RESOURCE, RE COURSE AND DECISIONS: INCENTIVE STRUCTURES IN FOREST DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EAST AFRICA

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The management of forest resources in Uganda has vacillated from centralization to decentralization over the past century.

However, In 2003-The new Forest Act of 2003

- delineated responsibilities for forest management in Uganda.
  - Established the autonomous National forest Authority (NFA)
  - District Forest services (DFS)
  - Forest inspection division (Now Forest support services department)
History of forest management in E.Africa – Cont.

- In Kenya, Forest conservation and management
  - guided by the forest policy of 1957
  - revised in 1968,
  - then again in 1994

- Policy created a highly centralized government bureaucracy
History of forest management in E. Africa
–Cont..

- In 1983- the government attempted to decentralize its activities
  - decentralization of administrative functions to the provinces and districts
  - the forest department created district forest offices across the country.

- in the early 1990s the government initiated pilot collaborative forest management between local communities and Forest Department in selected forest reserves in Kenya.

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Unlike Uganda, Kenya’s reform of the forestry sector is very recent. Kenya passed decentralization laws in July of 2005. Forest Department was in May of 2006 replaced with a Kenya Forests Service, mandated with the development of partnerships for sustainable forest management.
Why Decentralize?

- Governance reforms in natural resources management have not occurred in isolation.
- Part of wider processes of democratization to increase:
  - efficiency
  - flexibility,
  - Equity, and
  - Accountability.
Analyzing Accountability in Decentralized Resource Governance Regimes

- For this paper, we analyze whether the form of decentralization of forest resources in East Africa is likely to lead to:
  - Increased accountability in the forest sector
What is Accountability

- Schedler (1999) defines accountability as
  - “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct"
Forms of accountability

- democratic elections represent the most direct way for political accountability
- citizens have the right to ask their elected officials to render accounts—
  - to present information to the public on how government officials have spent public funds
  - regularly hold public meetings where they present progress reports to interested citizens.

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Analyzing Accountability

- We can learn a great deal about a system’s de facto accountability by
  - Understanding the direction and volume of the financial resources that flow between actors in the decentralized forest system.
  - Understand who gets what, how much, from whom, and for what purpose.
We can also learn a great deal about a system’s de facto accountability by:

- Analyzing the strength of political recourse that exist between myriad of actors in the system
  - Understand who has authority over whom, who is accountable to whom and to what extent are these rights actually monitored and enforced?
Analyzing Accountability-Cont.

- We suggest that by mapping these flows in a Recourse and Resource Diagram (RRD) it is possible to get a better sense of what the de facto accountability for a particular system is likely to look like on the ground.

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How is this done?

Recourse (influence, rights to engage and appeal decisions)

Resources (financial resource inputs)

- National Government
- Local Government
- NGOs
- Resource User Groups
The Recourse and Resource Diagram above depicts the relationships in terms:

- of the existence recourse (the political right to hold another actor accountable and the extent to which this right is actually enforced)
- and the financial resources that might flow between actors in a governance system.
How is this done? Cont.

- A red arrow from the Central government to the local government
  - central government has authority over the local government
  - and can hold the local officials to account for their decisions and actions.

- A dotted green arrow from NGO’s to Local User Groups
  - money flows in that direction.

- Both the green and red arrows represent de jure arrangements,
  - it is when we consider these two relationship characteristics together that we can begin to appreciate de facto accountability.
Using the Resource and Recourse diagnostic tool in the field

Next we examine the usefulness of this tool in a comparative study of two forest-dependent communities in East Africa.

- Mabira forest reserve in Uganda
- Kakamega forest reserve in Kenya
Study Forests

- Mabira, is a 300-km² forest located about 50 km from Uganda's capital, Kampala and 26 km from Jinja, in central Uganda.
- Kakamega is a 17838ha forest located in western Kenya.
  - These two forests are tropical moist forests,
  - rich in biodiversity and
  - surrounded by densely populated areas,
  - most of whom are dependent on the forest for their livelihoods and cultural rituals.
Pressure on the two forests is intense,
- with many competing land uses such as plantation agriculture (predominantly sugar and tea), small-holder subsistence agriculture, and ecotourism.

These forests also provide crucial habitat for a range of endangered
- bird species and endemic forest trees, and

performs crucial ecosystem functions.

Managers of both forests face a daunting challenge of balancing these often contradictory needs.
Both forests represent a diversity of governance regimes,
The main management authorities are government actors.
  - In Kenya, the Forest Department (now Kenya Forest Service) and the Kenya Wildlife Service have been the key authorities mandated with management,
  - In Uganda the National Forest Authority is the main authority mandated with management in Uganda.
Objectives of the study

- This study compares the structure of decision making in Kakamega and Mabira forests using the resource and recourse tool.

- It seeks to find out how these governance regimes impact on local actors’ capabilities to influence forest management.

- It also seeks to assess the incentives of local actors under these divergent institutional arrangements.
At the national and district levels, forest officials and their staff were interviewed. Together, we mapped the changes:

- in the decision-making process
- in division of roles and responsibility of forest monitoring, rule enforcement among the various actors,
- and development of forest management plans following the implementation of the decentralization policy in Uganda and the implementation of the pilot collaborative forest management in Kanya.
At the community level, focused group discussions were held with:

- local politicians, elders, and forest user groups.
- The discussions focused on understanding the roles, responsibilities and benefits the community expect from participating in forest management.
Methods cont.

- In a one-day workshop attended by:
  - local and national forest officials,
  - local and national politicians
  - policy makers and
  - Forest user

- Developed the resource and recourse diagrams to illustrate:
  - the flow of decisions, information, authority, responsibility, and financial and human resources before and after the decentralization
Results

- The minimal decentralization of Kakamega forest is here contrasted with a more profound decentralization in Uganda’s Mabira forest, which has had close to a decade of implementation experience.
Mabira Forest: Actors and Interactions before decentralization

- Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment
- Other Gov Min. or Departments (e.g. AGRIC, UWA, UIA)
- NGOs
- DFO (CFR & LFR and all trees on private & public land)
- CBOs
- Communities
- Private Forest-Owners

Arrows indicate interactions and relationships between the actors.
MIN OF LOCAL GOV.

MLW AND ENVIRONMENT

OTHER GOV MIN. OR DEPARTMENTS E.g. AGRIC, UWA, UIA

FSSD

NEMA

WID

DFO LFR & All trees on private and public L

LFR & All trees on private and public L

CBOs

COMMUNITIES

NGOs

PRIVATE FOREST-OWNERS

LC I

LC II

LC III

LC V

NAADS

NFA CFR
**Major Actors include:**

- the Sector Manager in charge of:
- Forest management of Mabira
- Ecotourism and Collaborative Forest Management (CFM).
- Area Supervisor.
  - These NFA staffs who work with the support of the Sub-county LC III, LC II and LC I.
- local communities and other community based organizations can legally participate in monitoring, rule enforcement and forest improvement.

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Accountability in Mabira after decentralization

- Mukono district local govt. as an actor in Mabira,
  - Local councilors are subjected to periodic elections, an important avenue of recourse for those dissatisfied with their performance.
  - Local government has the authority to collect and retain revenue from forest extraction activities.

The communities, through their local councils, are now participants in rule making and vet the licensing of forest extraction

- Make by-laws in council meetings
- The communities through collaborative forest management committees can now directly participate in resource management
- Individual farmers are accountable to the rest of the community through the local councils
Accountability in Mabira after decentralization-Cont.

- National Forest Authority and of the District Forest Services are accountable to:
  - The Forest sector support division of the ministry of water and environment
  - Mukono District Environmental Committee, which coordinates their activities in Mabira
Avenues for Recourse

- Farmers/communities around Mabira now have a diversified pool of people to help solve their problems, from different organizations and at multiple levels:
  - local level collaborative forest management committees,
  - area supervisor and sector managers,
  - Wakisi sub-county officials,
  - Mukono district forest office, range manager,
  - NFA head office and FSSD.
But how effective are new organizations and relationships?

- The effectiveness of these channels and processes is unclear. For example,

  - in some areas around Mabira, collaborative management committees are not yet formed or are inactive or need constant supervision.
  - Some Community based organizations around Mabira are just in the process of being formed
  - Other CBOs are ‘brief case organizations,’ with nothing to show for their activities.
  - While local councils are involved in making decisions and rules for the management of local forest resources, most do not.
But how effective are new organizations - Cont.

- Most local councils are strapped for resources and not making sufficient allocations to the forest sector.
  - For example, Wakisi LC111, where Mabira forest is located allocates only three million Ug. Shillings, equivalent to two thousand US $ per year for forest activities in the sub-county.
- The environmental committees at the LC1 and LC111 in the sub-county are also not yet functional.
- The Mukono district forest services (the district in which Mabira forest located) is not operational due to limited human and financial capital.
Other disincentives in the reform system

- Leasing of forest reserves to private investors
  - lowers accessibility to forest products by locals who previously had access.
  - financial rewards to communities are much lowered by the leases and accrue instead to the private sector,
  - Local farmers are entitled to lease at least 10% of the forest land but can not meet the conditions set by FSSD in order to receive funding through the saw log scheme.
Other disincentives in the reform system-
cont.

- Decentralization reforms transferred the management of large forest reserves (i.e. greater than 100ha) to the NFA and the district councils were left with smaller forests, many of which have been degraded with limited financial rewards
Other disincentives in the reform system-
cont.

- If the amount of time and labor invested by communities in forest patrol and rule enforcement is factored in, then costs of participation to individual might run higher than benefits and incentives to engage in sustainable management run the risk of being undermined.
Kakamega forest: Actors before decentralization

- The fig shows the structure of the Forest Department prior to decentralization.
- The downward arrows represent the flow of authoritative decisions, while the upward arrows represent the flow of revenues and reporting.
- Decision-making power in the Forest Department in Kenya was heavy at the top before decentralization.
- There was little feedback along the hierarchy save for the writing of monthly, quarterly or annual reports.
Structure of Kenya’s Forest Department before Decentralization Reforms

- Chief Conservator of Forests
  - Deputy Chief Conservator of Forests (2)
    - Provincial Forest officer (8)
      - District Forest Officer (72)
        - Forester (several)
Forest Management in Kenya after Decentralization
Kakamega forest: Actors after decentralization

- Following decentralization, there are several actors in the forest who have direct or indirect contribution to its conservation and management. These organizations can be categorized into 5 major groups:
  - Government organizations: Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Culture and Social Services
  - Parastatals: Kenya Forest Service; Kenya Wildlife Service;
  - Kenya Forestry Research Institute, National Environmental Management Authority
  - International organizations and NGO’s: International Centre for Research and Agro Forestry, ICIPE- International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology
Kakamega forest: Actors After decentralization

- Once again, the FD is the primary organization with regard to forest monitoring and protection.
- It authorizes forest activities, both consumptive (such as harvesting of forest products) and non-consumptive (such as ecotourism) with its areas of jurisdiction.
Kakamega forest: Actors After decentralization-Cont.

- In return, communities are mobilized to helping to monitoring and patrolling the forest. Funding for forest activities is largely obtained through international NGOs and from local NGOs.
Avenues for Recourse

- The Forest Department is still the central authority in decision making.
  - It still determines who can benefit from forest use and in what way.
  - Local communities only involved in policing
  - And finding alternatives to reduce reliance on forest resource.

- There are limited alternatives for conflict resolution and redress of grievance.
Lessons from decentralization reforms in East Africa

- Decentralization reforms in Kenya and Uganda are still in their infancy
- In Kenya, piloting:
  - did not change the structure of engagement
  - it was still top down
  - It exploited the labor of communities in forest monitoring,
  - did not give them sufficient alternatives for redressing dissatisfaction
Lessons from decentralization reforms in East Africa-cont.

- However, piloting paved way for:
  - the interaction of multiple actors
  - development of community based organizations and forest associations,
  - for planting trees,
  - regeneration of degraded forest patches and
  - ecotourism.
Lessons from decentralization reforms in East Africa-cont.

- The current incentive structure in Kenya, is insufficient to warrant greater effort at local communities participation in forest management.
Lessons from decentralization reforms in East Africa-cont.

- In Uganda, there is scope for enforcing accountability through:
  - an electoral process
  - local actors have an assortment of options for redress over grievances and/or advisory support for their activities.
  - Local actors are subject to oversight by higher and lower authorities.
Lessons from decentralization reforms in East Africa-cont.

- It is important to address the following inconsistencies in the decentralisation reforms in Uganda
  - under funding of local governments
  - improve incentives for individual farmers,
    - ploughing back of revenues collected from product taxation and permits to reward community managers involved in patrolling and forest improvement activities.
    - Conditions for leasing forests to farmers for tree planting be relaxed
    - part of the forest reserve should be left natural so that farmers can continue to obtain the products