and its watershed, with less emphasis on the exact location of the outer bounds. Individual property also existed. Major customary leaders controlled rights to valuable resources, such as birds’ nest caves, located within the territory of a sultanate. The sultanate in turn levied taxes on the traded products. Interestingly, the descendents of these customary leaders have used the letters of tax payment in recent years to establish ownership over the caves.

Customary leaders used hierarchical social controls within their villages and periodic consultation—especially with a close circle of influential villagers, or
tokoh masyarakat—to manage conflict within the group. Unresolved conflict was handled through the fission of the group, with one faction moving to a new settlement or, in the case of external groups, through warfare. Around 1900, Kayan groups repeatedly attacked Merap groups on the Malinau to reclaim caves taken over by the Merap.

Rights of access to village territories were based on ethnic, marriage, and trade alliances, as well as respect for customary authority. Outsiders entering another group’s territory were formally expected to request permission from the customary leader, although in practice people often casually entered watersheds to hunt or collect forest products without permission. Some leaders required not only permission, but also fees from outside groups to collect forest products in their area (Sellato 2001).

Colonial and Governmental Authorities

As warfare declined, the Dutch, and later in the 1950s the government of Indonesia, constituted additional layers in the institutional hierarchy in what was first the Bulungan Sultanate and later the kabupaten or district of Bulungan. The new Indonesian government established an infrastructure of centralized control. The role and direction of accountability of customary leaders became muddled as many were appointed by outside officials as village government heads and thus became upwardly accountable to a camat (subdistrict head), bupati (district head), governor, and the president. Local social institutions were severely weakened with the delegitimation of customary laws and leaders. Government maps of villages bore little relation to actual settlements and their claims. Local people became increasingly disenfranchised and politically distanced under this system. Most matters of village concern continued to be settled by customary leaders, especially those who also worked for the government as village head. These leaders made decisions among a group of ethnically homogenous people. Access to land and forest continued to be managed as before.

In addition to establishing a new overlay of administration, the state staked extensive claims to forested territories starting in the 1960s as Indonesia’s timber boom began. Nearly 95% of what is now the district of Malinau was designated as state forest land, and in the late 1960s the central government allocated all the state forest land to timber concessions. Suddenly villagers found themselves sharing the forest with logging companies and were told that the land belonged to the government of Indonesia. The state’s assertion of authority over land through the logging companies’ presence openly challenged local sovereignty and claims to land in a way that sultans and the Dutch had never done.

Villagers accommodated the concessions, largely out of feelings of intimidation. Military officials usually accompanied logging company staff or otherwise harassed potentially troublesome villagers. The gradual degradation of forest, loss of wildlife for hunting, and lower water quality that villages experienced were partially offset by the construction of roads, provision of transportation, generation of employment (albeit limited), and occasional contribution to a
village project. A few villagers also benefited from illegal logging opportunities. Local concessions did not strictly enforce hunting and burning prohibitions and allowed swidden agriculture in some forest areas in an effort to maintain good relations. During this time, the most common forest-related conflicts were inter-village quarrels about access to agricultural plots and for a few individuals, disputes over claims to birds' nest caves. The state simply did not allow conflicts with the government or concessions.

The authority of village customary leaders eroded further and land claims became more complex as ethnic groups began to share territories. Government resettlement programs of the 1960s through 1980s, and an ad hoc case of government-sponsored resettlement in 1999, reallocated most formerly Merap lands along the upper Malinau River to other Dayak groups from more remote areas. The newcomers did not, however, always sever ties with their former territories. As a result of these programs, two to four ethnic groups now reside collectively in 9 of the 16 settlements (lokasi) of the upper Malinau River. Population pressure has also increased substantially. Local groups now claim multiple territories, with overlaps common. The role of customary and government authorities in settling these claims has not been clear. Because of the resettlement programs, the upper Malinau River area suffers more from these sorts of multiple claims than other parts of the Malinau District (see also Chapter 2).

Recent Developments

The final and most recent major development occurred with three overlapping phenomena: decentralization reforms; new access for villagers to monetary payments for timber and land; and the creation of the new Malinau District. With the initiation of decentralization and the associated uncertainty, local people from all sectors of society have sought to seize their share of Malinau's resources. Even before decentralization policies were formally implemented at the district level, de facto decentralization began taking place with villages making claims to customary (adat) lands and negotiating directly with local investors (Rhee forthcoming). Villagers made demands for compensation or benefits from timber and mining companies more freely and requested larger amounts than ever before. Since former President Suharto stepped down in 1998, villagers say they can express their discontent without fear and have been much freer about speaking out against their leaders and the government. Military officials only rarely accompany timber companies or government entourages any more. New political associations have formed among different ethnic groups. Village leaders can be seen as often in the central town of Malinau, meeting with government or company officials, as they are in their own villages.

Fuelling the race for resources was the offer of payments by companies for harvesting timber. In 1996, the exploitation of coal in the Loreh-Langap area resulted in payments to some 10 to 20 households and to the customary Merap leader of Langap for rights to excavate their fallowed swidden fields. In 2000, the governor of East Kalimantan passed a provision (stimulated by the new Basic
Forestry Law 41, 1999) enabling communities to claim compensation from timber companies for logs harvested in their areas.

The most lucrative deals, however, were the IPPKs, or *Izin Pemungutan dan Pemanfaatan Kayu*. Beginning in April 2000, the district head began allocating these small-scale logging permits for 100 to 5,000 ha each to hastily formed small local companies. With decentralization, the district became responsible for generating its own income and could also keep a larger proportion of the income it generated than ever before. The incentives for intensive resource use were therefore high. The presence of the Kayan Mentarang National Park increased the pressure on the district to make more intensive use of the remaining areas, such as the upper Malinau River, which is more accessible and has better infrastructure. The result has been extraordinarily high levels of timber extraction among more diverse groups and increasing conflict among nearly all parties, including small-scale timber harvest permit holders, concession holders, villagers (themselves often forming factions), and mining interests (Barr et al. 2001). Forty-six IPPKs were issued, granting access to more than 60,000 ha in Malinau since April 2000. Underlying the logging deals have been negotiation of territorial claims and speculation about the value of these lands for future claims or compensation. A laissez-faire, frontier atmosphere has emerged in which the importance of making money far outstrips the value of being lawful or fair.\(^\text{12}\)

The symptoms of trouble have been clear: community protests against the investors for not paying expected fees or wages to local harvesters; complaints among villagers about opaque deals struck between leaders and investors; and forest logged in areas where permission was not granted by villagers. In most villages now, few people know the content of the evolving law or are aware of their entitlements. Usually only a select elite close to the village head are involved in district matters and negotiations with investors. Many villagers are excited about trying new economic options, but lack information about how to consider trade-offs in livelihood security and long-term resource use. The communities’ euphoria about receiving several thousands of dollars now will most likely be forgotten in a few years when both the forest and their money have run out.

Furthermore, the formation of the new Malinau District in October 1999 (one of three new districts formed from the district of Bulungan) resulted in a one-and-a-half-year period of temporary leadership, when the district government was not accountable to a local assembly. Not coincidentally, this was also the time when the bulk of the IPPKs were issued. Many government offices, including the forest service, were not filled until 2001. Another significant aspect of the new local government was its dominance by locals. For the first time, people from the district (or married to someone who was) filled most government posts. Previous officials were mostly from Java, Sulawesi, or other parts of Kalimantan. The “Dayakization” of local government has meant that authority is now rooted in the local politics of more than 18 different ethnic groups. Local relationships of power are more intertwined and complex than ever before.

These evolving relationships have affected how struggles over land play themselves out. Current alliances in Malinau reflect a set of fluid, interlocking networks of ethnic affiliations, economic interdependencies, strategic kin relationships, and...
even historical alliances from the headhunting period. Kenyah, Lundaye, and Tidung groups have been the most politically aggressive in recent years and dominate Malinau’s new local government. These groups, together with the Merap, have also worked most aggressively to consolidate their claims to land. Punan groups, meanwhile, have had little representation in the district government, and are always the weaker partner in alliances with other ethnic groups (cf. the situation of Pygmy groups in Cameroon and Orang Rimba in Sumatra discussed in Chapter 4). Individuals from all groups have maintained an opportunistic attitude toward building alliances and have sought to strike new deals as they may, making it difficult to know at any one time precisely who has control where. Unfortunately, only a relatively small group of leaders and their circles has enjoyed the benefits of these deals and exerted any real influence over decisions.

Decisions made in the next several years will have huge consequences for who will control land and how that land will be used in the medium term. Current trends indicate very real threats of rapid deforestation, disenfranchisement of the Punan, and loss of long-term economic opportunities by most local groups. Because Malinau is one of Asia’s largest remaining expanses of continuous forest and home to the largest group of Punan in Borneo, it is vital that coordination be improved to encourage a longer-term, more equitable, and more integrative view of how the area’s forest can be managed to benefit local communities. Local stakeholders feel these challenges intensely.

Setting Village Boundaries

In the context of current theories of coordination, available methods, and these recent developments, CIFOR’s action research on intervillage boundary conflict proceeded. Below we report on the lessons learned about the sources of conflicts encountered, the factors influencing how communities reached agreements, and the results of the boundary demarcation process.

Sources of Conflict

Most conflicts between villages over boundaries involved overlapping ownership or use of agricultural lands (swidden fields, wet rice fields, and perennial gardens) and a history of mistrust and noncooperation. Other conflicts arose over rights to timber, valuable nontimber products like gaharu (Aquilaria sp., a fragrant resin) or birds’ nests, and land containing coal deposits. Every village, however, experienced its own unique constellation of specific conflicts (Table 1-1). In the far reaches of the upper Malinau, where only Punan groups lived, conflict focused on access to forest products, in addition to the sources mentioned above. In the central portion of the watershed, where rich coal deposits occurred, conflicts emerged over compensation claims against the coal-mining company for the use of cultivated or fallow fields. In the lower stretches, problems focused on access to agricultural lands and problematic relationships.
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Table 1-1. Sources of Conflict Affecting Boundary Negotiations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village boundary</th>
<th>Coal deposits</th>
<th>Agricultural lands</th>
<th>Non-timber forest products</th>
<th>History of poor relations</th>
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<td>Sentaban–Setulang</td>
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<td>Setulang–Setarap</td>
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<td>Setarap–Batu Kajang</td>
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<td>Batu Kajang–Gong Solok</td>
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<td>Batu Kajang–Adiu</td>
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<td>Gong Solok–Adiu</td>
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<td>Adiu–Loreh</td>
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<td>Adiu–Nunuk Tanah Kibang</td>
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<td>Long Loreh–Langap</td>
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<td>Laban Nyari–Mirau</td>
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<td>Laban Nyari–Tanjung Nanga</td>
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<td>Metut–Pelancau</td>
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<td>Pelancau–Long Lake</td>
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<td>Long Lake–Long Jalan</td>
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*Disparities in economic or political status among villages exacerbated mistrust and lack of cooperation. These disparities affected how a conflict over boundaries manifested itself, as well as the possibilities for resolving the conflict. As we discuss further below, the larger the discrepancies between villages, the less likely it was that villagers were able to reach agreement about boundaries.

Although many of these conflicts were longstanding, villagers noted that the intensity of conflicts increased as outside parties sought to exploit timber and coal and offered lucrative compensation payments. The promise of significant extra income raised the stakes of the conflict and made people determined to protect or expand their claims to timber- or coal-bearing areas. The high stakes brought to the surface more latent, long-term conflicts related to intervillage differences or rights to agricultural land, which further fuelled the intensity of the immediate conflict.
Factors Influencing the Negotiations

Community Participation. Community participation in negotiations was lower than CIFOR expected, even though, as others have noted, generating adequate participation is a central challenge of populist approaches (Rossi 1997). Although villagers asked us to conduct the mapping during a period of low agricultural activity (April to July) when they would have more time and CIFOR’s team actively sought to stimulate broad community participation through meetings and informal interaction, decisions tended to be controlled by only a few individuals. We have observed this decision-making pattern to be typical in villages of the upper Malinau River for most matters at the village or intervillage level.

Participation and representation were ineffective within villages, as well as in meetings between two or more villages. Within villages, participation in meetings was low. In the Loreh site (four villages) only 50 people out of 1,000 ever attended public village meetings. Only 20 people from the Loreh villages were later involved in the final boundary negotiation with the neighboring village, Langap. Of the 60 people interviewed in the Loreh villages after the mapping had been completed, only a small proportion knew that the negotiations and mapping had taken place.

Factions were common in even small villages. Representatives of these factions were frequently not present in meetings, either because they had not been invited or because they purposely did not attend. Boycotts of meetings were a common means of quiet protest against the group calling the meeting. Village leaders usually consulted a small circle of influential colleagues among the tokoh masyarakat and never actively sought the views of different groups, let alone represented them. Women rarely participated in meetings, and if they did, rarely spoke. Predictably, village politics led to some groups giving more weight to their own preferences, while marginalizing others.

In intervillage meetings, one to six influential village members (tokoh masyarakat), including among others the village head, members of his staff (aparat desa), and customary leaders, represented a village. Decisions often could not be reached if a key person was absent. In Langap, for example, a decision could not be taken without the endorsement of the Merap customary leader. In Metut, the absence of the village secretary completely stalled negotiations with Pelancau.

In cases where the village leader only needed to reaffirm an existing agreement, we observed that the participation of a few individuals was sufficient for ensuring the acquiescence of other villagers and the stability of the decision. A small delegation became problematic, though, where changes needed to be negotiated and consultations with key influential people and representatives of groups were needed before settling on a particular option on behalf of the village. People attending meetings on behalf of a village rarely reported back to the village about the outcome of their negotiations.

One of the most important factors affecting participation was the location of a meeting. Time and transportation expenses limited the number of people willing or able to travel the often significant distances between neighboring settlements (one hour to one day). For example, in a meeting in Langap, 21 people from Langap attended, while 0–3 people from each of the eight neighboring villages
attended. Similarly in a meeting held in Setulang, 30 people attended from Setu-
lang, compared with 3 from the neighboring village of Setarap. If negotiations are
held repeatedly in the same village (because of better facilities, ease of access for
the facilitator, etc.), other villages may be compromised in their ability to partici-
pate fairly.

Representation and participation among the Punan was especially poor (cf.
Chapter 4 on Orang Rimba, Chapter 5 on Pygmies). The Punan faced special
constraints to participating in meetings called in villages. First, Punan families
frequently went to the forest for long periods of time, with men additionally
going into the forest to look for gaharu for weeks or months at a time. As a result,
they would often not know about meetings in advance and lacked time to consult
with other community members before attending a meeting. More dominant
groups also did not always invite them to meetings, and information from meet-
ings was not always shared with them.

Second, the Punan often did not feel comfortable expressing themselves freely
in the presence of more dominant groups. Among the nine locations where Punan
villages coexisted with other ethnic groups, participation of Punan groups was
extremely weak in three communities (Seturan-Punan Rian, Tanjung Nanga-
Respen, and Gong Solok I-II).

Third, in at least Langap, the Punan living in neighboring Long Rat and Punan
Rian had a historically subservient relationship with the Merap, having been giv-
en land locally to facilitate their work as birds’ nest collectors for the Merap.

A final reason for weak Punan participation was that in four settlements (Pelan-
cau, Long Lake, Metut, and Long Jalan), members of the village were scattered in
several locations, making it difficult to involve representatives from all groups and
distribute information to everyone.

**Internal Village Processes.** Often villages did not undertake adequate internal
consultations to reach agreement among themselves. In every village, the village
head coordinated whether these consultations occurred or not, sometimes to-
gether with the customary village head (kepala adat). Of seven pairs of villages that
engaged in broad consultations within their respective villages before negotiating
with their neighbors (Setarap-Setulang, Setarap-Batu Kajang, Batu Kajang-Gong
Solok, Tanjung Nanga-Langap, Langap-Laban Nyarit, Langap-Loreh, and Metut-
Pelancau), five resulted in agreements. Internal preparations ensured that the ne-
gotiated decision would be acceptable to the broader community. They also helped
community representatives explore different options and have more information
at hand to be able to negotiate better. Nonetheless, only 11 out of 27 villages held
formal community consultations. Others held small informal meetings. Aspects of
internal consultations that seemed most important in producing a stable, broadly
acceptable outcome included:

- Transparency, indicated by the holding of a community meeting attended by a
  majority of the families. Where transparency was lacking (e.g., Metut, Sentaban,
  and Laban Nyarit), people within the village later challenged the agreement
determined by the village head.
Community capacity to work together and trust each other (community cohesion), indicated by a history of low factionalism and high cooperation at the village level and support for the village leader. Such capacity was high, for example in Tanjung Nanga and Setulang. Where people did not work together, negotiations were less effective. Langap representatives, for example, negotiated demands from Tanjung Nanga that were not supported by other Langap villagers (where at least four factions exist). As a result, when the mapping team tried to identify boundaries, the agreement was rejected.

Negotiations between Villages. In observing the negotiation process, we sought to understand how negotiations were organized and what factors influenced their outcome. Although we initially encouraged parties to reach agreement quickly and described such an outcome as a successful negotiation, we soon learned that most of the agreements were short-lived and partial in their support. An agreement reached quickly enabled communities to conduct the mapping of their territory, but we fear this occurred too often at the expense of a more socially inclusive process that would have probably resulted in more stable results. We learned that we should have evaluated the process underlying how a village reached an agreement as a basis for proceeding with the mapping, not just whether an agreement had been reached.

Villagers used two approaches in their negotiations: meetings between village heads or meetings between selected village representatives. Meetings between village heads usually occurred where there had been no previous village consultation. As noted above, this occurred where both parties already accepted a boundary and the boundary only required affirmation (Laban Nyarit-Pelancau, Laban Nyarit-Metut, Laban Nyarit-Long Lake). In these cases one meeting was sufficient to agree on boundaries. Where there was a disagreement about the boundary, however, community members consistently rejected agreements reached by only their village heads. For most villages, negotiations commonly involved one to five meetings. One set of villages held 19 meetings! As noted above, village heads and other representatives were only partly accountable, if at all, to their broader village constituency.

Five factors appeared to help communities reach agreements in these negotiations. First was consultation with the other village. Among the 27 villages, 8 held consultative meetings with neighboring villages as part of their preparation for the mapping. Six of these villages successfully negotiated agreements. Good relations did not predispose these villages to reach agreements, since half of the six were communities with long-standing difficulties with their neighbors.

Second, family relations among villages encouraged compromises that led to more rapid agreement. Six villages (Long Jalan, Long Lake, Pelancau, Metut, Laban Nyarit, and Langap) sought agreements based on compromises. Although these communities may have wished to expand their territory to take advantage of the changing value of resources, they ultimately decided to maintain existing boundaries, rather than invite conflict, because they were all members of the same extended family.

Third, financial incentives encouraged speedy resolution. Potential compensation payments by the coal company or sharing of benefits from small-scale
Chapter 1: Negotiating More Than Boundaries in Indonesia

Agreement reached

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference in capacities and power status</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Agreement reached</th>
<th>Stability of decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate difference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large difference</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Number of villages.

*Stability was counted only for cases where agreement was reached.

Timber harvesting (through IPPK holders) promised concrete benefits that encouraged villagers to reach agreement quickly, get on with mapping their lands, and secure additional income. The uncertainty of decentralization policies also pushed people to quick settlements. Many people adopted a first-come, first-served attitude, fearing that someone else would benefit from the resource if they did not make use of it first or that benefits would no longer be available if the policy changed.

Fourth, villages with similar institutional capacities and power were more likely to reach agreements than villages that differed. In a number of cases, especially the case of Langap and its weaker neighbors Long Rat or Paya Seturan, more powerful villages presumed themselves entitled to exert their will about a boundary decision and disregarded the need to build agreement with a weaker village. Weaker villages often passively resisted these decisions by the more aggressive villages. This pattern is evident with the application of a simple scoring system, the results of which are summarized in Table 1-2 and shown more fully in Annex 1-1. Even where villages reached temporary agreements, those villages having lower capacity-power differentials were more likely to reach stable agreements. The more similar the villages, the more likely they were not to challenge boundary agreements.

The fifth factor influencing outcomes was the opportunity to share benefits across villages. CIFOR assisted villages to reach agreement in several cases by encouraging villagers to treat the boundary not as a fence excluding nonvillagers, but as a set of rules about sharing access or benefits. In seven cases, villages negotiated agreements enabling neighbors to maintain their swidden fields, perennial gardens, or hunting rights (Langap-Loreh, Langap-Seturan/Punan Rian, Langap-Nunuk Tanah Kibang, Langap-Laban Nyarit, Laban Nyarit-Tanjung Nanga, Metut-Pelancau, Long Lake-Long Jalan). In five of these cases villagers reached agreement. Langap and Nunuk Tanah Kibang agreed to share future compensation payments from the coal company. Langap and Long Loreh reached agreement about an area under which lay valuable coal, by acknowledging that Loreh could continue to use existing cultivated plots in the Langap territory.

Where these five factors were not present, villages with conflicting boundary claims were not able to reach agreement. These villages were ultimately not able to
sustain a supportive political base. We observed in particular that community members in these villages frequently did not support agreements produced by their leaders and in several villages refused to map the suggested boundary. Two villages also had the practical problem of not being sure whose territory adjoined their own because their borders were far. They had not prepared for negotiations with these neighbors, and preliminary agreements had to be renegotiated (Gong Solok–Long Loreh and Batu Kajang–Adiu).

### Results of the Boundary Demarcation Process

Of the 27 boundaries among villages in the upper Malinau, villagers negotiated 21 agreements (Table 1-3). During the period of the mapping, most villages relied on written agreements between villages, which for many was a new development. Verbal agreements had previously been more common for boundaries. Written agreements were more stable in these cases.

#### Table 1-3. Results of Boundary Negotiations among Villages of the Upper Malinau River

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village boundary</th>
<th>Agreement reached</th>
<th>Documented in writing</th>
<th>Agreement stable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lidung Keminci–Sentaban</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentaban–Setulang</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setulang–Setarap</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setarap–Batu Kajang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batu Kajang–Gong Solok</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batu Kajang–Adiu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gong Solok–Adiu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adiu–Loreh</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adiu–Nunuk Tanah Kibang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Loreh–Gong Solok</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Loreh–Nunuk Tanah Kibang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Loreh–Langap</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langap–Seturan/Punan Rian</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langap–Nunuk Tanah Kibang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langap–Laban Nyarit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langap–Tanjung Nanga</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyarit–Mirau</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyarit–Halarga†</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyarit–Tanjung Nanga</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyarit–Metut</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyarit–Pelancau</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyarit–Long Lake</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanjung Nanga–Seturan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanjung Nanga–Metut</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metut–Pelancau</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelancau–Long Lake</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Lake–Long Jalan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: X indicates yes; — indicates no.
†Stability means that the two villages involved had not challenged the agreed boundary as of July 2000.*
agreements were produced as public announcements signed by two parties and sometimes further signed by the local subdistrict leader (camat). In the past, one village had attached the signatures from attendance at a meeting to a statement of supposed agreement and produced a map showing their own version of the boundary. Trust in written agreements appears to be increasing despite such past abuses. Trust in verbal agreements has certainly declined, perhaps because they are seen as less legitimate and no longer binding.

Negotiations conducted transparently with written agreements were more stable than those that were not. Of the 21 boundary agreements, 14 were stable, while 7 changed within the seven-month period of mapping. The 14 stable agreements were based on more transparent negotiations in which negotiators shared information about the process or contents of their meetings; 10 of the 14 stable agreements were written.

Within six months, however, nearly all villages requested changes even to previously stable boundaries. We attribute these demands to the increasing activity of the small-scale timber permit (IPPK) holders during the latter half of 2000 and the introduction of a new provincial provision enabling villages to claim compensation from timber companies for timber previously harvested. Both changes led villages to increase their land claims even further. Also contributing to the fluidity was the lack of involvement from a higher institution with the authority to provide formal recognition of boundaries and control ad hoc revisions. With decentralization, just where this authority lies is not clear, although many have assumed it is now with the districts. The establishment of the new Malinau District has delayed the local government’s involvement in the boundary demarcation to date. As the district asserts its authority and endorses boundary agreements, we can expect to see more stable results.

Conclusions

What does the Malinau experience in boundary demarcation indicate about the kinds of conditions necessary to facilitate better coordination with other stakeholders and improved negotiations by communities? What do they add to our understanding of emerging principles related to multi-stakeholder processes? We summarize our observations below and draw conclusions about the lessons that could be generalized to other settings.

Understanding the Complexity of Local Power Relations

Boundary negotiations in Malinau highlighted the deeply political nature of coordination efforts, even among seemingly homogeneous community groups. Portraying agreement-building as apolitical or neutral would ignore fundamental power relations that were influential in Malinau. Those power relations were expressed in the way conflicts were defined (e.g., mistrust between villages), the inequalities that made agreements hard to reach or less stable (e.g., differences in capacity and
status among villages), and the lack of representation and attention to negotiations (e.g., among weaker or more marginalized groups).

The Malinau case showed the problems of basing negotiations solely on people’s voiced interests, as leaders covertly discussed among themselves and changed their minds about previous agreements. Instead, we suggest that a fuller understanding of the diverse political relationships among groups can facilitate coordination and negotiation. Such an understanding is necessary for dealing fairly with differences in power among stakeholder groups, particularly in selecting representatives, choosing forums for decisionmaking, and identifying subjects of negotiation that deal with the different aspects of the conflict.

Special effort is needed to encourage effective participation and representation of weaker or disadvantaged groups. We suggest that at a minimum facilitators of coordination pay attention to these differences and give certain advantages to weaker groups. These include, for example, distributing information to them earlier, giving them priority access to resources, and facilitating their preparations for negotiations. More significant measures for longer-term empowerment include organizing community members, assisting them to mobilize resources, and helping them to develop strategic alliances. All of this depends, of course, on the desire of the group in question to receive such extra attention, and facilitators should take care not to create an identity of disadvantage that prevents the group in question from empowering themselves. Facilitators also need to take care not to alienate more powerful groups in the process by creating unfair advantages or overprotecting the group in question.

Dealing with Fluidity

In Malinau, the more intense the underlying struggle, especially in the absence of a third-party authority, the more fluid the villagers’ interests, agreements, and coordination. Periodic opportunities to claim resources—as with the advent of decentralization, the changing monetary value of local resources, the creation of the new district, and the introduction of the mapping activity—directly increased these struggles. Villagers sometimes actively avoided reaching stable decisions in part because they lacked knowledge of an appropriate solution, given the rapidly changing conditions.

During periods of fluidity, a focus on managing conflict to maintain constructive debate is likely to be more productive than forcing an agreement. Instead of investing in formalizing and implementing agreements, facilitators can anticipate conflict and seek only tentative agreements that require a testing period. In this way, agreements reached quickly can be tested for their loopholes. Villagers can also use this time to develop a shared understanding of what the agreements imply. Investment in implementing the agreement could occur after evidence of reasonable stability.

Where constant modifications of agreements cause frustration and incur high costs, we observe the need for negotiators to build more supportive political constituencies from both the top and bottom. In Malinau, transparent decisionmaking and consultation with communities were key to achieving and then keeping an agreement with villagers. The presence of a third party with authority and legiti-
macy above the level of the village to set the criteria for resolving conflicts and to validate and enforce legitimate agreements could have ended much debate. Such top-down measures probably need to include districts making use of provincial and national policies and agencies to reinforce local decisions.

**Improving Accountability in Decisionmaking**

In Malinau, only a handful of people were involved in negotiations. These representatives, if the label is even apt, were weakly accountable or unaccountable to their communities. Networks, communication, and trust were frequently strong among selected leaders, or between leaders and companies, but much weaker between leaders and their constituencies. These conditions made it difficult for conflict to be managed in transparent ways, which kept disagreements from being acknowledged and agreements from being implemented.

Abuses of power are likely to persist unless certain checks are put in place. Broader consultation with factions in communities and better reporting back to communities can assist with building transparency. Complete accountability to villagers would be difficult to implement, however, with groups such as the Kenyah and Merap, because of their tradition of hierarchical control by the aristocratic class. In Malinau, the history of upward accountability of government representatives, the hierarchical nature of customary leaders, the strong local networks, and the pressures for striking quick deals have led to regular abuses of power that will not change easily.

**Increasing Legitimacy and Coordination**

Given the on-going struggles and highly unequal power relationships in places like Malinau, the potential is great for abuse of power in multi-stakeholder coordination processes. Such abuse can cause existing conflicts to escalate, particularly under the conditions of greater openness enjoyed now in Indonesia, and result in protests involving disruption of work, degradation of forest resources, and destruction of property, as has already been seen in Malinau.

In Malinau, the present institutional gap has left no clear customary or government authorities for settling conflicts. Self-interest and the close relationships between many government officials and local customary leaders have made many citizens question the legitimacy of these authorities. There is thus a need to build coordination upon stronger foundations of governance about what citizens and authorities consider legitimate operating principles and outcomes.

**Conclusions**

Our experience in facilitating boundary demarcation in Malinau marked only the beginning of a long and multistranded process for achieving better coordination
among the very diverse stakeholders interested in Malinau’s forests (see Annex 1–2 for some preliminary impacts). The research demonstrated the current vulnerabilities in coordination and agreement-making in Malinau. The political support for coordination is often fragile; few safeguards exist to ensure fair negotiations for weaker groups; and no clear authorities are in place to support and endorse these processes. Very real gains have been made, however, in empowering local communities to begin the processes of asserting claims to their territories and of establishing debate about rights associated with those claims. Communities, government, and companies are now keen to complete those processes, and by heeding the lessons of Malinau’s experience, they may succeed in generating their own local brand of democracy.

Notes

The project was conducted by the following members of the Bulungan Adaptive Collaborative Management and Core Mapping Teams from 1998–2000: Salmon Alfarisi, Sargius Anye, Njau Anau, Ramses Iwan, Pajar Gumelar, Miriam van Heist, Godwin Limberg, Made Sudana, Nyoman Wigunaya, Asung Uluk, and Lini Wollenberg. We wish to express our thanks to and acknowledge the support of the following parties: the local government of Malinau District; Roem Topatimas and INSIST; Carol J. Pierce Colfer, Kuswata Kartawinata, Steve Rhee, David Edmunds, Yurdi Yasmi, and Herwasono Soedjito from CIFOR; Jalong Lawai, and Paulus Irang of Long Loreh; Samuel ST Padan and WWF-Kalimantan Action Network; WWF-Kayan Mentarang; Ade Cahyat and Konsortium Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan-Kaltim; Niel Makanuddin and Plasma; Franky and Yayasan Tanah Merdeka; Amin Jafar and Yayasan Padi; H. Sayo and Pemberdayaan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam Kerakyatan; Mairaji and Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat; and Jon Corbett and the University of Victoria. The work was jointly funded by ITTO (primary donor) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

1. Coordination refers here to decisions that seek to achieve an aim on behalf of a group in light of the many self-interests of individual group members. Coordination can be self-organized (DiZerega 2000; Ostrom 1999) or imposed from outside. We assume here that coordination is likely to be more successful where it can balance self-determination by group members with institutions at the group or supragroup level that maintain authority and legitimacy to make and enforce decisions on behalf of the group.

2. We use Rossi’s (1997) interpretation of deliberative here: dialogue and discussion that operate in an “engaged mode, somewhere between mere respect and confrontation” (205); deliberative democratic decisionmaking refers to a process in which individuals seek to go beyond their self-interest—although such interests might be part of the dialogue—and make decisions based on their perception of the common good.


4. These recommendations are drawn from Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001 and Wollenberg et al. 2001c, the latter of which is a synthesis of other papers.

5. For the earliest periods we can only draw evidence from historical documents and oral histories and try to extrapolate from conditions observed in more traditional villages, although the latter is risky (see Sellato 2001 for a historical overview of Malinau during the past 150 years).
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6. The Kayan, Merap, Kenyah, Punan are all local ethnic groups, as are Tidung, Berusu’, and Lundaye (see below). The Punan are a hunter-gatherer group, traditionally, whereas the other groups survive by shifting cultivation. The Tidung are Muslim and were organized into a sultanate in the past.

7. Fox (forthcoming) characterizes overlapping sovereignties in the late 1800s in Thailand, writing that sovereignties were “neither single nor exclusive” (2), but rather (citing Winichakul 1994, 88) “capable of being shared—one for its own ruler and one for its overlord—not in terms of a divided sovereignty but rather a sovereignty of hierarchical layers.”

8. According to Sellato (2001), Dutch control in the Bulungan sultanate began in 1850 with a Politiek contract, was furthered in 1877 with an agreement for the Dutch to handle some of the sultanate’s affairs, and was formalized in the late 1880s as part of the Dutch colony. In the early 1900s the Dutch forced the sultan to turn over control of the remoter regions of the Bahau River, Pujungan River, and Apo Kayan. They also worked with the sultanate, for example, to put down a Dayak rebellion in 1909 in the Tidung lands (which include the current Malinau River area).

9. According to Sellato (2001), in 1950 Bulungan became a Wilayah Swapraja (autonomous territory) of Indonesia after the Japanese occupation, and then in 1955, a Wilayah Istimewa (special territory). In 1959, after the last sultan, Jalaluddin, died in 1958, the sultanes were abolished, and Bulungan became an ordinary district (Daerah Tingkat II or kabupaten).

10. Prior to the Merap, it is believed that the Berusu’ and Punan occupied the area (Kaskija 2000; Sellato 2001).

11. Even though demands for compensation had been made previously, villagers received few, if any, benefits in response.

12. This is not to imply that conditions before decentralization were always lawful or fair. There are numerous examples of small-scale illegal logging and other illicit and unfair activities from the prereform era.

13. Historically they have lacked the strong social cohesion of groups such as the Kenyah or Lundaye and have lacked effective institutions for representing their interests. Only in the mid-1990s did the Punan in Malinau organize the appointment of a Punan customary leader.

14. We defined agreement as concurrence between two villages about the location of their boundary.

15. We used strength of leadership (economic status of leader, e.g., food surpluses; quality of home construction; access to significant or regular cash income; possession of productive assets, such as rice mills, or luxury items like satellite dishes; alliances with powerful external groups; support of leader by community; and level of leader’s education), cohesiveness of community (economic status of community, e.g., similar to leader but more broad-based; internal loyalties and mutual supportiveness; alliances with powerful external groups; skills and education levels; support of leader by community; and level of leader’s education), and access to information (transparency of mapping process within village; knowledge of their territory) as indicators of a village’s institutional capacities and power.

16. A score of 0, 0.5, or 1 was assigned for each of the three dimensions above.
### Annex 1-1. Scores of Village Capacity and Power Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Strength of leadership</th>
<th>Strength of community</th>
<th>Access to information</th>
<th>Village score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sentaban</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setulang</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setarap</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batu Kajang</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gong Solok</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adu</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Loreh</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langap</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seturan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunuk Tanah Kibang</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laban Nyart</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirau</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halanga’</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanjung Nanga</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metut</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelancau</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Lake</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Jalan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The village score derives from strength of leadership, community strength, and access to information (value: Weak = 0; Medium = 0.5; Strong = 1). Strength of leadership is measured by economic status, external connections, community support, and education. Strength of community is measured by internal loyalties, economic status, human resources, and external connections. Access to information is measured by knowledge of their territory, knowledge of the mapping activities, and community discussion.

### Annex 1-2. Impacts of Mapping

As of November 2001, more than a year after the completion of the mapping, we observed several important impacts of the negotiation process and mapping activity. First, a new awareness emerged among all stakeholder groups of the location and extent of different villages, as well as the value of mapping as a means for making claims to land. This awareness can be considered a necessary basis for coordinated landscape management. Although CIFOR did not distribute maps of a village to others and clearly marked maps as drafts, villagers themselves often shared them (especially with local investors), and CIFOR displayed the maps in several meetings with other stakeholders.

Second, new types of boundaries emerged as some villages (e.g., Tanjung Nanga and Langap) reconceptualized boundaries as straight lines or along roads rather than natural features. For most groups, the conceptualization of territory subtly shifted, from being defined by a center settlement point or a main river of a watershed to having an emphasis on outer boundaries. For some groups, especially the Punan, we suspect that the mapping has reinforced the historical trend of gradual territorialization of previously nomadic or shifting groups, a trend accompanied by an increasing tendency among inland groups to want to register their land as property, and even to seek private rather than communal property. It is too early to
tell whether such changes are significant and benefit or harm Malinau’s populations and forest, but they do signal changing attitudes and values related to land. Developments in the policy environment related to *adat* and IPPK claims will strongly influence how these changes play out.

Third, community capacities for mapping and negotiation improved. Small teams of people in each mapped community gained experience with the methods and equipment necessary to geographically reference and plot a series of points in their village on a map. Understanding of maps—including scales, legends, orientation, and their uses—became stronger in each village. Through the process of negotiation and with input from CIFOR, communities have greater understanding of representation and the need for building a wider political base of support for reaching an acceptable agreement. This understanding increased among a broad range of community members. Many community leaders were savvy enough to know, and decide when to use more (or as was usually the case, less) participatory approaches. Since the project began, community members have increasingly demanded that their leaders use more transparent, inclusive processes for consultations and decisionmaking.