DEVOLUTION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND POWER SHIFTS

A synthesis of case studies from southern Africa

Sheona Shackleton and Bruce Campbell
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### List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Area Development Committee – Malawi/Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMADE</td>
<td>Administrative Management Design for Game Management areas – Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Annual General Meetings</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress – South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources – Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Controlled Hunting Area – Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Conservancy Management Committee - Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Communal Property Association - South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>Community Resource Board – Zambia</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>District Assembly - Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>District Development Committees - Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNPWS</td>
<td>Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services- Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation</td>
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<td>GMA</td>
<td>Game Management Area - Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Agency for Technical Development (Gesellschaft fuer Technnische Zusammenarbeit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>Kruger National Park – South Africa</td>
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<td>LIFE</td>
<td>Living in a Finite Environment Project – LIFE - Namibia</td>
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<td>LLC</td>
<td>Local Leaders Committee - Zambia</td>
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<td>MPs</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development</td>
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<td>NRM</td>
<td>Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rural District Council – Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Resident Development Committee - Zambia</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Range Management Area - Lesotho</td>
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<td>SANP</td>
<td>South African National Parks</td>
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<td>SLAMU</td>
<td>South Luangwa Area Management Unit – Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNV</td>
<td>SNV/Netherlands Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Transitional Local Council – South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Transitional Rural Council – South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDC</td>
<td>Village Development Committee – Botswana/Malawi/Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFA</td>
<td>Village Forest Area - Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFC</td>
<td>Village Forest Committee - Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>VGA</td>
<td>Village Action Group – Zambia</td>
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<td>VIDCO</td>
<td>Village Development Committee - Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNRMC</td>
<td>Village Natural Resource Management Committee - Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>WADCO</td>
<td>Ward Development Committee - Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDC</td>
<td>Ward Development Committee – Zambia/Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMA</td>
<td>Wildlife Management Authority – Zambia</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
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Executive summary

Throughout the region there has been a move to empower communities to manage natural resources (wildlife and forestry). This paper provides a comparative analysis of the devolution and empowerment process in 14 case studies drawn from eight countries in southern Africa. Each case study examined the extent to which policy and legislation devolves significant control over decision making and benefit flows to communities; the legitimacy and power of different community institutions and their relationship with other stakeholders such as local authority structures, NGOs, donor agencies, and the private sector; and lastly the relationships and divisions between different actors and groupings in the community. The impacts of devolution were found to differ considerably among case studies both within and between countries. Many of the cases cannot therefore be interpreted as representative of the countries. The study revealed that while some empowerment schemes appear to be marked successes others appear doomed to failure, or if one is more optimistic, have resulted in the development of capacity within certain organisations but are unlikely to result in sustainable systems of natural resource management (NRM).

The community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) cases covered in this study can be classified into four main types or “institutional models”. (1) In some cases the empowerment process has resulted in district structures being the new loci of power. These may be local government structures, such as the Rural District Councils in the Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE case, or multi-stakeholder forums aligned to line ministries, and with strong representation by traditional leaders, as in the Zambia cases. In all these cases there is little community involvement in planning or decision-making, and a large percentage of the revenue is retained at district level. Consequently, people on the ground rarely identify with these initiatives, and, indeed, few have a clear understanding of their purpose and objectives. This paints a bleak picture for the future of CBNRM in these areas. (2) In other cases, line department-sponsored organisations at lower levels, such as Village Forest Committees in the Tanzania case and Village Natural Resource Management Committees in the Malawi case are the new loci of power. Many of these committees appear relatively successful as CBNRM institutions, provided they do not become elitist but remain accountable to the community at large (mechanisms to ensure this need to be in place). Furthermore, the greater the authority and power such committees receive and the more the state is willing to let go, the more likely they are to succeed. Thus, in Malawi and Tanzania the committees, in consultation with the community, can formulate their own by-laws, while the Resource Management Committees in the Zimbabwe Gokwe case are weak and still largely controlled by the Forestry Commission. (3) The third case is when there is very little “imposed” NRM at the lower level, but what does exist is largely derived through structures and systems outside of the state hierarchy, such as traditional customs and norms in the Zimbabwe Chivi case and Resident's Associations in the Fish River case. In these cases, the lack of external support and the absence of any clear policy and legal framework for CBNRM is limiting the achievement of sustainable NRM. (4) Finally there are cases that can be considered to be truly community-based, where legally recognised
organisations consisting of community members themselves are the new locus of power, for example Trusts, property associations, and user associations in the cases of Botswana, Namibia, Makuleke and Lesotho. In these cases local residents or resource users have been devolved user or proprietary rights over resources. This provides them with the authority, through their elected executives or boards, to make rules, to approve developments, to enter in partnerships with the private sector, to receive revenues and to distribute benefits. There is very little state interference in any part of the process, and 96-100% of the cash benefits are returned to the community. Analysis of attitudes towards CBNRM has shown that community-members are particularly behind the scheme in these cases, and in some countries a demand-driven movement to establish further such CBNRM initiatives is emerging.

The state and communities are not the only stakeholders in CBNRM. Indeed, having appropriate policies and institutions for CBNRM that empower communities to manage resources is insufficient to guarantee success. All the studies have demonstrated the key role that NGOs and donor agencies play in facilitating the CBNRM process and building the capacity of local organisations. Given the social complexities at a local level, the high potential for conflict and the lack of experience in running business partnerships, the more successful CBNRM initiatives, such as in Botswana, Namibia, and the Makuleke in South Africa, have received long-term “light-touch” support from dedicated NGOs. A number of these NGOs have also acted as mediators or power brokers between communities and the state, helping to level the playing field and ensure true community participation. This is particularly important in co-management situations, and the Gokwe case in Zimbabwe may have benefited from such input. Funding from donor agencies is essential to cover the costs of facilitation, as the governments of the various countries simply do not have the resources for this. The danger is that an unhealthy dependency on these external funds is created, often resulting in the collapse of the initiatives when the funders withdraw (as happened in Lesotho). It is also unclear whether such high levels of funding would be available for new initiatives within the same country. Donors often prefer to support “pilot” projects and would be unlikely to fund a nation-wide programme. This presents problems for “replication” and the expansion of CBNRM programmes to new areas. A further role for NGOs and donors is in advocacy and lobbying. This sometimes places them in an adversarial role with the state (e.g. in the Lesotho and the Makuleke cases). Donors are, however, in a fairly powerful position in that they can attach conditions to their funding which forces the state to re-look at its policies and implementation approaches. In most of the countries studied, NGOs and donors have been instrumental in driving the agenda towards greater local level control of natural resources.

Another important stakeholder in the CBNRM process is the traditional leadership. In all case studies, with the exception of those in Tanzania and the Fish River in South Africa, where this institution has been almost totally displaced, the traditional authorities have continued to play a role in NRM with varying degrees of authority and control. In Zambia, chiefs assert a disproportionate degree of power as chairpersons of the
sub-district wildlife management structures (a position that allows them to divert some of the benefits of CBNRM to building their own power base). A similar situation applies in Lesotho. On the other extreme, the exclusion of traditional leaders from new CBNRM structures in Namibia resulted in conflict and delays, and their subsequent co-option onto the conservancy committees. Since traditional authority structures have long played a role in the management of natural resources and are likely to remain an important institution at the local level, the key to success appears to be in achieving a balance regarding their relative power and influence in CBNRM. Providing traditional leaders with an ex-officio or non-executive role (e.g. as patrons) has been one way forward for a number of cases. In others, e.g. Malawi, the CBNRM organisations report to the traditional leaders who remain external to the committee. Another solution is to leave it to communities themselves to elect whether or not the hereditary leaders are represented on the CBNRM structures. Where the traditional leadership is strong and legitimate it will be supported, and can have a very positive impact on CBNRM as discussed in the Malawi, Makuleke and Lesotho case studies. Where it is weak or biased towards certain ethnic groupings, as in the Botswana case, chiefs and other lineage leaders will have little support or role.

The private sector provides the key for income generation in many CBNRM initiatives. This applies particularly in cases where valuable wildlife resources are involved, and where there is high potential for tourism and safari hunting. In Namibia and Botswana, CBOs enter directly into partnership with the private sector, and hold the rights to retain all revenues from tourism and hunting for later disbursement to the community. The same process is expected to apply in the Makuleke case. In contrast, in Zambia, the community benefits little from private sector involvement other than the opportunity for employment. All negotiations take place directly with the Department of National Parks and Tourism (DNPW) after selection of the tourism company by the National Tender Board. Fees and levies are retained by the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund. Furthermore, private sector operators are able to obtain title deeds to communal land via a procedure that involves a whole range of stakeholders (local chief, District Council, DNPW, the Zambian National Tourism Board and Commissioner of Lands) except the community themselves. Once title is transferred, the private operator is under no obligation to share revenues with the community. In Zimbabwe private operators deal mainly with the Rural District Councils, similarly isolating communities from any discussions and decisions in this sphere. Indeed, the community in Sengwe, Zimbabwe complained about a lack of communication with the private operator.

Another type of private operator is the individual entrepreneur. Whilst they can bring in revenue via permit fees and other levies, a number of studies have highlighted that entrepreneurs from both inside and outside the community are posing a serious threat to effective community management of resources. This particularly applies to woodcarvers and charcoal producers in the forest management cases of Malawi and Zimbabwe. These powerful actors tend to ignore local regulations and controls, undermining the authority of community institutions and appropriating the resource base at the expense of local community members.
Where CBNRM institutions have attempted to take action, they have received threats and warnings from the perpetrators. In these situations, government law enforcement agencies have been relatively ineffective in providing back-up support. Under such scenarios, there is often a fine line between promoting strategies that enhance the value and benefit of natural resources as an incentive to manage them better (one of the principles of CBNRM), and the potentially negative impacts that enhanced commercialisation may bring especially when the opportunities are recognised and exploited by more powerful groups outside the local community.

In all the case studies problems arose regarding the issue of “who is the community”. In many cases these related to defining the membership of the group to participate in the CBNRM initiative, as well as the boundaries to the management area. For example, in Mumbwa GMA, Zambia, the “community” who benefits from wildlife management is much larger than the “community” who is directly affected by wildlife. As a result the benefits from wildlife management are severely diluted and seldom outweigh the costs for households living within the GMA. This provides little incentive to participate in the programme and “poaching” is still rampant. In Namibia, establishment of many of the conservancies was delayed due to conflicts over land and boundaries. However, because the legislation requires that communal area residents themselves define the conservancy boundaries and membership, most of these problems could eventually be resolved with the aid of external mediators. The Namibian wildlife authorities also accept that “community “ is dynamic, and recognise that conservancies will shrink and expand as boundaries are adjusted to fit with more appropriate social and ecological scales. This flexibility is far more likely to lead to successful CBNRM than the rigid approaches used in other countries.

Highly stratified and differentiated communities are a feature of all the case studies. As a result, intra-community power struggles and conflicts, between, for example, different ethnic groups, groups with varying allegiances to modern and traditional structures, the youth and the established leaders, different user groups, and so on, are not uncommon and were mentioned for most countries. Many of the case studies also referred to a community “elite” who are strong, educated and articulate with the capacity to link in with the state apparatus or private operators and thereby control decision-making and the flow of benefits. These local level complexities need to be recognised and taken account of by CBNRM implementers. It is here that external facilitators such as NGOs can play a critical role. The building of CBNRM institutions that are representative of the different interests amongst local actors and sensitive to the dynamics and power relations in the community is an intensive and time consuming process. It involves bringing all local actors, regardless of socio-economic background, together in a negotiation process. Differences and conflicts of interest need to be worked through, and collective stakes should be strengthened through a social learning process. It was strongly argued in a number of cases that any attempt to speed up implementation and ignore the social process would condemn the initiative to failure from the start.
Conflicting policies or a lack of complementarity and integration between policies and implementation across natural resource sectors is another factor affecting the success of CBNRM. As outlined above, most countries have policies that attempt to empower local people to manage resources, but in many countries these policies may be empowering for one sector (often wildlife), while command and control policies continue to apply in other sectors (often forestry resources other than wildlife). The principles of CBNRM need to be extended to cover all natural resources in a manner that ensures integration with, rather than further complicates, the already multifaceted institutional set-up. There are also instances where policies may be promoting contradictory outcomes. For example, in Lesotho, Grazing Associations are empowered to manage grazing areas, but other policies give rights to all citizens to use the resource, even if they are not part of the Association. This undermines the common property base of Grazing Associations.

Multiple structures operating at the same level, but guided by different policies and legislation, are a feature in most countries. Many of these have unclear mandates and overlapping functions and responsibilities in NRM (with Zambia and Lesotho probably being the most complex). This applies particularly to the parallel hierarchy formed by local government and the traditional leadership. The result of this institutional ambiguity is a great deal of confusion on the ground, contestation and power struggles between structures, and a weakening of authority all round that often creates an institutional gap that can be exploited by those with vested interests. It is clear that policies that explicitly devolve power to communities, as in the case of the Makuleke, Botswana and Namibia, or to village level state-sponsored structures, as in the case of Tanzania and Malawi, help to avoid some of these complexities and associated conflicts. However, the opposite concern now applies, in that there is a danger that these new community-based institutions become isolated enclaves that are dissociated from the wider district or regional development context, as is happening in Botswana. One of the consequences of this is a loss of support by the broader community and political structures.

In conclusion, this study has shown that the move to CBNRM within the region has taken many different forms and pathways, and has been influenced by a variety of factors and contexts at both a national and local level. Environmental, political and social-economic conditions vary widely between countries and case studies, affecting quite dramatically the conditions and incentives for devolution, collective action, and effective CBNRM. All the cases highlight the complexity of the local situation in terms of history, socio-economic setting, the range of stakeholders involved, the parallel structures of local governance, and the high potential for conflict, pointing to the need for flexible and adaptive approaches to CBNRM. Overall, policies and implementation approaches that provide community members with the authority to make decisions regarding the use and management of natural resources appear to have a greater chance of succeeding than those transferring control to higher levels, providing attention is paid to capacity building.
1. Introduction

In recent years, coinciding with the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in development theory and practice, there has been a policy shift to advocate that local resource users and their organisations play a much more active role in the protection and management of land and natural resources (Jodha and Bhatia 1998, Ainslie 1999). Concomitant and complementary to this was a recognition that state control has been largely unsuccessful, costly and financially unsustainable requiring a new more decentralised approach to local level natural resource management (NRM).

As a result, over the last 10-15 years community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has received considerable policy, development and research attention (Getz et al. 1999, Christofferson et al. 1998) and the move to local control is now well advanced in most countries (Matose and Wily 1996, IIED 1994). There has been considerable progress in devolving power over forests from the state to local communities in Asia, and there are now also numerous examples within Africa. Within the wildlife sector, there has been much activity in the last decade, especially in southern Africa, where almost all countries have examples of programmes designed to empower communities to manage and benefit from wildlife.

Focusing on southern Africa, a range of different policies, sectors, agencies and processes have driven the emergence of a diversity of CBNRM models and initiatives. In Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia, the conservation sector, through a wildlife management focus, has provided the major initiative for CBNRM, resulting in, amongst others, CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, the Communal Area Conservancies in Namibia, and the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project in Zambia. In South Africa, the land reform process, in particular land restitution, has been the major driving force for more equitable and participatory forms of natural resource management, as evidenced by the Makuleke and San-Kalahari agreements with South African National Parks, and the Ngome State Forest and Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve co-management initiatives (Shackleton and Willis, 2000). In contrast, in Lesotho, the need for more effective rangeland management provided the primary impetus for CBNRM. In other countries, such as Malawi and Tanzania, forestry has provided the focus for efforts in devolution.

In all these initiatives effort has been made to devolve at least some responsibility and authority over natural resources from a central level to a lower level, whether to local government structures or direct to the communities themselves. This transfer of authority, and associated power, may manifest as the control of decision-making; the control of income, expenditure and benefits; the control of developments such as tourism ventures; the transfer of ownership and property rights; and improved status amongst the individuals and organisations involved. It is frequently accompanied by competition for the benefits of the power. This

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may take place between the organisation/s receiving devolved authority and existing organisations (e.g. between tribal authority structures and newly formed community-based organisations - CBOs), or between the body devolving the authority (usually the state) and the receiving structures or community, or it may emerge amongst different actors within the community.

This paper investigates the shifts in authority, decision-making and power that have accompanied the move to CBNRM in a number of southern African countries. The objectives of the study were to determine the loci of power within different models of CBNRM; to understand the systems and institutional arrangements that define who asserts control and authority and under what conditions; and then, from this, pinpoint the institutional models that provide good opportunities for successful CBNRM.

The next section outlines the approach and methods used in the study, and introduces the case studies. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the policies, institutions and stakeholders involved in CBNRM in each of the case study contexts. Section 4 explains the new locus of power that has emerged as a result of devolution, and describes some of the results of that power shift, in terms of attitudes towards CBNRM and benefits derived. Section 5 focuses on the emerging problems in the empowerment process and Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion.

2. Approach, methods and case studies

Fourteen case studies were completed in eight southern African countries, namely Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia (Figure 1, Table 1). The case studies were compiled by researchers with substantial knowledge of and direct experience in CBNRM in their respective countries. Authors drew mainly on existing literature, although some fieldwork was undertaken where required to cover under-researched areas. Most of the case studies span the period from initial implementation of the CBNRM project to the end of 1999 when the write-ups were completed. Each case study was structured using a common framework designed to examine the extent to which policy and legislation devolves significant control over decision-making and benefit flows directly to communities and community organisations; the relationships between community organisations, the state and other actors such as local authority structures, NGOs, donor agencies, and the private sector; and lastly the relationships and divisions amongst different groups within the community including any conflict that has arisen.

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3 Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources.
4 It is possible that for some cases studies the legislation and institutions may have changed between write-up of the case studies and publication of this synthesis report. For example CBNRM in Zambia was under going a process of change at the time of write-up, as was local government in Malawi and South Africa.
emerged over CBNRM issues. The full case studies are published separately in Shackleton and Campbell (2000).

The case studies covered a diversity of sectors from wildlife management to range and forest management, and involved both co-management and common property arrangements (Table 1). Most of the studies were based on specific sectoral and donor initiatives, whilst others described situations without any direct project intervention. Environmental, political and socio-economic conditions varied widely both between and within countries, influencing the approaches and implementation of CBNRM (Table 1). For this reason, case studies cannot be taken as representative of the countries from which they are drawn.

**Table 1.** Case studies forming the basis of this paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Specific cases studies</th>
<th>Sectoral focus</th>
<th>Key characteristics of study sites</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td>Rozemeijer and van der Jagt (2000)</td>
<td>KD1 – a Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) consisting of 3 settlements in Kgalagadi District.</td>
<td>Wildlife management in the Khaa Wildlife Management Area. KD 1, in northwestern Kgalagadi district, covers about 12,000 km². The CHA is designated as a multi-purpose community area and forms part of a buffer zone north of the Kgalagadi Trans-Frontier Park (KTP). The three settlements, Ukhwi, Ncaang, and Ngwatle, are inhabited by members of a San group (Western !Xo) and a Bantu group (Bakgalagadi). Approximately 850 people live in KD 1, of which 70% are of San origin. Livelihood strategies consist of a mix of activities including livestock and small stock rearing, subsistence hunting and gathering, labour intensive public works, and handicraft production.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>Kayambazinthu (2000)</td>
<td>Chimaliro Hills – Group Village Bori Chakuchanya in Kaluluma Traditional Authority.</td>
<td>Forest and woodland management on state (forests reserves - co-management blocks) and communal land (Village Forest Areas). The study area lies midway between Lilongwe and Mzuzu. The population density is 74 persons km⁻². Rainfall varies between 800 and 1600 mm. There are 9 villages each with a Village Forest Area. Chimaliro Forest Reserve is divided into 3 co-management blocks managed by groups of 3 villages. Most households are smallholder commercial and subsistence farmers. Ethnic groups include the Thumuka and Chewa tribes.</td>
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<td>Mangweru Hills Village Forest Area in Group Village Jamali in the area of Traditional Authority Lundu.</td>
<td>Mangweru Hills VFA lies 30 km from Blantyre. Population densities are 200 persons km⁻². There is 700-800 mm rainfall. Smallholder farming community. Scattered settlement. Mixture of tribes dominated by the Yao.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Fish River, former Ciskei, Eastern Cape Province, consisting of 9 villages.</td>
<td>Management of common pool resources in a communal area and co-management of local nature reserves.</td>
<td>The area borders the Great Fish River Reserve Complex. Population densities are about 70 people km(^{-2}). The vegetation is semi-succulent thorny wood and scrubland known as Valley Bushveld. Rainfall - 434 mm. There are high levels of poverty and environmental degradation, and a heavy dependency on urban earnings and welfare payments. Crop production is virtually non-existent although many households own livestock. The 9 villages have different histories of land occupancy and tenure, which has impacted on settlement patterns and land and resource management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steenkamp and Urh (2000)</td>
<td>Makuleke in northern Kruger National Park, Northern Province.</td>
<td>Land restitution claim within a national park. Conservation, wildlife and tourism.</td>
<td>In 1969 the Makuleke community was evicted from approximately 25,000 ha of land in northern Kruger National Park and were resettled some 60 km to the south. In 1998, they successfully regained ownership of their land under a restitution claim. A condition of the agreement was that they would not resettle the area but could have exclusive commercial rights to the land.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>Chivi Communal Area - Romwe catchment</td>
<td>Management of common pool resources in a communal area.</td>
<td>Situated in south central Zimbabwe the Romwe catchment is some 10 km from the Masvingo-Beit Bridge road, linking South Africa and Harare. Rainfall - 548 mm. Vegetation - miombo woodland confined to hill and ravine areas. Population density - about 60 people km(^{-2}). Most people in Romwe are of Ndebele descent, although Chivi largely consists of Shona people. Woodcraft production in the area has increased over the last 10 years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campbell, Nemerundwe and Sithole (2000)</td>
<td>Wildlife management through CAMPFIRE.</td>
<td>Situated in the south east corner of Zimbabwe bordering Mozambique and South Africa. The area lies between the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe and the Kruger National Park in South Africa. Rainfall is 500 mm p.a. Vegetation is mopane woodland. Population densities are approximately 20 people km(^{-2}) with most people being Shangaan.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chikwarakwara and Sengwe wards.</td>
<td>Forest management on state land through a co-management arrangement.</td>
<td>Situated in west central Zimbabwe. The co-management arrangement involves the joint use of resources in Mufangabusi State Forest (82.1 km(^2)). The forest is largely miombo woodland with elements of Kalahari sand forest. Rainfall averages 819 mm per year and population densities are about 35 people km(^{-2}). The original people in Gokwe were of the Shangwe tribe, but the area is now dominated by the Shona.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gokwe Communal Area - Chirima Ward, Mateme VIDCO.</td>
<td>Wildlife management on communal and state land. Part of the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAME) programme, a national programme implemented in more than 20 GMAs.</td>
<td>Mumbwa GMA (3 395 km(^2)) is located in Mumbwa District about 270 west of Lusaka bordering Kafue National Park. Population density is 1.79 people km(^{-2}). 3 chiefs have portions of the chiefdom in the GMA. Rainfall is 1300 mm and the vegetation is miombo woodland. Agriculture and consumptive use of wildlife are the main sources of livelihood. Luba forest reserve is located within the GMA. The area is well endowed with natural resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kapungwe (2000)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Specific cases studies</td>
<td>Sectoral focus</td>
<td>Key characteristics of study sites</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lupande GMA</td>
<td>Wildlife management on communal and state land. Part of the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU), previously the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP). This is an integrated approach to resource management implemented in the South Luangwa National Park and Lupande GMAs.</td>
<td>Lupande GMA (4 080 km²) is located in the Mambwe district in the Mfuwe area of Eastern Province of Zambia. South Luangwa National Park borders it on the west. 35 000 people or 9 355 households live within the GMA. Population density is 8.57 people km⁻². Six chiefs control the area. Rainfall is 700 mm and the vegetation is dominated by mopane woodland. The area is rich in wildlife and other resources that generate revenue for the GMA.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMIBIA Jones and Mosimane (2000)</td>
<td>One emerging (Sesfontein) and two established (Torra and #Khoadi//hoas) conservancies in the Kunene Region in northwest Namibia.</td>
<td>Sesfontein and Torra Conservancies: Semi-desert/desert environment. Arid - &lt; 50 mm - 240 mm rainfall. Low population densities of &lt; 1 person km⁻². Scattered settlement. Livelihoods derive from semi-nomadic pastoralism or sedentary livestock farming at low stocking rates. Mixed population consisting of Herero, Himba, Damara, Nama and Riemvasmaker ethnic groups - the result of forced removals and relocations by previous governments. Inter-group tensions and rivalries not uncommon. High tourism potential. #Khoadi//hoas Conservancy (registered in 1998) lies between commercial farmland in the east and the escarpment in the west. Rainfall - 230 -300 mm. Sedentary livestock farming. Mainly Damara with some Herero speakers. Organised community with a strong farmer’s association. Lower tourism potential and wildlife densities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three emerging (Kwanu, Mayuni and Wuparo) and one established (Salambala) conservancies in Caprivi Region northeast Namibia.</td>
<td>Wildlife management on communal land. Conservancy programme.</td>
<td>Rainfall up to 600 mm. Savanna. Population density of 4.2 people km⁻². Many ethnic and political divisions. Tribal conflicts, differing allegiances to political parties and secessionist groups have affected community cohesion. Main groups are the Basubia, who support SWAPO, and the Mafwe, who support the opposition DTA. Wildlife densities low although improving. The Salambala Conservancy is under the Basubia whereas the Kwanu Conservancy falls under the Mafwe but suffered when most of its committee fled with the secessionists. Both the Mayuni and Wuparo Conservancies have been formed by breakaway Mafwe groups. Both border national parks.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Institutions and stakeholders involved in CBNRM

3.1. Overview and conceptual framework

Figure 2 displays the key institutional features found in most of the case studies. National legislation and policies set the broader institutional framework (Sections 3.2), within which lower level government organisations operate – the most pertinent level in many of the cases being the district level (Section 3.3). This in turn usually plays a major role in defining the governance structures at the village level (variously termed as local, community or village). There are a wide variety of structures at this level, many of which fall within the state institutional framework (Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3), but some of which fall outside of this framework (Section 3.4.4). Apart from these structures for land and resource management, there are the traditional institutions (Section 3.5) that, depending on the case, may fall within or outside of the state structures or may have disappeared completely.
Figure 2. Framework for institutional analysis of the cases from Southern Africa (derived from Doré 1997; Painter and Durham 1995).
NGOs and international agencies operate at a number of levels of the governance hierarchy, promoting policy reform, facilitating local capacity or building civil society (Section 3.6). In most of the cases private sector operators from outside the community are involved in resource use and management, building partnerships or ventures with the district authorities or local communities (Section 3.7). There are also entrepreneurs from outside the community that attempt to use resources from community woodlands and forests, but are unwilling to compensate local villagers for this use. In addition, but usually playing a very different role, are local entrepreneurs from the community.

Lastly, there is stratification and differentiation within local communities themselves, that is rich as opposed to poor households, male-headed versus female-headed households, various kinds of local elites, members and non-members of user groups, and so on (Section 3.8). The different cases have specific make-ups and different contexts, which influence the nature of control at the local level.

### 3.2. National policies and legislation supporting CBNRM

#### 3.2.1. Overview and general trends

In all the countries studied there has been effort to devolve authority and control for NRM, in at least some sectors, to a lower level. In general, this is supported by national policy and legislation. In most cases these policies are relatively recent, often coinciding with periods of independence and democratisation, and tend to focus on highly visible and politically important resources such as wildlife, and forests. Scant attention is paid to those resources used for everyday subsistence. Only in a few countries and for a few sectors does the legislation remain in the old command and control style (e.g. the Communal Lands Forest Product Act of 1928, amended in 1987, for Zimbabwe).

This section briefly outlines the policy and legislative frameworks for devolution in each of the case study countries, and draws out important differences and implications for CBNRM.

#### 3.2.2. Policies devolving NRM to community-based organisations: Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi

In Namibia there is a strong policy and legal framework that devolves authority and rights over wildlife, forests and tourism directly to CBOs. Following independence in 1990, changes in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s wildlife policy and legislation resulted in communal area residents gaining use and management rights over wildlife, and associated tourism and hunting activities, provided that a legal entity know as a Conservancy is registered. A Conservancy consists of all residents in a conservancy area, and is administered and managed by an elected committee. The Directorate of Forestry has followed this example and has developed draft legislation that makes provision for the creation of Community Forestry Committees with similar attributes to those of Conservancies. These committees would gain rights to manage and benefit from designated community forests. Recognising the potential for competition and
conflict, a policy decision has been taken that both structures should not be set up in the same area. Where a Conservancy exists, the Department of Forestry should support this organisation with forestry management.

Botswana has seen a decade of policy development aiming at achieving community-based control, especially in the wildlife sector. The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 laid the foundation for CBNRM. The follow up CBNRM policy, drafted in 1998, provides guidance for the implementation of CBNRM. Community Hunting Areas defined by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing are the “units of production” for which CBOs can apply for leases. The community has to organise itself into a representative and legal body such as a trust or co-operative. A clearly laid constitution should be developed and appropriate by-laws defined. After the community has prepared a land-use and management plan conforming to the Wildlife Management Area regulations, a 15-year lease can be obtained. While the policies and regulations for wildlife use are highly progressive, those for other resources are not. Few comprehensive development strategies have been designed for community tourism (under the Department of Tourism) or for woodlands, fisheries and other wild products (Ministry of Agriculture).

The only other country covered in this study, where legislation allows community members to hold secure tenure over natural resources is South Africa, but in this case it is not only resources such as wildlife and forests that are involved, but also land. Land restitution, in cases like the Makuleke, has effectively placed ownership of land and resources back in the hands of the claiming community through a legal land holding entity known as a Communal Property Association (CPA Act 1996). The restitution process made it possible for communities who were evicted during the apartheid era to lodge a claim for restoration of their land through the Land Claims Commission. Many of these claims are for areas under conservation management as in the Makuleke case.

Malawi has progressive policy and legislation for forest management (National Forestry Policy of 1997, Forestry Act of 1997) that removes restrictions on the access and use of woodlands and promotes equity and participation in management. The policy promotes co-ordination with other government departments, and specifically targets women as key resource users. However, unlike the Namibia and Botswana, the legislation does not provide local level organisations with statutory authority. Furthermore, *de jure* rights over communal resources remain vested in the state, and there are no moves to transfer ownership of forest reserves to the community (which contrasts with South Africa where land claims are forcing this approach).

The situation in Lesotho is somewhat ambiguous, and conflicting legislation is undermining the effectiveness of CBNRM. Members of Grazing Associations are allocated grazing rights to Range
Management Areas, and the Societies Act No. 20 of 1966 empowers associations to enforce these rights and obligations. However, Range Management Areas constitute communal land, and cattle owners from an area who choose not to be part of the Grazing Association cannot be excluded from grazing their cattle (Clause 8 of the Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations of 1980). This results in open access use by some residents and acts as a disincentive for association members to comply with grazing regulations. Separate legislation also gives powers over rangeland management to both chiefs and local government structures creating a complex institutional environment.

3.2.3. Policies devolving NRM to district structures: Zimbabwe and Zambia

In Zimbabwe the Rural District Councils Act of 1988 (and its precursors) places decision-making over NRM at the district level. Control, authority and tenure rights over wildlife are devolved to Rural District Councils through the granting of “appropriate authority” under the Parks and Wildlife Act (1975). By contrast, forestry legislation makes no such provision for local management. The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (of 1928, amended in 1987) confines the use of forest products in communal lands to “own use”, requiring permits for commercial exploitation.

Wildlife is state property in Zambia (National Parks and Wildlife Service Act no. 10 of 1991), but the Wildlife Policy of 1993 bestows user rights to land holders. This means that local people who reside in Game Management Areas (GMAs) are eligible to a share of revenues generated from wildlife utilisation. However, the institutional framework for wildlife management does not allow communities to derive much control and decision-making power from these rights, and all authority still ultimately lies with the state. Like other countries, the more progressive policies of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services in Zambia are not reflected in other natural resources sectors such as fisheries, forestry and land, which are administered by a range of different departments, each with their own separate policies and legislation. The National Parks and Wildlife Services Act makes provision for the creation of Integrated Resource Development Committees, but the Forestry Act does not have any framework for community-based forestry management in GMAs (Chilomo et al. 1995). The Local Government and Housing Act of 1995 firmly places local control in the hands of District Councils, but chiefs and other lineage leaders continue to play a key role in wildlife management. The Zambia Wildlife Authority Act No. 12 of 1998 has recognised these contradictions and has proposed the establishment of Community Resource Boards (CRBs) (their title is somewhat of a misnomer as the CRBs are at the level of the district not the community). These will replace the current district structures (see Section 3.4) as a way of rationalising and harmonising the different approaches to game area management. Proposed changes include transferring proprietary rights to villagers within GMAs and the return of 100% of benefits to the community.
3.2.4. Absence of NRM policies: South Africa

South Africa stands out as being somewhat different from the other countries in that the presence of the state in communal areas has been virtually non-existent (see also Ainslie 1999). Communities have been left to manage their resources in the absence of clear policy, legislative and institutional frameworks. The consequence, especially with the erosion of the power of chiefs, has been a dissolution of arrangements for NRM and de facto open access systems in many areas.

3.2.5. Some policy and implementation issues: Is the state prepared to let go?

Even though appropriate policy and legislation may exist, there can be large differences between the stated intent of government, and how bureaucracies apply this intent in practice. In some parts of the world the lack of political will to implement more progressive NRM policies, and a reluctance of the state to let go of power, have been identified as some of the major stumbling blocks to the success of community-based initiatives (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Datta and Varalakshmi 1999, Jodha and Bhatia 1998, Anderson et al. 1998). In other instances, vacillation and bureaucratic delays result because government has not yet realised the practical and logistical implications of its new policies, and is poorly prepared and ill equipped to deal with implementation aspects. A parallel problem relates to financial and capacity limitations within departments, and the officious attitude and poor ability of many government officials to work with local communities and engage in participatory processes (Fabricius 1999).

Within the case studies, most governments have demonstrated a commitment to decentralising decision-making authority, and have moved beyond the policy rhetoric into the realm of concrete action on the ground. The most convincing of these are Botswana and Namibia, where a number of functioning conservancies and wildlife management trusts exist. It is of note that in the early days of CBNRM in Namibia many conservation officials were sceptical of the approach and little field support was provided. In Malawi, the Department of Forestry facilitated several training and skills development workshops in the case study areas, building the capacity of the community organisations to become involved in NRM. However, long delays in approving regulations and management plans has resulted in dissatisfaction and a loss of interest by the communities in participating in CBNRM. The reluctance of the South African government to take the step of legalising its tenure reform proposals is having a major negative impact on NRM in communal areas. In Zambia, the limitations of the country’s wildlife programmes have been recognised and there are moves to devolve tenure rights, to increase transparency and accountability, and to ensure a much greater percentage of revenue reaches communities (see also Wainwright and Wehrmeyer 1998). This appears to be more than Zimbabwe has achieved given that problems with the Rural District Councils have been articulated extensively over the last few years.
3.3. Role of regional, district and sub-district organisations in CBNRM

3.3.1. Overview and regional structures in Namibia

In all the countries studied, with the exception of Namibia, district structures have a role to play in NRM, a role that varies from pervasive, as in cases from Zimbabwe and Zambia, to facilitatory, in the case of Malawi. The exception, Namibia, has regional structures. These have few powers and no revenue generating authority, although a new policy proposes to devolve further functions and budgets from the central government to regional level. The regional governor must approve conservancy applications before they move up to central state, but the Minister of Environment and Tourism can override the governor’s decision as happened with the Salambala conservancy.

3.3.2. Situations in which elected district councils and structures are primary stakeholders: Zimbabwe and Lesotho

In the Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE case studies control and authority over wildlife lies at the level of the Rural District Council (RDC). This is despite the fact that CAMPFIRE is advocated as “a grassroots movement that empowers rural people to undertake their own wildlife management and to receive benefits from it” (Martin 1998). Villagers from a Ward (usually about 1000 households) are represented by a single councillor at RDC level, and s/he is only one of a number of councillors many of whom may be from areas poor in wildlife and therefore have little interest in wildlife management initiatives. All decisions are made at district level, including those concerning quotas, the granting of concessions, problem animal control, and rules and regulations regarding wildlife utilisation.

In Lesotho, local government has a long history and was first established under colonial rule in 1948. The main district structures were District Development Councils (now Rural Councils - Local Government Act of 1997) that included chiefs. Unlike many countries, the Councils’ boundaries follow the chieftainship boundaries. The Development Councils were initially established to deal with local governance and development issues of a different nature to those dealt with by chiefs. They also served as a link between central government and local communities and authorities. However, these councils soon took on a role in range management and became responsible for issuing grazing permits, impounding trespassing stock, issuing fines and setting aside maboella or closed areas. The new Act charges each local authority, within its administrative limits, with the control and administration of, among others, natural resources, physical planning, land/site allocation, grazing, water resources and fire management.

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5 Wildlife that threatens the livelihoods of local communities by destroying their crops or killing their livestock.
3.3.3. Situations in which elected district councils and structures exist but play little active role: Botswana and South Africa

The government of Botswana has a long history of decentralised planning and development. Democratically elected District Councils guide local development but do not play a very active role in wildlife management (see below). Another structure at district level is the Land Board, which is an independent body, partly elected by the population, and is responsible for the management and administration of land. Amongst other duties, it approves the land use and management plans for tribal land – these are needed when a CBO applies for a lease on land in a Controlled Hunting Area.

District Councils, Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) or Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs) form the primary local government structures in South Africa. The TLCs/TRCs consist of elected representatives and operate on a sub-district basis, responsible for up to 20 or more villages. TRCs do not have executive powers and function primarily as advisory bodies to District Councils. TLCs, on the other hand, are independent authorities. The problem with rural local government in South Africa is that it is fairly removed from the communities it serves, necessitating the establishment of village level structures or the continued role of the traditional authorities in day-to-day administration. Tension between traditional and modern structures is occurring in many parts of South Africa, especially regarding issues such as land allocation. But, in other areas both structures are managing to co-exist, partly due to the limited implementation capacity of local government (e.g. in the Makuleke case). Certainly, at the moment, local government has little role in NRM in South Africa, although the fact that it exists is undermining the ability of the traditional leaders to enforce existing rules and regulations and creating an institutional gap that is being exploited by a range of individuals and groups.

3.3.4. Situations in which multi-stakeholder district structures aligned to line departments are primary stakeholders: Zambia, Botswana and Malawi

A variety of multi-stakeholder forums at district level were identified in the different case studies. Some of these structures have broad mandates, addressing a wide range of local development issues including NRM (e.g. Malawi), whilst others are constituted specifically to deal with CBNRM and wildlife management (e.g. Zambia and Botswana). The latter tend to have greater decision-making power and influence over CBNRM than the former. The key players in these forums include traditional leaders, district councillors and officials of line departments working at the local level. Community is rarely adequately represented. In Zambia local government district (District Councils) and sub-district structures (Ward Development Committees) have little direct involvement in NRM. Instead this responsibility is assumed by a set of organisations aligned to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services (DNPWS). These organisations differ between different GMAs resulting in a very complex and confusing institutional set-up. In the Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA) case study the Wildlife Management Authority (WMA) caters for stakeholders at district level and consists of district councillors, park wardens, chiefs, indunas,
members of parliament, prominent personalities, district representatives of line ministries, and unit leaders. The unit leaders are government officers from the DNPWS trained to administer the programme in GMAs. They play two conflicting roles (Chilomo et al. 1995, Kapungwe 1996). On one hand they perform the duty of community extension officer through conducting sub-authority meetings and coordination of development projects, and on the other they are law enforcement agents on behalf of the state. Consequently, they are seen as extensions of the state whose functions are to arrest and pacify local people. The WMA decides on the annual programmes and the budgets for wildlife management and community development projects in the GMA, and thus has considerable authority and power over NRM. The situation is much the same in Lupande GMA under the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU). The highest-level management structure, the Local Leaders Committee (LLC) is dominated by chiefs, SLAMU personnel, district councillors and members of parliament. Their main role is to monitor and collate audited financial and project reports from the lower level structures (see next section).

At the district level in Malawi, traditional authorities (chiefs or sub-chiefs), representing Area Development Committees (at the tier below the district level), become members of District Development Committees (DDC), which consist of a wide range of stakeholders including the district commissioner, elected district councillors and departmental heads of ministries represented at district level. These committees deal with a range of development issues and not just forest management. In the post independence Banda era there was little separation between the functions of the ruling party and local government, with most representation on the various levels of committees being by nomination. Under the new Local Government Act (1998) these structures are now being phased out and replaced by new structures at a district level based on democratic principles, accountability, transparency and local participation. Traditional leaders will be ex-officio members of the new district assemblies (DA).

Despite having strong local government (see above), most activates related to CBNRM in Botswana are the responsibility of the line ministry, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. There is a Technical Committee at district level, established by the wildlife department. This is composed of central government officers, Land Board and District Council officers and sometimes a representative of an NGO. This organisation has a fair degree of power – in the case study area the committee presented the synthesis of the bids to the residents in a general meeting, so that the residents could select a private operator to conduct the hunting. This committee is not sufficiently embedded in the District Council, with the result that CBNRM programmes have tended to become profitable enclaves, with rapidly growing trust accounts, while the District Council, which receives only 4% of total trust income, remains responsible for social and community development. For this reason the CBNRM activities are viewed ambiguously by the local authorities and a lack support by the Councils may ultimately endanger the CBNRM concept.
3.4. **Local level and village organisations involved in CBNRM**

3.4.1. **Overview and typology of local level structures**

There is a great complexity of governance structures at the local or village level, which varies from case to case (Figure 3). These may be broadly classified as (i) traditional structures that lie outside the state hierarchy (e.g. some Zimbabwe cases); (ii) traditionally-aligned structures that are within the state hierarchy (e.g. Malawi, Zambian and Lesotho cases); (iii) state-sponsored organisations that have no grounding in traditional institutions, sometimes aligned to party political organisations (e.g. Tanzania); (iv) community corporate entities (e.g. a property association in the Makuleke case, trusts in Namibia and Botswana, villages in Tanzania); or (v) community-derived structures having no legal status (e.g. Fish River case study).

**Figure 3.** Organisations involved with village-level NRM in the case studies.

A typology of village level organisations can be based on a number of different variables. One important distinction that emerges between the cases with respect to village level-governance is related to whether communities can themselves be viewed as corporate entities. In a number of cases communities can be regarded as corporate entities, i.e. they can sue and be sued, hold property, enter into business contracts,
etc. Other possible ways that the organisations could be classified is whether or not they have political affiliations, are supported by local government structures or by line ministries, are specifically for natural resources or include a broad development focus, and whether they are embedded within traditional systems or not. A common feature of many village organisations is their alignment to ruling political parties (e.g. Zimbabwe VIDCOs, and Malawi, Lesotho, and Fish River case studies). As found for district structures, in some cases village organisations include a broad development focus (e.g. VIDCOs in Zimbabwe), while in others they are primarily for natural resources (e.g. VNRMCs in Malawi). In most cases the former type of organisations are facilitated by the district councils and local government, whereas in the latter cases the key facilitators are departments of wildlife, forestry and natural resources.

In most countries, local government structures were created as a channel for central and district government to reach communities. The state has attempted to have a presence at the village level through some type of village committee that reports to the district authority (or the regional authority in the case of Namibia), either directly or through several layers of the hierarchical structures. In the cases from a number of countries the state village structures have no formal connection to the traditional authorities (e.g. Tanzania, Zimbabwe) while in others the traditional structures have been formalised to be the functionaries of the state (e.g. Malawi, Lesotho). The efficacy of these village organisations varies from case to case, with strong village organisations in the Tanzania, Malawi, Botswana, Namibia and Makuleke cases but weak state-sponsored village structures in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

3.4.2. Local and village committees linked to the state hierarchy or line departments: Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho

In Zimbabwe, the lowest level of the state hierarchy is the Village Development Committee (VIDCO), consisting of elected persons from the administratively defined village. Chairpersons of the VIDCOs make up the Ward Development Committee (WADCO). The chairperson of the WADCO is an elected councillor. All councillors from the wards within a district make up the Rural District Council (RDC). This state hierarchy exists side-by-side with traditional institutions, which, although not having the legal mandate to manage resources, tend to be the institution with the most power over resource decisions at the village level, except for those resources with high value, which are managed by the RDC. VIDCOs tend to play an insignificant role in NRM.

In Botswana, the lowest level of district administration is the Village Development Committee (VDC). Given that much of the focus of activity for CBNRM in Botswana lies with the community-based legal entities (trusts, see next section), the VDC has little to do with NRM. In resource-rich areas the trusts are much more powerful than the VDCs.

In Malawi at village level there is a Village Development Committee (VDC), consisting of members of the community and chaired by the village head (from the traditional hierarchy). However, the main organisation
The lowest level of organisation in the district in Zambia is the locally elected Resident Development Committee (RDC) whose primary function is to identify development needs and projects at the local level. At the next tier Ward Development Committees (WDC) approve suggested development projects and either seek funding or pass them up to the District Council. However, these structures are not functioning in many parts of Zambia including the Game Management Areas (GMAs) used as case studies in this project. Instead, there are various tiers of wildlife management organisations that link to the district level (see Section 3.3.4). In the Lupande case study under SLAMU, there are six Area Development Committees (ADCs) run by chiefs from the six chiefdoms that form the GMA. The Village Action Groups (VGAs), the lowest level structures, consist of elected members and are guided by a constitution developed by community members. One of the main functions of the VGA is the allocation of wildlife revenues to projects or household cash at general meetings. The lowest structure in the ADMADE programme is the Wildlife Management Sub-Authority. This caters primarily for chiefs. There is no village level structure.

The old local government structures in Lesotho consisted of elected Village Development Councils (VDCs) at the lowest level, of which the chief was initially chairman and then an ordinary member. Ward Development Councils (WDCs) at the next tier up are responsible for collating development proposals from VDCs for recommendation to the District Development Councils (DDCs). The principal chief is a
member of the VDCs and WDCs. Since 1997 these councils are being phased out and their functions will be taken over by Community Councils (includes one or more gazetted chiefs).

3.4.3. Corporate entities at local and village level: Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa (Makuleke) and Tanzania

In a number of cases, NRM can be said to be truly community-based, with most of the rights over NRM vested firmly in CBOs. In two of the case study countries, Namibia and Botswana, the key organisations in control of NRM appear to be highly successful, and are both established as legally-constituted trusts. A similar CBO has been established in the case of the Makuleke in South Africa. A legally recognised entity, a Grazing Association, is also apparent in the Lesotho case, but here success has been elusive as all members of the community are not members of the Grazing Association, and there are overlapping and conflicting responsibilities between these structures and local government. Tanzanian villages enjoy a similarly strong corporate status.

In the Namibian cases, rights, control and decision making over wildlife and tourism are devolved fully to community level. Legislation allows communal area residents to register a conservancy in which membership and physical boundaries must be defined, a representative committee elected, a plan for the distribution of benefits agreed on, and a legally recognised constitution adopted. This conservancy then receives conditional ownership over “huntable” game and use rights over other species through a permit system. It can also register as a hunting farm to gain rights to trophy hunting, although in this case quotas are set by the state in consultation with the conservancies. All decisions regarding tourism development lie with the conservancy. The Conservancy Management Committee (CMC) is the highest authority at community level in the management of the conservancy, and in the absence of administrative units below the region, the lowest governance structure in a region. The people elected to the CMC are local community members. In some conservancies, e.g. Caprivi, this may include traditional authorities. The committee takes decisions about day-to-day administrative matters and purchases of low cost equipment. Major decisions such as benefit distribution and expenditure on capital items are made in consultation with all conservancy members including traditional authorities. This may be through an AGM or special meeting and quorum requirements must be met. Rules and regulations are developed through the committee and traditional structures in consultation with residents so that they are tailored to the specific needs and conditions of the conservancy. The rules are included in a NRM plan. National government may provide technical advice in this process. In some conservancies, e.g. Mayuni and Wuparo, these rules are enforced by anti-poaching units formed by the traditional authorities and management committees of the conservancies. Neither regional nor central structures of the state have influence on the formation of conservancies other than to approve applications. NGOs, traditional authorities (e.g. in Caprivi) and communities themselves are playing the leading role in conservancy establishment.
There are no blue prints for CBNRM in the policy framework in Botswana with respect to community management structures, constitutions, and by-laws. However, most communities involved in CBNRM follow the model proposed by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, which is to establish a community trust. Community trusts are legal entities usually composed of all people who have lived in the concerned village/s for more than five years. The Board of Trustees is the focal point for decision-making regarding quotas and benefit distribution, business deals with the private sector and agreements with supporting agencies such as donors and NGOs, making it a powerful institution. In some communities the Board of Trustees have started to take on a life of their own, forming close alliances with the safari operator and losing contact with their constituencies. In such circumstances a community elite has become the substitute for the previous extracting role of the state. Fortunately, such examples are the exception rather than the rule. In the Botswana case, it could be argued that there is less community control than in Namibia for the following reasons. (i) The lease agreement is only for 15 years, which does not promote long-term investment decisions. (ii) The lease agreement covers the use of the resources, and not the land. The land remains under the control of the Land Boards. (iii) The community cannot control the subsistence use of non-wildlife products. The use of forest products, fish and grazing is theoretically controlled by the state but is in effect open access. (iv) The wildlife quota is set by the wildlife department and not the community.

In the restitution process in South Africa, the Makuleke community successfully regained ownership of land that they had been removed from in Kruger National Park in 1969. However, conditional to the transfer of ownership was agreement that the land would continue to be managed as a protected area by the South African National Parks in the form of a contractual park. Land title and all commercial rights were transferred to the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA), a legal land holding entity compromising of all rights holders (CPA Act of 1997). This structure has a written constitution agreed on by all members and an elected executive committee in which traditional leadership, including the chief, is represented. Certain mechanisms within the constitution ensure the accountability of the executive structure to the community. All decisions to develop the tourism potential of the area lie with the CPA, and all benefits from the process will accrue to the members of the CPA (i.e. the entire Makuleke community). In this case, although property rights, authority and control are vested at community level, the National Parks Board is still a powerful actor and a key decision-maker on the joint management board. However, the issue of land ownership and the possibility of resettlement have provided the community with a very powerful stake, which cannot easily be ignored by the wildlife authorities.

In Lesotho, CBOs such as Grazing Associations (GAs) are important in the management of grazing areas but have a less clear legal status. These associations are formed in Range Management Areas (RMAs), which are areas of land in which improved range management and livestock production practices are introduced. Formation of the GA is usually driven by a chief or Ward Development Council. GAs consist of rangeland users resident within the RMA (which may cover several villages and several traditional
authorities) including the chiefs of the area. They generally operate with the support and advice of an extension officer. These CBOs are, in theory, responsible for the management of grazing resources, but their operational powers depend on the delegation of management powers by the Village Development Councils (see above). Members of a Grazing Association are allocated grazing rights in the RMA after payment of a once-off joining fee and yearly subscription. Members must abide by the policies and grazing plans guiding the association. Grazing permits, whose purpose it is to regulate access based on commonly agreed regulations, are issued to members by the Grazing Association committee and stamped by the chief. The Grazing Association committee consists of elected members as well as traditional leaders representing each village in the area. Generally, the Village Development Council and other local government representatives are invited to the Grazing Association committee meetings. However, counter legislation (Clause 8 of the Range Management and Grazing Control regulations of 1980) fails to protect the rights of members of Grazing Associations. This makes it difficult to prevent use of the better-managed RMAs by non-association community members.

Tanzanian villages enjoy a peculiar legal status in that they can sue and be sued, hold property, etc. This is unlike village level structures in the state hierarchy in most other countries. The village government plays an important role in the management of the Duru-Haitemba forest of the case study area. Actual management is organised through externally facilitated, local structures known as Village Forest Committees (VFCs), which report to the village government. These committees set the rules and organise enforcement and collection of revenues and fines. Village management plans and use rules are reframed as by-laws that are approved by the District Council.

3.4.4. Community-derived structures: South Africa (Fish River)

Of all the cases, the Fish River case study in South Africa is exceptional in that a civic grouping is a key player at the local level. Resident’s Associations have taken over many functions, such as land allocation and NRM, previously attributed to the tribal authority. Whilst the Resident Associations have attempted to assume these responsibilities within their respective communities, they do not have any formal or legal recognition to do this. The Resident’s Associations are aligned to the ANC, the major political party in South Africa and work closely with local government, especially in matters of land allocation. In terms of NRM, the Residents Associations are primarily responsible but their lack of legal status is undermining their effectiveness in enforcing rules and regulations.

3.5. The role of traditional authorities in CBNRM

3.5.1. Overview and complexities

The post-colonial era in all the countries studied has resulted in parallel or dual local authority systems consisting of the traditional authorities on one hand, and the government established structures on the other. In general, the powers of the traditional leaders have been eroded by colonial and post independent
political processes (e.g. very marked in Tanzania). The dual structures compete with each other for power and influence, often resulting in a power vacuum that may be exploited by powerful vested interests. Later changes in government, often from one party rule to democracy, and the creation of a set of new local government structures have also exacerbated this situation. In many instances potential conflict between modern structures and traditional structures has been avoided by incorporating traditional leaders into the new structures (e.g. Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia). In other situations traditional authorities have been deliberately excluded as being undemocratic, corrupt and agents of the previous regimes (e.g. South Africa, Zimbabwe until recently). The situation is also highly dynamic. Recent legislation in Zimbabwe (Traditional Leaders Act) and Namibia may see the resurgence of power in traditional structures, but the new legislation has perhaps given legal status to another hierarchical layer without clarifying the overlapping nature of the traditional and modern structures. In Malawi, where the traditional structures have always been strong, the recent legislation has gone the other way, towards reducing the role of traditional authorities and making them more accountable to the populace. A similar shift appears to be occurring in Zambia.

The case studies cover the whole spectrum of involvement of chiefs and other traditional leaders, from situations where traditional authority structures have been almost completely removed (e.g. Fish River) to cases where these institutions exert considerable control over CBNRM (e.g. Zambia).

3.5.2. Situations in which traditional leaders have been largely sidelined: Botswana, Tanzania and South Africa (Fish River)

Of the cases studied, the Tanzania and the Fish River case studies have local governance structures that have almost no elements of the traditional systems. Even so, in Tanzania in a number of villages, the traditional ritual structures still play a significant role, either complementary to or in competition with the Village Forest Committees. The transfer of powers away from the traditional authority structures to civic organisations is fairly unique to the Eastern Cape of South Africa and has been influenced by a range of local political and historical factors. In other parts of the country, traditional authorities are still the principal actors in NRM in communal areas, albeit their authority has been greatly eroded by past political processes and the establishment of local government councils.

In Botswana, the Land Boards have taken over most of the powers of the chiefs in relation to land and NRM, and the Trusts control all aspects of wildlife management. At village level, the headman plays a representative role and administers a customary court for minor offences. Headmen still wield power over use of subsistence resources using values and customs derived from traditional practices, though these traditions are being eroded with the modernisation trend.
3.5.3. Situations in which traditional leaders are incorporated into the new CBNRM structures: South Africa (Makuleke) and Namibia

In Makuleke, South Africa traditional leaders are integrated into the new Communal Property Association (CPA), although the roles of the CPA executive versus the tribal council are becoming blurred. In theory, the tribal council is still responsible for ‘tribal matters’ whereas the CPA executive’s role is primarily in land claim issues and now the development of the Pafuri Triangle in Kruger National Park. However, what exactly falls into each of these broad roles is not clear, and the CPA executive is increasingly assuming functions that originally fell under the tribal council. This is partly because of the chief’s position as chairperson of the CPA. This lessening of the role of the traditional authority is likely to increase when the Makuleke gain tenure rights of the land they currently occupy (part of the agreement) and ownership becomes vested in the CPA. However, because traditional leaders have been an integral part of the land claims committee and then the CPA there is little disruptive competition between the two structures at this stage.

Traditional authorities are generally members of the Conservancy Management Committees in Namibia, sometimes in an executive capacity and other times as patrons or non-voting members. In most cases this is because these leaders were elected to the committee, but in other cases they were co-opted as a solution to potential conflict (e.g. in the #Khoadi//hoas, Torra and Sesfontein conservancies). The emergence of the conservancies has meant that responsibilities for game guards and wildlife management has shifted from the sole domain of chiefs and headmen to include young people and women. Some headmen and chiefs resent the benefit this brings the committee members in terms of training, workshops, receipt of allowances, etc. In Caprivi, the traditional structures are particularly well integrated into the conservancies, both in the Conservancy Management Committees and as advisors at village level. The strength of the traditional leaders in the conservancies can be seen in the strength of traditional rules, which continue to regulate the use and access to natural resources (see also Katjiua 1998, Mosimane 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b). Because there is no governance structure at district level in Namibia, there is little threat to traditional structures although there has been some friction in the Kunene region. This has been partly suppressed by the fact many of the regional councillors are chiefs and headmen. In the future though, the proposed Land Boards will remove land allocation powers from the chiefs, which is likely to cause major resistance.

3.5.4. Situations in which traditional authorities continue to play a central role in CBNRM: Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia

In Lesotho, chiefs are empowered by legislation to play a central role in range management (Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations (Land Husbandry Act No. 22 of 1969)). These regulations, plus an addition to them (Legal Notice No. 39 of 1980), gives chiefs control over grazing land and the power to set aside special grazing/rest areas, apply restrictions on who can graze and when, and to impound.
trespassing livestock. Chiefs are thus vested with substantial powers in range management implementation and have considerable influence in their permanent constituencies. Indeed, the success or failure of CBNRM depends a great deal on the goodwill, accountability and motivation of individual chiefs. However, at the same time local government councils, on which chiefs are represented, have been given similar powers (see Section 3.3). Indeed, these structures have the legal mandate over natural resources. It is the District councils that provide Grazing Associations the authorization to operate. Chiefs are often represented on the Grazing Associations, giving them a fairly direct role in range management. In the Pelaneng/Bokong range management area, traditional leaders are members of both the Grazing Association Management Committee and the Grazing Association Executive Committee, whereas the local government representatives are invited to attend meetings as non-executive members. Thus, the relationship between local government and the traditional structures in Lesotho is complex and confusing due to dual responsibilities and powers as legislated in the Acts of different departments. Given the numerous changes in government in Lesotho and the multiple structures that are presently operating, the one constant has been the traditional authorities. They have been able to maintain their autonomy and some power, and have been represented within the different structures that have been in operation at different times. This has given people a degree of security that would not otherwise be there, and the chiefs are still seen as the institution to co-opt to gain community acceptance for new developments. The co-option of chiefs onto local government councils has recognised the powers chiefs have and the importance of their participation and cooperation, but at the same time has diminished their authority and decision-making powers.

Traditional authorities have a more influential and powerful role in decision making around wildlife management in Zambia than in most of the other countries studied. The district level Wildlife Management Authority and Local Leaders Committee have representation from traditional leaders, but it is particularly the Wildlife Management Sub-authority and Area Development Committees (ADCs) that cater for stakeholders at chiefdom level. Sub-authority and ADC members comprise the chief as chairperson, councillors, indunas, representatives of line ministries and unit leaders. In Mumbwa GMA there are three Sub-authorities corresponding to the three chiefs in the area, whereas in Lupande GMA there are six such structures. Given this authority, it is not surprising that the traditional leadership is feeling threatened by new proposals to remove some of their power on the wildlife management organisations. The new Community Resource Boards are proposing the chiefs as patrons of the boards rather than executive members.

In Malawi, at village level the village head deals with village issues with the aid of a Village Development Committee (VDC). A tier above this is the group village head, who looks after several villages grouped together, and then the sub-chief or chief (often called the Traditional Authority). A group of VDCs form the Area Development Committee (ADC) that is chaired by a chief. Thus, traditional leaders play an important role in local governance structures. In fact, the effectiveness of the committees depends largely on the
calibre and influence of the traditional leaders. This is illustrated in the case studies where the Village Natural Resource Management Committees (VNRMCs) in Chimaliro are more successful than in Mangweru, because, in the former, the traditional leaders are still held in deep respect by the community. Overall, the village head has supervisory control over Village Forest Areas, as well as co-management blocks of forest reserves, and has to be approached for permission to access the forests. The village head is also the person with the final say about management rules. Thus, although authority and control is devolved to community-level, much power is vested in a single individual. Since the modern structures have incorporated the traditional leaders in Malawi there was never serious competition between the traditional and modern structures, although the power of the traditional leaders was greatly diluted and weakened through the process. This was especially the case during under the dictatorial rule of the one-party state when the traditional leadership and its structures had to modify their own rules and by-laws to toe the party line.

3.5.5. Situations in which the role of the traditional authorities is variable and ambiguous: Zimbabwe

The situation in Zimbabwe is variable and partly dependent on resource endowment. In parallel to the state-supported system in Zimbabwe is the traditional system of chiefs (often in charge of an entire communal area), headmen and, at the lowest level, kraalheads. The number of households under a kraalhead is often fewer than that falling within the state-sponsored VIDCO. The Rural Council Act of 1988 ensured that control of natural resources at a local level was placed in the hands of the RDCs, rather than chiefs and other lineage leaders. This has undermined the authority of the chiefs but not necessarily their support. In all the study sites, the traditional authorities in the villages have maintained a degree of authority over NRM, but because of the dual structures, there are many examples of individuals going against the traditional authorities and using the ambiguous situation existing between kraalheads and VIDCOs as the rationale for such action.

3.6. Role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors in CBNRM

3.6.1. Overview of the importance of NGOs and donors

In most of the cases, CBNRM initiatives have been driven by projects, often with funding from international agencies and local facilitation by NGOs. Experience from the case studies indicates that assistance from NGOs and international donor agencies can complement and enhance government efforts at devolution. Indeed, NGOs and donors have emerged as significant contributors in fostering CBNRM at the local level. NGOs have played an important facilitatory role in CBNRM, a role that government often does not have the human resources or skills to do. In some countries NGOs are being used as project implementers by government departments. In other instances, NGOs may be the power brokers or mediators between
communities and government, or may contribute to developing income generating activities from natural resources.

3.6.2. How can NGOs and donors contribute: Evidence from the case studies

An important service provided by the “Friends of the Makuleke” to the Makuleke community was to level the playing field between the community and the more powerful South African National Parks. In Namibia an NGO, known as Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation, was responsible for pioneering community-based conservation in Namibia. NGOs involved in CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and others in Malawi have been instrumental in driving the agenda or facilitating the movement towards greater local control of natural resources (see also Nhira et al. 1998). In Botswana an international NGO (SNV) and a national NGO (Thusano Lefatsheng) have been the key players in community-based wildlife management in the case study. They engaged in a process of community capacity building for three years before the management structure, a constitution, and a land use and management plan were developed. This involved a full-time advisor working with the community. The NGOs also undertook extensive lobbying on behalf of the community to get the Trust registered (in 1998). It remains to be seen whether such an intensive and expensive facilitation process can be replicated elsewhere, and to what extent it is necessary for success.

An emphasis on opportunities for income generation from forest and woodland products has made NGOs in Malawi essential partners to government in CBNRM efforts. The Wildlife Society of Malawi (WSM) was instrumental in mediating access to Chimaliro Forest Reserve for local communities to practice bee-keeping. This NGO has also provided the training, marketing and back-up support to make the bee keeping project a success. Other NGOs have offered intensive training programmes on environmental education, soil and water conservation, wildlife utilisation, fuelwood saving devices, gender issues and so on and have integrated and linked the wider needs of community with land and NRM concerns.

NGO involvement in wildlife management in Zambia is limited compared to other countries, although aid from NORAD, WWF-US and USAID has provided much of the funding basis for the programmes. The Village Forestry Committees in the Tanzania case received considerable support from a donor-funded initiative, but in this case it was project personnel funded by the donor rather than NGO staff that facilitated the process (see also Wily 1999).

It is often argued that high donor inputs contribute to initiatives that are unsustainable and frequently collapse following withdrawal of the donors. This was, to a large extent, the case when USAID stopped supporting the Lesotho range improvement programme. However, the establishment of CBNRM programmes in all the countries studied would have been impossible without donor support, and all boast
a long list of international donors (e.g. UNDP, USAID, DFID, EU, GTZ, FAO) concerned with development, livelihoods and NRM. The possible exception is communal area management in South Africa.

3.6.3. **Approach and process issues**

Generally NGOs working in Namibia and Botswana are providing what has been called consistent and persistent “light touch” community empowerment and facilitation (Jones forthcoming). This approach involves working directly with communities (rather than through other structures), regular field visits, follow-up, staying in touch with community power shifts and internal dynamics, and training and capacity building. Communities are “nudged” into taking action so that facilitators are not taking a decision for or on behalf of communities. This requires assisting communities and community organisations to identify key issues and potential problems, and helping them work through these issues and develop appropriate decisions, solutions and actions - a necessary process so the NGO does not become the community’s gatekeeper to the world.

Striking this balance is important, as NGOs are potentially powerful actors. They receive funding and can allocate and withhold this. They can push communities into certain decisions and can provide material benefits and employment. If NGOs are good facilitators their role will diminish as the community’s capacity increases. This is not always the case and some NGOs have a vested interest (i.e. further funding) in continuing a relationship with a community. During the Makuleke restitution claim, NGOs and donors competed with one another to become part of the process and, as a result, had a very disruptive effect, contributing directly to conflict in the key community structures. In Malawi, some NGOs have had a tendency to pursue their own agendas without considering the wider consequences of their actions. For example, in the Mangweru study area income generation projects requiring a constant supply of fuelwood were implemented without consideration of the impact of this on forest management and future wood supplies. Furthermore, there was no attempt to link with the Forestry Department.

In Zimbabwe in the Gokwe case study, the community Resource Management Committees were set up by the Forestry Commission to facilitate and manage the resource-sharing scheme. In some areas the committees were viewed suspiciously and regarded by villagers as spies for the state. The Forestry Commission had a long history of conflict with local people in this region, and one wonders whether the situation would have been improved if the project had been implemented by an NGO.

3.6.4. **Relationship between NGOs and the state**

Sometimes governments are reluctant to engage NGOs in a CBNRM process due to perceptions that NGOs are radical organisations that have potential to cause disruption. This has happened to some extent in Lesotho and South Africa and is to the detriment of effective CBNRM implementation. Zimtrust, an NGO
that provided technical support to Rural District Councils at the inception of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, is advocating for benefits and management of CAMPFIRE to go below Council level. Consequently, it is now viewed suspiciously by Councils and has been, to large extent, replaced by the CAMPFIRE Association—an association with representatives from all Councils involved in CAMPFIRE. In contrast, recognising the very crucial and complementary role of NGOs, the government of Malawi has entered into a number of collaborative partnerships with NGOs, and a number of official policies, strategies and forums exist which clearly demonstrate the partnership role of NGOs in supporting and implementing development policies.

3.7. **Role of the private sector in CBNRM**

3.7.1. **Overview: Where does the private sector fit in?**

The private sector provides the key to income generation in many CBNRM initiatives and consequently is an essential partner in the process. In this section we consider the role of entrepreneurs who are external to the community, but who attempt to work with the community or its supposed representatives (such as district councils). There are three other classes of entrepreneurs. Firstly, there are community members that are themselves entrepreneurs, generally involved in small-scale operations (Section 3.6.4). Secondly, there are entrepreneurs from outside the community that usually work through specific community households (e.g. charcoal makers) (Section 3.8.4). Thirdly, there is the situation where the community itself is the entrepreneur, as in Namibia, Botswana and Makuleke, and enters into business arrangements with private companies.

3.7.2. **Benefits of private sector involvement: Evidence from the case studies**

The importance of the private sector has been particularly emphasised in situations such as the Makuleke where the ultimate success of the initiative depends on private sector investment and the delivery of levies from this. In Namibia and Botswana private operators are increasingly becoming the tourism and safari hunting partners of conservancies and trusts, providing capital, expertise and market access. Leases and concessions have been transferred from government to conservancies or trusts and any new arrangements are made directly with these corporate entities. In most of the more established conservancies and trusts reviewed, substantive income has been generated.

There are, however, many examples where the community benefits little from private sector involvement. For instance, in Zambia, tourism partnerships have provided little more than an opportunity for employment to a very small number of community members. This is partly because communities themselves do not negotiate directly with the private sector and because title to the land for development is transferred to the tourism operator. Safari companies deal directly with the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund after being selected by the National Tender Board. The chief is the only local level member on the selection panel. He also maintains the power to allocate communal land for tourism enterprises without any consultation with
the community, although the District Council must provide final approval of the site. If the business plans for the proposed development are approved by all relevant authorities (District Council, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Service and the Zambia National Tourist Board), then full title deeds may be transferred to the private sector operator by the Commissioner of Land. This effectively isolates the community and means that the operator is under no obligation to share revenues with the community except in special circumstances where a token of appreciation may be provided to the chief. Thus it can be seen that the private sector, in alliance with other players, can shift the balance of power away from communities.

This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where safari operators usually deal directly with the Rural District Council or its CAMPFIRE committee, effectively isolating the community from any discussions. Thus while councils may be highly positive towards CAMPFIRE, local people often express disenchantment with CAMPFIRE, as in the Sengwe case study.

The private sector is a powerful actor with a high degree of self-interest and considerable knowledge of the tourism industry. This puts community organisations at a distinct disadvantage and sometimes a third party broker is required to ensure a fair and equitable arrangement. This broker could be the state as in Namibia, or an NGO as in the cases of Makuleke, Namibia and Botswana.

### 3.8. Within the "community": community differentiation and dynamics

#### 3.8.1. Defining the participating group - overlapping boundaries and rights

In all CBNRM initiatives there needs to be a recognised group of people who are eligible to participate in NRM activities and to receive the benefits from use. However, defining the group can be a very complex process. Some of the problems relating to defining “community” that have arisen in the different case studies are discussed below. This area remains one of the most difficult aspects in the implementation of community-based programmes.

In Zambia there are clearly problems relating to the definition of the beneficiary community in Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA). The participating community was defined by the boundaries of the chiefdoms of the three chiefs rather than by the actual GMA itself. As a result families resident outside the GMA are eligible to benefits accruing from wildlife management. However, these households are seldom victims of crop damage and bear little of the costs associated with living with wildlife. Certainly, the ability to provide household dividends would be more viable if emphasis had been placed on the 6 097 people residing inside the GMA rather than focussing on the chiefdom areas as the units of benefit. Kapungwe (2000) emphasises the need to apply the principle of “unit of production is the unit of benefit” in such situations.
In the Makuleke case in South Africa, a latent power struggle between the resettled Makuleke group, under Chief Makuleke, and the Mhinga Tribal Authority under whose jurisdiction they fall has existed since their forced removal in 1969. This rose to a head in 1997 when this administrative arrangement was translated into a claim for the restitution of the Pafuri Triangle not to the Makuleke but to the Mhinga Tribal Authority. When the Makuleke refused to accept this, Chief Mhinga lodged a counter claim. This delayed the settlement of the Makuleke claim by the Land Claims Commission, who eventually rejected the Mhinga claim recognising the Makuleke as the rightful claimants. Such situations, in which tribal authorities are claiming to be ‘the community’ eligible for land restitution has emerged in other parts of South Africa (Kepe and Wynberg 1999). In all cases these claims have been countered by the group whose families had been physically removed from the restitution area, but this has not been without raising a great deal of conflict within the broader community.

In the co-management arrangements for Chimaliro Forest Reserve in Malawi there was much discussion and contesting views as to how the nine villages surrounding the forest should organise themselves to manage it. Two proposals were tabled: either to manage the forest as one group comprising all villages, or to manage it in blocks comprising three villages each. During discussions it transpired that not all villages were comfortable working together. Those that were happy to work together tended to have historical and ethnic ties, although all the headmen preferred the option of working as one group. Young men within the villages wanted to manage the forest for the production of timber, charcoal, etc. for income generation, with patches of forest allocated to individuals. On the other hand, the community elders did not want to see the forest divided up. Even after consensus was reached (block option), there was much disparity regarding the type of management for different sections of the forest. Most suggestions put forward had to do with personal interests and benefits.

In Namibia there has been conflict over land and boundaries in the formation of most conservancies. The conservancy policy expects communities to define themselves and to agree on boundaries. However, this often causes or exacerbates conflicts over land causing significant delays in conservancy registration. Disputes between Torra and #Khoadi//hoas conservancies over an area rich in wildlife resources required several mediation attempts to overcome. Torra was also involved in a dispute with another emerging conservancy. In the end Torra and the other conservancies pragmatically decided to exclude the disputed areas from their conservancy applications pending later settlement. The process to define the community in Sesfontein in Namibia took nearly three years. During this process one group of people geographically separated from the rest of the community decided to form their own conservancy, despite being linked to the broader group through a number of factors including traditional leadership. This was partly because previous ethnic administrative borders had cut through the area that people believed encompassed one “community”, breaking the ties between villages. In most cases the conservancies are based on social units.
of people who decide that they are a “community” because of historical ties, access to a certain areas of land linked to chieftaincies, ethnicity and geographic proximity.

Despite the problems in Namibia, the strength of the Namibian approach is that people on the ground decide how they will define “the community” rather than this being imposed from the outside. The main role of the state or NGOs is to facilitate and mediate this process. Furthermore, the concept of community is accepted as being dynamic and changeable. It is expected that conservancies will continue to shrink and expand as communities find the appropriate social scale at which collective action is practical and effective and the ecological scale at which wildlife management can work. It is also expected that in the north west, conservancies may merge to manage highly mobile game such as elephants (Jones, forthcoming). Such changes will be accommodated rather than resisted by the state.

3.8.2. Community differentiation and intra-community power struggles

In all the case studies the communities participating in the CBNRM initiatives were stratified and differentiated along the lines of age, gender, livelihood strategies, ethnicity, political affiliations, education, wealth, interest and/or allegiance to traditional versus modern structures. Many of the studies referred to a community “elite” who are strong, educated and articulate with the potential to link in with the state apparatus or private operators, and thereby control decision-making and the flow of benefits.

In the Lupande Game Management Area (GMA) in Zambia the Village Action Groups tend to be dominated by the ‘community elite’ who are close to the chiefs and traditional leadership and trap the decision-making process. This is a common phenomenon where communities are required to elect representatives to a committee. They tend to choose the better-educated and more powerful individuals in the village. However, once these elites are in power, they are said to forget and neglect the people whom they are representing. A similar situation was reported for the Malawi case studies where members of the community made allegations that some committee members, although elected, showed tendencies to serving their own interests. A mechanism was thus put in place in which community members could voice such concerns with the chief and present a case for removing the offending members from the committee. Poor representation was also apparent in the case study areas of Chikwarakwara and Sengwe, where a common criticism of councillors was that they tend to forget about the community as soon as they were elected.

In Namibia problems between groupings and different sectors of the community varied across conservancies. Cattle owners are often an important community stakeholder in resisting conservancy formation, especially in situations where land is demarcated for wildlife re-introduction, as this leads to a loss of access to this land by graziers (Jones and Mosimane 2000). Cattle owners in Sengwe in Zimbabwe were also a grouping that had very specific interests when CAMPFIRE proposals were being entertained.
(e.g. the alignment of cattle veterinary fences were often at odds with CAMPFIRE proposals).

In Namibia, like South Africa, population mix and distribution has been affected by forced removals and relocations imposed by successive colonial governments. This has resulted in frequent inter-group conflict, tenure insecurity, and leadership instability making local level organisation and action difficult to implement (Durbin et al. 1997). In the Sesfontein conservancy residents are a mixed group consisting of Herero, Himba, Damara and Nama people settled in a dispersed manner, which limits interaction and creates logistical problems for collective decision making. Building cooperation and consensus between these different ethnic groups, people living in scattered villages and between people of the same ethnic group but under different headmen has proved difficult and has required a dedicated facilitated process. Many of the problems have still not been resolved, delaying progress. There is also no guarantee that some of the issues will not flare up again in the future. A similar forced relocation occurred in Chivi in Zimbabwe, but much earlier (1950s). Thus the study site has many Ndebele households in an otherwise predominantly Shona area. This has resulted in some weakening of NRM institutions, but more recent phenomena (e.g. the liberation struggle) have been more important in shaping current-day NRM.

In the Kunene conservancies in Namibia conflict has begun to emerge between the youth and the conservancy committees (Jones forthcoming, Jones 1999b). Young people have been encouraged to form their own youth development committees by the Ministry of Youth and Sport. These committees have no funding or power and little focus. As a result, they have been challenging the conservancy committees, questioning their representativeness and their actions. The conservancy committees have responded to this challenge by attempting to provide the youth with a meaningful role in conservancy activities. It is apparent that age divisions are also present in the Chivi case in Zimbabwe, where young men in their 20s and 30s, have expressed severe discontent with their elders, claiming that they dominate the development process for their own ends.

In the Caprivi region in Namibia, ethnic divisions and tribal conflicts, compounded by allegiances to opposing political parties and secessionist politics, have affected the formation of conservancies and local level decision-making. The Kwandu conservancy in Mafwe area (supporters of the DTA) suffered a setback when much of the committee fled with the secessionists. The emergence of minority factions opposing conservancies also has been an issue in a number of areas and has delayed progress with conservancy formation. In Sambala four families, driven partly by tribal and political motives, delayed the registration of the conservancy until government at national level ruled in the favour of the majority. Ethnicity is also a big issue in Botswana, where in some wildlife areas, the partly elected Land Boards are delaying approval of land use plans, thus stalling CBNRM implementation. This is probably because the wildlife schemes in those districts are the domain of minority tribes, and CBNRM implementation would see the reduction of
free meat to the majority in the district (the majority do not necessarily live with the wildlife). Land Boards are also easily swayed by the cattle owners in a district, and are often keen to expand the cattle grazing areas. Once again, cattle are generally the preserve of the dominant ethnic group, so there are constant calls for rezoning Wildlife Management Areas for commercial grazing. In the KD1 case study, the San are in the majority and yet the local leadership is vested in the minority. One of the challenges for the Trust was to set up a management structure that would represent all ethnic groups. The community is grouped into a number of family groups, which are grouped into three settlement committees. Each family group selects one female and one male to sit on the Settlement Committee. Two female and two males from each settlement committee then sit on the Board of Trustees. Distribution of benefits (jobs and money) follows clearly laid down procedures that allocate benefits to family groups in proportion to their size.

Communities in the Fish River study area in South Africa are highly heterogeneous entities that are becoming increasingly more stratified along social and economic lines. Some families are well integrated into the formal economy and receive income from fixed employment opportunities whilst others are solely reliant on state pensions and *ad hoc* informal income sources. The more well off in the community can access alternatives to local resources and therefore have little reliance on or interest in managing the resource base. On the other hand, poorer residents’ immediate daily needs tend to take precedence over the long-term interests of sustainable management. It is argued that this differentiation provides little incentive for engagement in NRM issues and makes co-operative action almost impossible. Migrancy also often acts as a barrier to effective NRM in this area, as senior residents are often reluctant to take decisions on behalf of the absent, but more powerful and educated, sector of the community. This results in delays in decision-making to a point where interest and momentum wanes and the initiative may be lost. Ainslie (1999) believes that, for these reasons, that a CBNRM approach may not be the most appropriate route to improved NRM in the Fish River case study area. Migrancy from the Sengwe case study area for work in South Africa is also seen as a problem for CBNRM.

In Duru-Haitemba in Tanzania the divisions and power struggles between the so called “traditionalists” and “elites” at village level are impacting negatively on or have the potential to disrupt forest management by providing conflicting messages. However, some villages have successfully managed to integrate across these two groupings through having members in both groups.
3.8.3. **Gender roles**

In general women tend to take a back seat in NRM issues. Often this is because of the emphasis on economic resources such as wildlife, livestock and timber rather than on an integrated approach that includes the less valuable but vital resources used every day in the home.

In Malawi the role of women in forest management tends to be restricted to certain activities and forest products (e.g. thatch and fuelwood). However, women in both study sites expressed the view that they wanted the same opportunities as men and to have an equal say and influence in decision-making concerning forest management and utilisation as a way of ensuring a fair share of the benefits.

Effective NRM in the Fish River area is being impeded by gender discrimination. Despite being the primary resource users and the most knowledgeable about resource availability and condition, women are generally not involved in decisions around NRM nor do they hold meaningful positions in local structures. This results in a focus on livestock and range management and the neglect of other important resources.

Similarly, in Zambia the lack of adequate participation of women in NRM has prompted a suggestion that a targeted policy should be formulated that is gender sensitive regarding the membership and composition of local level organisations and the recruitment of village scouts. For the Makuleke case in South Africa this is exactly what has happened following the land claim. CPA legislation promotes the role of women in CPA executives, so women within the Makuleke community have moved from having been excluded from community decision making by the traditional structures to at least being recognised as having a role. Similarly in the Botswana case, female representation on the various community committees has been assured through the constitution of the trust.

The message from Lesotho is quite positive. Here, there is increasing recognition for women, not just as “stand-ins” for their absent husbands (working in South African mines) but as resource managers in their own right. Grazing associations are open to women, and women cattle owners are joining these. In many cases village committees have women holding the portfolios of vice chairperson, secretary and treasurer.

3.8.4. **Role of local entrepreneurs**

At a local level, individuals, often outsiders, appropriating resources for commercial purposes are placing a serious constraint on the ability of local organisations to regulate and control the use of resources. This applies particularly in the case of forest and woodland management. In these situations there is a fine line between promoting strategies that enhance the value of and benefits from natural resources as an incentive to manage them better, and the potentially negative impacts that enhanced commercialisation may bring especially when the opportunities are recognised and exploited by more powerful groups outside the local community.
Entrepreneurs pose one of the greatest threats to sustainable local level NRM in Malawi. In both Chimaliro and Mangweru study areas major conflicts exist between entrepreneurs and local communities with regard to the utilisation of forest products. The entrepreneurs are much more sophisticated than villagers in terms of resource acquisition (mostly illegal), processing, transportation and marketing, and therefore harvest large quantities of resources at a time. These entrepreneurs are said to be mainly outsiders operating alone or in small groups. Many show very little interest in managing the resource they are exploiting. Woodcarvers have been long established in Malawi and have pursued their business relatively unchecked. There is little understanding of the woodcraft industry and few efforts to regulate it. Many of the industry’s entrepreneurs are economically powerful individuals with no accountability to local institutions, so they are virtually a law unto themselves, harvesting wood where and when they want to.

Similar problems are experienced with individuals in the firewood and charcoal trade. The impact of this trade on woodlands is substantial, particularly in the Mangweru area. Mwabumba et al. (1999) cite an example where local VNRM members received death threats after they attempted to challenge the right of charcoal makers to harvest wood. The government, through the Forestry Department, tries to control this trade through roadblocks, fines and seizure of products but with little effect.

Similarly, in Zimbabwe woodcarvers operate with little regard to traditional rules and regulations or by-laws administered by the RDC. Often, traditional leaders themselves are involved in woodcraft and misuse their authority to maintain a continuous supply of timber. Outsiders often gain access to timber for their work through purchasing the wood from community members.

The issue about how to deal with these powerful commercial users is something that all countries are facing and there are few easy solutions. Greater support by the state in local level law enforcement and greater industry regulation at a national level could possibly help. But, at the same time the former undermines local authority and creates a continued dependence on the state.

In the Fish River in South Africa, reserves managers have, in recent years, been issuing permits for the harvesting of resources from within the reserves for US$3 per seasonal permit. This has resulted in outsiders taking advantage of the permit system rather than the local community being specifically targeted. There have been reports of entrepreneurs harvesting medicinal plants from the area. Careless and damaging medicinal plant harvesting by urban based traders is a considerable problem in many parts of South Africa leaving local residents feeling helpless in dealing with it. The Fish River communities are also facing problems dealing with the invasion of livestock from large cattle owners in the neighbouring densely populated settlement.
In Namibia, especially in the Sesfontein conservancy, individuals within the community are beginning to recognise opportunities for income generation through tourism, and have started campsites and traditional villages, sometimes with the help of NGOs. This has led to some tensions between conservancies and entrepreneurs with the latter resisting working through conservancies (Davis and Jacobson 1999). NGOs have intervened and have encouraged a relationship with the conservancies by arguing that the land for development is communal land and, therefore, any enclosure of it is an opportunity cost to other land users. In this context it is fair that some fee or levy is paid to the conservancy. Tourism development plans are also being used to resolve this important issue of collective rights and interests versus individual rights and interests. These plans aim to ensure ecologically and socially sustainable development that is appropriate with regional supply and demand. Conservancies in Kunene and Caprivi have decided to apply for all “permissions to occupy” (PTOs) within their boundaries forcing individual entrepreneurs to enter into contracts with them (Davis and Jacobson 1999).

4. Where is the new locus of devolved power and what are the benefits of that power?

In the previous sections we have described all the organisations and stakeholders that are involved in NRM and the roles that they play. It is apparent that devolution has resulted in contrasting outcomes in the case studies, with different loci of power emerging amongst the range of organisations involved. Consequently, diverse attitudes towards CBNRM among case studies and rather different kinds of benefit streams are evident. It is these issues we turn to in this section.

4.1. Grassroots or extensions of the state: Who has received devolved authority and control?

4.1.1. What has the stakeholder analysis revealed?

The previous sections have revealed that the transfer of authority and control for NRM from a central to a local level has varied widely across the case studies impacting differently on community participation and involvement in NRM. Control over wildlife, tourism and forest management has been largely devolved to either (i) lower tiers of government (Zimbabwe), (ii) multi-stakeholder structures aligned to the wildlife authorities and with strong representation from traditional leaders (Zambia), (iii) village based committees (Malawi and Tanzania) or (iv) direct to communities through representative and statutory CBOs (Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho and Namibia) (Table 2). In many cases the situation is not as clear-cut as the above categorisation suggests, and a range of stakeholders may have overlapping roles to play (e.g. Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi) with varying influence on the CBNRM process.
Table 2. Summary of the level of devolved authority and control over natural resources in the case study countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Level of devolution</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Authority rests in the hands of a community trust with corporate status.</td>
<td>Accountability mechanisms are established in the Trust constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Ultimate authority lies in the hands of the local councils and traditional leaders. Grazing Associations consisting of resource users with an elected committee help to manage the rangelands in Range Management Areas.</td>
<td>Other stakeholders play a more prominent role than the local community members. Legislation prevents true transfer of grazing rights to association members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Forestry management in communal areas (Village Forest Areas) has been devolved to elected village committees (non-statutory structures) known as Village Natural Resource Management Committees (VNRMCs).</td>
<td>Traditional leadership still plays a very important role in these committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Conservancies (statutory structures) - formed by all communal area residents. Managed by an elected management committee.</td>
<td>Accountability mechanisms set out in the conservancy constitution. Property rights transferred to the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>In restitution cases in protected areas (e.g. the Makuleke) there has been high level of devolution to community level through transfer of land ownership to Communal Property Associations (CPAs) (statutory structures), although some authority still lies with the parks boards. In communal areas, there has been no coordinated process to address resource management and thus this responsibility still lies with the traditional authorities in most areas or with non-statutory civil society organisations. In the Fish River case study Residents Associations have attempted, unsuccessfully, to take over resource management responsibility.</td>
<td>CPAs consist of all rights holders and have built in accountability mechanisms. Since historical processes have eroded the power of the chiefs, open access systems apply in many areas. In the Fish River the community through the Residents Associations are in a position to manage their own resources but are not doing this for many reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Elected village-based structures (non-statutory) are responsible for most aspects of forest management in communal areas. These are known as Village Forest Committees (VFCs). Villages have corporate status.</td>
<td>There is competition between traditional and the externally facilitated village organisations for forest management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>No real devolution. Local management structures include a range of stakeholders from central government, local government, traditional authorities, and community.</td>
<td>Other stakeholders play a more prominent role than the local community members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Local government - Rural District Councils.</td>
<td>Little accountability to the community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Zambia and Zimbabwe, authority is largely concentrated at the district level. However, this power may or may not be felt at lower levels. For instance, where high value wildlife is concerned, the Rural District Council (RDC) makes sure that it has the sector under its control (as with CAMPFIRE). Where high value resources are not present, such as in Chivi, the workings of the Council are all but absent, and in that case the de facto power rests with the village traditional leaders. In Zambia there is virtually no institutional mechanism to cater for local people at village level. Thus, the Wildlife Authorities and Sub-authorities have no true community representation. In these situations it could be argued that devolution to district level merely results in a shift in power from one level of government authority and control to another, and does not represent true community empowerment or CBNRM. Most other countries have district structures that have some NRM responsibilities, but decision making over NRM rests with village-level organisations. Cases that have state aligned village organisations as the key loci of power are Malawi and Tanzania, while those with community-based trusts or property associations are Botswana, Makuleke and Namibia.

In the Fish River case study it was a civic association that assumed responsibility for NRM, but since this is not supported by appropriate policies these structures remain relatively powerless.

4.2. How is CBNRM benefiting the community?

4.2.1. Community perceptions and attitudes towards CBNRM: Enchantment or disenchantment?

This section attempts to summarise how local people feel about the CBNRM programmes in which they are participants. If there is little local level support for the process, then the chances of the initiative leading to more sustainable NRM and enhanced rural livelihoods are minimal.

The sentiments of community members towards the CAMPFIRE programme appear to be increasingly negative. In Sengwe discontent related primarily to the lack of compensation in the face of problem animals, the high proportion of revenue retained by the RDC, the lack of consultation by the CAMPFIRE committee on issues such as fencing, a feeling that ‘their’ animals are being driven to other areas and hunted with the result that other communities receive the benefits, and the lack of communication with the private sector operator. People in Chikwarakwara were less negative having recently received a fence for their irrigation scheme from CAMPFIRE monies and being happier with the lines of communication between themselves and the local CAMPFIRE committee. However, damage by problem animals is still seen as a major issue. Many felt that the large percentage of revenue retained by the RDC is not justified as almost none of this is returned to the community in the form of development. In the Chivi case local residents were also unhappy with their RDC, seeing little benefits from it and wanting support from it for NRM. De facto control is at the local level but the RDC could facilitate the situation by actively supporting local leadership (largely the traditional structure in this case).
The Forestry Commission in Zimbabwe is unpopular with the people of Gokwe because of its enforcement regime and policies towards the state forest. Many residents in the communal area regard the state forest as their own making it difficult to control illegal resource use. Older people were unanimous that the forest should be returned to community ownership and control, whilst some of the younger generation felt that it was important for the Forestry Commission to continue to play a regulatory role. However, there was consensus that the Forestry Commission should relax some of its rules.

In Zambia, in the Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA), community members expressed the view that they would like the ADMADE programme to benefit them more directly by, for example, providing fertiliser or household dividends to allow farmers to purchase such requirements. However, government officials argue that emphasis is placed on community development projects because there is insignificant income to make any impact at household level. Household dividends could be made more meaningful if they were shared only by the households (6 097) residing immediately in the GMA, and not all people living under the three chiefs whose chieftdoms overlap with the GMA. The issue of crop losses and other damage by wild animals is again an area of discontentment. Local people are not normally compensated for crop loss. Negative attitudes towards law enforcement agents such as village scouts and wildlife police officers continue, despite schools and clinics being built from wildlife revenues.

In Lupande GMA, local people perceive the SLAMU programme as a donor and National Parks and Wildlife Services initiative, rather than a community-based programme. In a survey conducted by Wainwright and Wehrmeyer (1998) only about 10% of residents in the SLAMU claimed to have a good understanding of the programme. This suggests that either the aims of the programme have not been well communicated or that they have little relevance for local people. There have been clashes between wildlife officers and villagers especially after the arrest of villagers suspected of poaching. Subsistence poaching continues in Lupande GMA and can be interpreted as a lack of recognition of the positive links between community benefits and wildlife conservation, possibly because significant benefits are not forthcoming. As in other community wildlife areas, wild animals are destroying crops in Lupande.

While the cases so far discussed have elicited largely negative feelings towards CBNRM, many of the other cases have elicited largely positive attitudes, tempered with some negative ones.

In the Botswana case, residents are highly supportive of the CBNRM programme, though it is early days to assess success. Community members are also positive towards the forestry development in the Tanzanian case study. There is a degree of pride in the fact that through their own efforts the forestry areas have shown much improved forest quality in the last few years. In Namibia, recent surveys in the Kunene region (Jones 1999a and 1999b) have demonstrated that residents are mainly positive to the conservancies and by
implication the CBNRM process. The major area of complaint relates to the poor flow of information between conservancy committees and members that, in turn, compromises members’ ability to participate in decision-making. As the state takes none of the revenue generated, and has played an important facilitatory role in a number of the conservancies, relationships between government and community are generally good. In Caprivi, problem animal control is a major challenge and communities are dissatisfied with government for not being more proactive in dealing with this issue. In Mayuni, Kwandu and Wuparo conservancies, crop and livestock farmers have negative attitudes towards wildlife and are concerned that there are no strategies in place to compensate people who have lost crops and livestock to game. In Salambala Conservancy the employment of local people to fence the core wildlife area, the building of a community campsite, and the translocation of game to the area has resulted in a positive attitude towards the conservancy concept.

Regarding the Makuleke case in South Africa, research conducted by Fabricius et al. (in prep.) as part of a broad people and parks survey indicated that Makuleke attitudes towards conservation are unusually positive. This contrasted with earlier work when the Makuleke were still locked into hard bargaining with the SANP. The interpretation is that regaining ownership of the land has changed attitudes to wildlife management and conservation or, more realistically, has resulted in an acceptance of the new status quo. Indeed, the Makuleke agreement (Box 1) does not meet many of the desires and objectives of the broader community. The agreement imposes the conservation status of the land as non-negotiable, and subjects ownership to significant restrictions including no direct consumptive use of resources by the community. Acceptance of the new situation therefore does not necessarily translate into durable “positive attitudes” or in changed behaviour on the part of the general community especially when the desire to hunt has been strongly expressed. It can be argued that if the CPA elite were to intercept much of the benefit derived from the land, it would leave the remainder of the community with little motivation and incentive to adhere to the restrictions imposed regarding hunting and other direct uses.
Box 1: The Makuleke Agreement

In terms of the agreement the Makuleke regains ownership of the Pafuri Triangle (renamed ‘the Makuleke region of the KNP’). The land may, however, only be used for conservation purposes in addition to which the Makuleke are obliged to enter a 50-year contractual park agreement with the SANP, renewable after 25 years. Even should the contractual park relationship come to an end, the state will continue to have an obligation to ensure that effective conservation management takes place.

This means that the Makuleke region will be declared a schedule 2b national park and is to be managed through a Joint Management Board (JMB) as an integral part of the KNP. The KNP will furthermore remain responsible for the day-to-day management of the land, but as an agent of the JMB. Decision-making in the JMB is to be by consensus with a series of deadlock breaking mechanisms.

In exchange the Makuleke gain exclusive commercial rights to the area and a variety of other cultural and use rights. There would furthermore be no ‘human exclusion zones’ and the Makuleke could theoretically identify any activity in the area as ‘commercial’.

The relationship between the JMB partners, for a variety of reasons, is interesting.

- First of all, it can be described as an agreement between equals. The agreement thus transcends the traditional skewed power relations between parks and people.
- Second, the state’s vested interest, namely biodiversity conservation, is made explicit and is protected through various conservation guarantees that have been built into the agreement.
- Third, clear boundaries have been imposed between the partners, making it easier to untangle SANP and Makuleke vested interest. There will, for example, be no SANP involvement in the community development or commercial aspects. Structurally the agreement leaves little scope for the desire to ‘control’ in order to achieve conservation objectives.
- Fourth, the agreement can be described as flexible, a characteristic that makes it possible to aim at the development of a meaningful long-term relationship – but one that presupposes ongoing negotiations between the two ‘partners’.
- The agreement, in other words, is structured in such a manner that ongoing negotiation between the Makuleke and the National Parks Board becomes inescapable.

The Chimaliro community in Malawi has been positive and supportive of co-management and CBNRM arrangements in their area. For much of the community the removal of restrictions on the use of the forest reserve and various training sessions aimed at building the capacity of community organisations signified a huge improvement on the previous situation and a commitment by the state towards empowering local people to manage resources. There was, however, a general dissatisfaction with delays in formally ratifying the regulations drawn up by the community with the Forestry Department representatives. As a result the management plan for the co-management initiative is not being fully implemented and current community involvement is restricted to a few villages in dire need of forest resources. Most villagers fear that the good intentions and reputation built by the Forestry Department at the beginning of the co-management efforts are slowly being dented, and disillusionment is settling in.

In Mangweru in Malawi, the spirit of working together to manage the village forest area was evident in all sections of the community. Since the NRM initiative originated in the community itself the role of the state...
has been minimal. The free technical and material assistance provided has been widely appreciated and has acted to encourage and boost morale towards CBNRM. However, the community did highlight some problems in managing and protecting their forest from theft, and felt that the Forestry Department could do more to help address these. The deployment of two patrolmen by the Forestry Department was initially effective but this support had become too infrequent and unreliable. This highlights the need not only to devolve authority to a local level, but also to equip and support communities through legal mechanisms and back-up policing to protect the resource they have become responsible for.

4.2.2. Distribution of revenues and other benefits
In Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme a large proportion of the revenue from hunting leases is retained by the Rural District Councils (RDCs) at their discretion (Table 3). The remainder is channelled to the community, often after inordinate delays. In Chikwarakwara the RDC retained as much as 50% of the total revenue, 15% as a levy and 35% as a management fee. This is resented by the community who feel that they should receive a larger proportion of the funds, especially since they must bear the costs of wildlife damage. At community level, income is either dispersed as household dividends and/or used for community development projects. The choice as to how the money is distributed is rarely the community’s but is usually decided by the CAMPFIRE committee with little wider consultation. In Chikwarakwara and Sengwe, household dividends decreased in value and then ceased altogether over the years. However, a decision to reinstitute household dividends has recently been made. The problem with household dividends is that they are often very low (<US$5 per annum) and the larger the community the less income is available per household. In many instances the contribution is too small to counter the costs associated with living with wildlife. Community projects funded varied from those that benefit the entire community, e.g. school construction, purchase of a grinding mill and clinic upgrading, to those that are limited to a smaller sector of the community, e.g. rehabilitation of the irrigation scheme at Chikwarakwara. Households in both areas receive meat from hunted animals as an additional benefit.
Table 3. Distribution of benefits in the different case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Who benefits</th>
<th>Who decides</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>All members (residents) of the Community Trust.</td>
<td>The Board of Trustees in consultation with the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>No financial returns but Grazing Association members benefit indirectly through more productive range systems. Unclear as to what happens to the fees collected by the Grazing Associations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>State and community. In co-management arrangements a 70-30 share for government and community respectively, and for VFA a 20-80 share. In one area the VNRMC received all the revenue generated.</td>
<td>State and VNRMCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>All members (residents) of the conservancy.</td>
<td>The conservancy committee in consultation with conservancy members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Makuleke: Members of the CPA.</td>
<td>CPA executive in consultation with members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fish River: Few benefits other than access to resources.</td>
<td>In the co-management situations reserve managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Village members</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>In ADMADE 65% is retained by the programme and 35% accrues to the community.</td>
<td>State sets the shares. At a local level leaders and government officials in the management structures decide on behalf of the community. Percentages of revenue accruing to different organisations decided by the state. Village Action Groups decide how to spend the money earned by the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under SLAMU 80% of revenue accrues to the community via Village Action Groups. The remainder is shared by local government structures (14%) and the chiefs (6%).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>RDC retains most of the revenue - up to 50%.</td>
<td>Decisions made mostly by RDC and CAMPFIRE committee with little consultation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Revenue from wildlife and tourism goes directly to the conservancy management committees in Namibia. No portion of the revenue is required by central or local government (Christoffersen and Johnson 1997). The residents of the conservancies decide how revenues should be distributed at conservancy AGMs, based on a ‘benefit distribution plan’, which the committee develops in consultation with the community at the inception of the conservancy. Usually a small portion of income is retained by the committee for running costs (administration and personnel costs for game guards, resource monitors, etc.), although in some conservancies this is still covered by external funding. In Botswana a similar situation prevails, with only 4% of revenue generated having to be paid to the District Council as a Resource Royalty.

In most of the more established conservancies, substantive income has been generated. Some of this has been through joint venture agreements with tourism companies. In most situations community members favour the use of conservancy revenue for development projects that are identified by the community (Jones 1999a). The #Khoadi//Hoas conservancy is allocating some income to an “elephant emergency fund” to compensate residents for elephant damage. This is something that all the conservancies should consider, as damage to crops by wild animals is significant. In Mayuni Conservancy 56% of respondents in a survey indicated that they have lost more than 75% of their crops to elephants over the last three years (Mosimane 1999a). Households in most conservancies receive meat from animals shot for trophies. The conservancy committees in Namibia also reserve the right to decide how the conservancy wildlife quota is used. Some wildlife may be sold as part of a smaller trophy hunting quota, but some might be reserved for hunting by community members, while other animals could be sold live to game farms.

The situation in Zambia is less encouraging with a relatively small proportion of the overall revenue accruing to the community. The ADMADE programme endeavours to guarantee that income generated from hunting activities is returned to Mumbwa Game Management Area (GMA) through the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund (Lewis and Carter 1993; Tilly 1995). Disbursement of funds is done according to a formula devised by the ADMADE directorate as follows: 40% of income is set aside for wildlife management; 25% is retained for administrative costs at the ADMADE headquarters; and 35% returns to the community for development projects. No household dividends are disbursed. Local leaders are primarily responsible to determining how development funds are spent. Community projects that have received support include the construction of schools, mill shelters, teacher’s houses and health centres (Hachileka et al. 1998). These have tended to cluster around chief’s palaces leaving other villages and areas unserviced (Chilomo et al. 1995).

Restructuring of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project into SLAMU has ensured that a much larger proportion of revenue is distributed at a local level. Previously about 60% of revenue went to managing the programme (Wainwright and Wehrmeyer 1998). Now 80% goes direct to Village Action
Groups, whilst the remainder is shared by the Area Development Committees (4%), chiefs (6%) and the Local Leaders Committee (10%). At village level the Village Action Group decides how funds will be dispersed and which development projects will be supported. Community revenues in the Lupande GMA have been relatively high, with US$250,000 reaching community level in 1998. Since 1996, fifty-two community-based projects have been implemented. This approach to revenue sharing has contributed to raising awareness of wildlife conservation, increased accountability and transparency of local institutions, and increased democratic principles. One constraint is that management and administration costs are carried by a donor agency, rendering the project unsustainable in the long term. At some stage, some of the revenue earned will have to be reinvested in wildlife management.

In the Makuleke case in South Africa, all revenue generated from commercial enterprises in the Makuleke area of Kruger National Park (KNP) will accrue to members of the Communal Property Association (CPA) and will be managed through the CPA executive. The executive needs to ensure that it only enters into joint venture arrangements with the private sector that guarantee a fair share of returns to the community. Various models and opportunities are being considered. Since the process of developing the Makuleke area is only just commencing, it still remains to be seen how successful the CPA executive will be in including the broader community in decisions around income distribution and benefit sharing. Under the contractual agreement with South African National Parks, KNP remains responsible for biodiversity management (in return for the Makuleke foregoing direct use benefits). However, once the CPA begins accruing profit from its tourism ventures a proportion of this will be invested in a conservation management fund. This situation is in contrast to the initiatives described above in which the state automatically retains its share of the revenue for management services.

In the Fish River case study there are few financial benefits deriving from NRM in the communal areas, and Ainslie (1999) argues that this is one of the reasons why community-based approaches to NRM in the area are unlikely to succeed. Indeed, the potential to generate income from the resource base is extremely limited for a range of reasons including high levels of environmental degradation and the participation of many members of the community in the formal economy. In terms of the relationship between local communities and the protected areas forming the Fish River Reserve Complex, little income is currently returned to the community. A development levy of R40 per animal shot during the hunting season was introduced four years ago to fund development projects in the area. However, these funds have not yet been used because of the need to set up a Section 21 company to administer them. The Eastern Cape Tourism Board has recently provided some funding for local development projects such as fencing, schools and a proposed craft project. This was based on recommendations made by the reserve community liaison officers rather than on an agreement with community members.
In Tanzania, almost all the benefits of permits to collect forest produce and fines go to the village. The village also collects cattle and hut taxes, and of these 60% remain with the village and 40% go to the District Council. The amounts of money raised are not high, and yet the villagers appear to be positive towards the scheme. Thus Wily (1999), working in Tanzania, comes to a very different conclusion from that of Ainslie (1999) working in the Fish River case study in South Africa.

In Malawi, the situation differed between cases studies. In Mangweru the VNRMC, under the supervision of the village head, has full control of revenue derived mainly from the sales of poles, firewood and timber. None is claimed by the state. This revenue has been used for a number of purposes including rehabilitation of a church building, school and resident’s houses, and bridge construction. The initiative shown by the community in Mangweru and the success they have had in protecting and managing the forest resource has resulted in the Forestry Department maintaining a very low profile and not demanding any share of revenue. In contrast, in Chimaliro the state takes a proportion of the benefits. Under the co-management arrangements for Chimaliro Forest Reserve, the Forestry Department and the VNRMC agreed that 70% of the revenue from forest products collection would go to government and 30% to the community. On customary land this is reversed, with 80% and 20% of the revenue accruing to the community and government respectively. The VNRMC, with approval of the village head, decides how the income should be used, based on development needs in the community. Only when these needs are satisfied can money can be paid out as household dividends. Another material benefit gained is access to forest products on state land many of which, especially the non-wood products, can be gathered for free. The community appreciates this although there is some dissatisfaction with the disproportionate share of the income earned.

5. What are the problems to be overcome in the move to local empowerment?

Despite commitment to more local level management of resources, the success of this has varied from country to country and only in few cases have communities been fully empowered to take control of decision making around land and natural resource use. In this section we draw on the case studies to highlight some of the problems faced in the move to local empowerment, and by so doing indicate areas that need to be tackled if empowerment at community level is to be more successful.
5.1. National level policy and legislative issues

5.1.1. Lack of enabling policy framework that supports statutory, rights-based organisations for CBNRM

An enabling policy framework for community-based management is essential for effective devolution. The case studies have indicated that those countries with policies that devolve authority fully to CBOs, and more especially transfer proprietary rights over land or resources to resource users, through the facilitation of villages becoming corporate entities, appear to have more effective ‘on the ground’ initiatives, that are viewed positively by community members. If lower level structures such as district councils have been successful in obtaining power, they tend to hold onto it and are reluctant to devolve budgets and responsibilities to lower tiers (e.g. CAMPFIRE). Murombedzi (1999) has argued that “attempts to foster people’s participation in conservation through the distribution of revenues from resource utilisation without devolving rights to resources to local people” will not result in improved NRM. With specific reference to CAMPFIRE he points out that, without control over wildlife management, equity in wildlife utilisation and opportunities to participate in the wildlife industry directly, wildlife utilisation will remain inferior to other forms of land and resource use over which households exert a far greater degree of control.

5.1.2. The lack of commitment to devolution

In other parts of the world a lack of commitment by the state to truly release power to a local level has been highlighted as a major factor limiting the success of CBNRM (e.g. Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Wainwright and Wehrmeyer 1998, Jodha and Bhatia 1998, Nhira et al. 1998, Murphree 1993). For example, Jodha and Bhatia (1998) argue that in India the legal and administrative arrangements for CBNRM (despite lip service to the opposite) tend towards centralisation and the application of generalised and uniform solutions that do not recognise the diversities and complexities at community level. This is supported by Datta and Varalakshmi (1999), Anderson et al. (1998) and Hildyard et al. (1997) who believe that local organisations under joint forest management in India are little more than a proxy for the Forest Service, with the Forest Service still controlling key aspects such as the distribution of benefits. The same could be said to be true, to some extent, for Malawi, Tanzania and Gokwe studies reported in this paper.

In southern Africa, Martin (1998), after working 24 years in the Zimbabwean wildlife department, notes that the notion of the selfless civil servant is a myth – power is all important, and every bureaucrat is reluctant to give it up (see also Murphree 1991). The command and control philosophy is thus still entrenched in much of the legislation and work ethic. Martin (1998) argues that natural resource agencies should see themselves as spearheading national development and only, secondly, as a regulatory body. Thus most of their actions should be facilitative rather than prohibitive.
Of the case studies, those in Zambia and Zimbabwe illustrate the lack of commitment to truly community-based initiatives.

5.1.3. Multiple structures with unclear mandates

In most of southern Africa there are still on-going power struggles between the traditional authorities and the modern structures of local government. A lack of clarity regarding the roles of these institutions in a range of issues, including land allocation and NRM, complicates and politicises the implementation of CBNRM, and results in competition for power, recognition and control that deflects the focus away from the real target of CBNRM initiatives, the local community itself.

Despite the weakening of the role of traditional leaders, evidence from many African countries has indicated that neither past colonial policies nor post-independent government policies which have favoured a democratically elected local government have managed to destroy the institution of traditional leadership and its legitimacy completely (see also Keulder 1998). Consequently, the traditional structures remain important politically and administratively and should not be ignored or underestimated. In South Africa and most colonial states, past political processes severely undermined the authority and legitimacy of traditional leaders and caused distrust and disrespect between them and their subjects, but, nonetheless, in most rural areas they have continued to remain the primary decision makers in communal land and NRM. But, because their role is in question, uncertainty, confusion and the erosion of existing authority pervades. In some areas this has resulted in the dissolution of existing institutional arrangements for NRM and land allocation, such that open access systems and land invasions are becoming the norm (Ainslie et al. 1998, Ainslie 1999).

A further problem being experienced in all the countries is a lack of integrated and coordinated policy development and implementation across natural resource sectors. Many of the CBNRM initiatives are sector specific. This can result in conflicting objectives and arrangements at a local level. Indeed, despite effective legislative frameworks, the lack of coherent implementation strategies has led to competition and contradictions between government departments negatively affecting CBNRM in many parts of the region. Complex institutional arrangements with many stakeholders and overlapping roles and mandates, as is the case in Zambia and Lesotho, has had negative effects on devolution and effective NRM. For Lesotho, institutional tensions and power struggles are experienced both at local and national government level due to a lack of clarity on the mandate guiding the different institutions and their relationship to one another. Furthermore, legally it is not clear who holds ownership or control. This has contributed to undermining the effectiveness of the range management programme.
Ostrom (1992) stresses that institutional ambiguity, such as is currently happening regarding the role of traditional authorities in most of southern Africa, can be an important factor in disrupting local level NRM and can prevent revitalisation of common property systems. Indeed, conflict and power struggles between the traditional authorities and elected local government and/or a range of CBOs are commonplace, mainly because there is little clarity regarding their precise role in NRM issues. In South Africa traditional authorities are protected by the constitution in their ‘cultural’ capacity, but what this means functionally is not spelt out. Steenkamp and Urh (2000) points out that further ambiguity is created because chieftaincies and tribal authorities are regarded as indispensable in some parts of the country but are rejected as archaic and redundant in other parts.

This issue of local governance and the division of responsibilities and functions between the traditional authorities, local government and new community NRM structures must be resolved if development and the introduction of enhanced systems for land and NRM are to move ahead effectively. In Zimbabwe after the Rural Districts Councils Act of 1988 firmly placed control in the hands of the RDC rather than the traditional leaders, there has been a move to reverse this and new legislation is currently being considered which will return some degree of control to the chiefs. However the new act legitimises the traditional structure without clarifying the overlapping mandates of the VIDCO/WADCO structure and the traditional structure.

5.1.4. A history of disempowerment and undermining of local institutions

Years of disruptive political manipulation in South Africa have practically rendered CBNRM approaches impossible in communal areas in the Fish River area (Ainslie 1999). Past state interventions such as resettlement villages, betterment policies, the formation of the homelands, the undermining and politicisation of traditional authorities and a lack of tenure security, together with the current lack of direction concerning local government, has had a major impact on rural peoples’ interaction with their natural resources. Furthermore, this legacy has undermined the legitimacy of local institutions, creating high levels of institutional contestation that act as a barrier to effective CBNRM. Very similar forces have been at play in Zimbabwe where the colonial government, and subsequently the independence regime, have disempowered local institutions, or manipulated local institutions for their broader intentions.

In many countries the state’s usurpation of community land and resources under different pretexts and its constant political interference in local issues were major contributing factors towards the disintegration of

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6 In the late 1930s there was increasing concern about the condition of the land in homeland areas. The early Betterment Proclamations of 1939 were directed at this. Under the charge of native commissioners, residential patterns were reconstructed, pastures fenced, stock reduced, and arable land demarcated. This meant the consolidation of scattered homesteads into villages, which resulted in millions of families being forcibly removed creating huge resentment and resistance.
traditional management systems for common property resources. In particular in South Africa and Namibia, the actions of the apartheid state contributed hugely to the erosion of local institutions and 'social capital' in most of the country's rural areas and, as a result, the re-institution of any form of collective action is very difficult.

Another issue is that past experiences of state manipulation have made people suspicious of any efforts by outsiders to formalise NRM systems, with some regarding these as yet another attempt at social control from the outside (Ainslie 1999). The main source of control and power in co-management arrangements for forests reserves in Zimbabwe remains vested in the state. In the Gokwe case study, the resource-sharing scheme proposed by the Zimbabwe Forestry Commission was rejected in one of the villages surrounding the State Forest, and the scheme is viewed ambiguously in other villages. This is partly due to a deep sense of mistrust between the community and the state, a result of a long history of conflict between the people and the Commission.

By contrast, a history that has encouraged rather than undermined local level management can facilitate the implementation of CBNRM. Malawi has a long history of forestry sector involvement in community-based management going back to the 1920s (Abbot 1997). The communal forest scheme established in 1926 allocated patches of woodland to village heads for local use and management. This gained momentum in 1931 after the enaction of Village Forest Areas (VFAs) under the Forestry Ordinance of 1931. At independence in 1964 the management of trees and forests on customary land was transferred to District Councils (Box 2). This usurped the power of village heads, placed an emphasis on revenue generation and led to wide scale degradation reducing the number of VFAs from 5 108 in 1963 to 1 182 by 1994. However, despite this set back, the fact that there has been a history of relatively successful village level management has facilitated the implementation of the new forest policy and legislation which amongst other goals aims to rebuild village level control of customary forests and increase the number of effective VFAs.

**BOX 2: Decentralisation of forest management in Malawi to local government**

In Malawi, after independence in 1964, the control, protection and management of forestry resources on communal land was transferred from the Forestry Department, which had a policy of promoting village forestry areas (VFAs) under village heads, to district councils. Extension became the function of the agricultural extension services. Rather than this decentralisation effort having a positive effect on local forest management it resulted in the opposite, as the state's role changed from forest conservation to revenue raising. This resulted in so much degradation of forests that management responsibility reverted back to the Department of Forestry in 1985. During this time the authority of village heads had been usurped by the politically aligned local government structures and the number of active VFAs reduced from 5 108 to 1 182.
5.2. **Local level issues and facilitating the CBNRM process**

5.2.1. **Low interest in natural resources by local government structures, except as an income source**

In a number of cases, the village structures forming part of the government hierarchy showed little interest in NRM, and can be interpreted as political arms of the ruling party. This was the case with the lower level structures in Zambia, and tends to be the case with VIDCOs in Zimbabwe. In addition, local government structures usually have diverse goals and responsibilities and do not have the resources to devote to resource management, other than to ensure that revenue continues. The consequence then is that local government may favour decisions that bring in more income for local government (such as selling wood from plantations to external vendors), rather than promoting and facilitating community use.

5.2.2. **Insufficient attention paid to institutional building**

Despite an enabling policy environment and considerable progress in devolution, only a few of the initiatives described have adequately contributed to enhancing the capacity of village level organisations, local communities and district level organisations to plan, implement and manage on their own. There has been too much emphasis on technical rather than socio-economic and institutional aspects of CBNRM, with the consequence that communities have realised little benefit on a sustainable and self-reliant basis. Indeed, in many instances dependency rather than self-sufficiency has been cultivated.

5.2.3. **Recognising a community and the fuelling of differentiation**

For most CBNRM initiatives it is necessary to determine who is eligible as a member of the group or ‘community’ to participate in a project, or, in other words, who has rights of access to land, resources and benefits. This is not always easy. In many cases, resources such as forests, wetlands, rivers or protected areas may be used by a number of different communities or villages to varying degrees with different claims to access or ownership. For example, Mandondo (2000), Lynam *et al.* (1998) and Nemarundwe (in prep.) show that use boundaries for common pool resources do not match administrative boundaries, traditional village boundaries or biophysical units (such as catchments), and that the pattern of utilisation differs from resource to resource. Additionally, the relative strength of state and traditional structures can differ between adjacent villages (Campbell *et al.* 1997) giving different meanings to ‘community’ across villages. In our cases, many of the successful CBNRM schemes involved a process where the community itself decided on its membership, often with facilitation by the state or NGOs.

In some policy frameworks real power is decentralised but village governance systems become little more than a system for channelling resources from above into the hands of the local elite. This often serves to alienate a large majority of the community by leaving little space for the involvement of socially and economically marginalised members (Datta and Varalakshmi 1999). Questions about the lack of equity in
power and benefits amongst community members have been raised in the Tanzanian and Zambian cases, for example. In these cases the well-educated elite and the traditional leaders, respectively, come to play a key role in the CBNRM systems.

Power struggles are also likely to take place within communities where local institutions or interest groups try to take control of a community-based process to further their own interests. In any project implemented at community level, there is ample opportunity for elite groups or individuals to dominate and control local level structures and projects largely to their own ends, especially in situations where external agencies (in particular private sector companies) have to deal and negotiate directly with the ‘community’ or rights holders. In these circumstances it is very easy for the more educated, wealthy and articulate members of the community to ‘hijack’ a community-based process. Indeed, Dove (1993) argues that when resources become sufficiently valuable, this value will be appropriated by elites, often from outside the community. In many ways the CAMPFIRE process can be interpreted as having been hijacked by the district authorities, who have used their power to ensure that the benefits of CBNRM accrue to the district council and thus to themselves.

Common property theory proposes that successful common property NRM is more likely where communities are small, have a homogenous social structure and hold shared views, understandings and norms (Ostrom 1992). However, communities on the ground rarely display these qualities. Communities are highly differentiated with multiple interests and actors, each of whom can influence processes and decision-making in different ways. Work from Zimbabwe has shown that a single community can be made up of separate individuals with divergent agendas, different user groups with distinct needs from their natural resources, individuals grouped into traditional social units, other individuals rallying behind the modern leadership structures, and traditional and political elites maintaining power over the populace (see also Mukamuri 1995, Mukamuri et al. in prep.). Furthermore, Sithole (2000) and Mukamuri et al. (in prep) show that these social groupings can change rapidly in relation to commercialisation, in-migration, and economic changes.

In South Africa, most rural communities are stratified according to wealth, education, ethnicity, political affiliations, livelihood strategies, access to land, use of resources, access to patronage, and engagement in the formal economy (Ainslie 1999, Kepe 1999). Some are strongly divided by factionalism. This socio-economic differentiation can result in weak incentives to contribute to NRM initiatives especially for people with access to non land-based sources of livelihood (Shackleton et al. 1998, Ainslie 1999). It is well known that people with little dependence on the resource base will show little interest in managing it, but, at the same time, the very poor for whom the resource base is critical may not be able afford the costs of restrained use in the interests of long term sustainability.
Agrawal and Gibson (1999) argue that this community complexity rarely receives the attention or analysis it needs from those concerned with resource use and management. The tendency is to view ‘community’ as a unified, organic whole. Questions relating to how differences within communities affect resource use, local politics, power relations and strategic interactions within communities are rarely addressed. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) feel strongly that “attention to these details is critical if policy changes on behalf of ‘community’ are to lead to outcomes that are sustainable and equitable”. Other analysts question whether ‘community’ is little more than an abstract term with little relevance to the spatial and temporal dynamics of groupings of individuals (Du Toit et al. 1998). If this is the case, can we ever talk of community-based management?

5.2.4. Insufficient benefits derived from CBNRM

For resource users to participate in resource management initiatives, the benefits of doing so should exceed the costs (Ostrom 1992). Incentives that will encourage collective action and compliance with rules should be associated with the change to new, sustainable resource use practices. Benefits from new approaches must accrue to all resource users and not just certain sectors of the community or management institutions. However, increasingly, CBNRM initiatives are demonstrating that the benefits may not justify the costs. Recent studies have revealed that frequently too little attention is paid to enhancing the value of natural resources for local communities or ensuring that they receive a fair share of the benefits (Fabricius 1999). Problems often arise when the supposed benefits are not forthcoming or what is given to the community is not what was anticipated, as in the Malawi cases. Much of this relates to a lack of community involvement in decisions around benefit sharing and/or poor feedback from community leaders or representatives. In community-based wildlife projects the costs carried by community members (costs of damage by wild animals, opportunity costs of land and restrained use of certain resources, costs of participation and labour) are rarely balanced by the benefits (Fabricius 1999). This has been illustrated in a number of cases in this study where communities have complained bitterly about the damage caused by wild animals and the lack of compensation for this. In some areas, the lack of significant high value resources may deter from the achievement of community-based management as the costs of collective action will always be higher than the benefits (e.g. Fish River).

5.2.5. Project-driven agendas

Most CBNRM in southern Africa is what has been termed “imposed” in that the process has been largely driven from the outside by the state and/or donor agencies and NGOs. In these situations true community empowerment may be difficult to achieve as illustrated in the following example from Zimbabwe. The style of councillors in Chikwarakwara and Sengwe in Zimbabwe is that of a state officer in charge, rather than of facilitator trying to understand local household aspirations. As a community member in Sengwe said: “at
first the officials spoke softly and repeatedly told us the programme belonged to the community. Now they have become forceful and we only obey their regulations for fear of being prosecuted." Consequently, villagers view the CAMPFIRE programme as an extension of the state and feel no ownership over it despite local level CAMPFIRE committees organised under the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) or Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). This perspective is reinforced by the fact that the adoption of CAMPFIRE has been largely driven from the outside by either the RDCs or national level players (Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, and NGOs, such as Zimbabwe Trust). In many of the other case study countries a similar situation prevails, where CBNRM initiatives are driven by project agendas. Care needs to be paid to ensuring that community agendas drive the process, and that longer-term sustainability issues are addressed.

6. Summary and lessons

6.1. Summary

This study has demonstrated that throughout southern Africa there has been a move to increase community participation and decision-making in NRM, both in communal areas and on state owned land. However, despite similar broad policy goals, very different approaches and institutional contexts for CBNRM have emerged across the case studies. These, together with the influence of local level historical, political, social and environmental factors, have impacted variably on the functioning and success of CBNRM initiatives both within and between countries.

A multiplicity of stakeholders are involved in NRM, ranging from national departments and officials, through to local government, traditional authorities, local resource management institutions, donors, NGOs, the private sector and a variety of social actors and groupings from within the community. Whilst there are a great many similarities in the composition of stakeholders between countries, their role and relative power and influence in the CBNRM process varies considerably.

All countries were found to have some form of decentralised local government at regional or district/sub-district level, with the traditional authority structures existing in parallel to these modern elected structures. In some countries, e.g. Lesotho and Malawi, chiefs and other traditional leaders are co-opted onto the district and sub-district structures, whilst in others, e.g. South Africa and Zimbabwe, these institutions are deliberately excluded as being non-democratic and collaborators of previous regimes.

Local government structures have a variety of roles and responsibilities relating to development and planning, and not all are directly involved in NRM. Indeed, it is only in Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent Lesotho, that local government has a clear mandate and powers in NRM. In the other countries this function is taken on by more local level organisations and/or district and sub-district structures sponsored by line
ministries and departments.

In Zambia, for instance, decisions relating to wildlife management in Game Management Areas are made by multi-stakeholder forums operating at district and sub-district level that report directly to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife. Along with chiefs, department officials and other representatives, councillors from the district councils sit on these bodies creating a link between local government and the district CBNRM structures. By contrast, in Botswana, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks’ multiple-sector Technical Committee has virtually no connection with the district councils. This has tended to dissociate the CBNRM projects from the broader district development context.

Most of these district structures, whether local government or line department sponsored, form the upper tier of a hierarchy of organisations that extend down to grassroots level. This tiered arrangement is, theoretically, designed to enable community needs and priorities to filter up into district level planning processes. The reality is often the opposite, with these structures forming a channel through which decisions made at a higher level can trickle down.

In Zimbabwe the district councils are linked to Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs). These have little direct role in wildlife management since this function has not been delegated down by the district councils. In Zambia, only the SLAMU programme has representation at community level in the form of Village Action Groups. This representation is severely diluted moving up the hierarchy as more powerful stakeholders come on board, with the result that there is no real community input at primary decision-making level. The District Councils in Zambia similarly link into lower tier structures known as Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and Resident Development Committees (RDCs), but, in terms of CBNRM, these are superseded by the line department structures and are barely functional at the village level in the case study areas. In Lesotho, the lowest tier of local government, the elected Community Councils (previously Village Development Councils), have legally recognised control over range resources. However, because chiefs play a dominant role in these councils, much of the authority still lies in their hands. Malawi also has its hierarchy of local government structures. Linked to the district assembly are District Development Committees (DDC), Area Development Committees (ADC), and Village Development Committees (VDC). These are multi-stakeholder committees presided over by chiefs and villages heads. Whilst these structures are not directly involved in NRM, the Village Natural Resource Management Committee (VNRMC) (facilitated by the Department of Forestry) is accountable to the VDC. The situation is similar in Tanzania with Village Forestry Committees (VFCs), although these are more distant from the traditional leadership.

In addition to these government-sponsored structures, in a number of countries there are also a range of
CBNRM organisations, which operate more-or-less independently of the state. In Botswana, Namibia and Makuleke (South Africa) these are corporate entities formed by all residents or rights holders within a designated area, often spanning several villages. These Trusts, Conservancies and Communal Property Associations, as they are known, elect their own management committees, which may include traditional leaders, and are governed by legally recognised constitutions. Because they have been devolved user or proprietary rights over resources, they have the power to make rules, to approve developments, to enter into partnership with the private sector, to receive revenues and to decide on benefit allocations. Although these structures are facilitated by state legislation, there is very little interference by any tier of government in their operation. Thus, in contrast to the government units described above, their foundation and legitimacy derives from the community itself. The main role of local and central government is to approve applications for the establishment of these organisations, to facilitate their formation, and ensure their integration into broader district planning processes. The Range Management Associations in Lesotho are of a similar nature, although there is considerably less clarity about their powers relative to local councils and chiefs. In the Fish River area the primary organisations for CBNRM are civil society structures known as Residents Associations. These have evolved and subsumed the responsibilities of tribal authorities in the former Ciskei without any intervention from the state. Ironically though, their ability to function effectively is hampered by the lack of state support to communal areas in South Africa. The Tanzanian case is somewhat peculiar as well, as the local committees for NRM, the VFCs, show many similarities to the state-sponsored organisations described above (e.g. VNRMCs from Malawi), but they differ in that Tanzanian villages have corporate status.

The study has thus revealed a complex of different structures at a decentralised level that have some role in NRM. It is clear that the more complicated the institutional arrangements and the greater the diversity of state-based actors directly involved, as evident in Zambia and Lesotho, the more likely the community is sidelined rather than empowered in the devolution process. In these cases, there is also increased likelihood of overlapping jurisdictions and mandates, potentially leading to institutional contestation and conflict. Neither of these situations bode well for sustainable CBNRM. On the other hand where “appropriate authority” is devolved directly to community level, the situation is greatly simplified and there is considerably less ambiguity regarding rights and responsibilities. The danger here, as stressed in the Botswana study, is that these institutions come to operate in isolation of broader district level processes and, because of their exclusivity, run the risk of alienation from the wider population. The latter could potentially lead to decreased political support.

Based on the above understanding and the commonalities and differences between countries, the CBRNM initiatives described in this study can be broadly classified as follows:
(1) Cases where the empowerment process has resulted in district structures being the new locus of power. These can be local government structures, such as district councils (Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE case), or multi-stakeholder, district structures aligned to line ministries (Zambia cases). In the latter cases the CBNRM agenda is driven by central state authorities, at a district level, with strong representation from traditional leadership. In all the cases where district level structures have been empowered, the future for CBNRM is not positive, as too few benefits reach communities, and communities feel alienated from the NRM decision-making process.

(2) Cases where line departments sponsor organisations at lower levels, such as Village Forest Committees in the Tanzania case, Village Natural Resource Management Committees in the Malawi case and Resource Management Committees in the Zimbabwe Gokwe case. The more powers such committees receive, the more likely are the successes in NRM. Thus in the Malawian and Tanzanian examples the committees can formulate by-laws, while the Zimbabwean committees are very weak vis-à-vis the Forestry Commission.

(3) Cases where there is very little NRM at the lower level, but what does exist is largely derived through structures outside of the state hierarchy, e.g. traditional customs and norms in the Zimbabwe Chivi case and Residents Associations in the Fish River case.

(4) Finally, cases that can be considered to be truly community-based, where organisations consisting of community members themselves are the locus of power (Trusts, Property Associations, as in the cases in Botswana, Namibia, Makuleke and perhaps Lesotho, and Villages in the case of Tanzania). It is only this “model” that meets most of the conditions required for successful CBNRM.

Analysis of community attitudes towards CBNRM, have indicated that community members are particularly supportive when the powerful organisation in the nexus of CBNRM stakeholders is a CBO, such as those in the fourth category above. At the other end of the continuum are the cases where the district-based structures assume authority (Zimbabwe and Zambia). In these, people on the ground rarely identify with the scheme being “community-based”. Benefit distribution also differs markedly among the cases, with 96-100% of revenues being returned to the community in the cases from Botswana and Namibia, but only 50% in the CAMPFIRE case (most of the benefits being retained by the district council).

Having appropriate policies and institutional arrangements for CBNRM that empower CBOs to manage resources is insufficient to guarantee success. Capacity building is essential. Given the social complexities at a local level and the lack of experience in running of business partnerships, etc. the more successful CBNRM schemes have been facilitated by NGOs. These organisations also play an essential role in conflict
management between different community actors and institutions competing for power, and can aid in brokering uneven power balances between community and state. Most of the CBNRM initiatives have received donor support, without which the above facilitation would be impossible. The negative is the creation of an unhealthy dependence on these funds and the danger of collapse when the funders withdraw.

6.2. Lessons and some recommendations for CBNRM implementation

In addition to the institutional context discussed above, a number of other factors and issues have been identified by the case studies that impact on the empowerment process and the success and sustainability of CBNRM. These are summarized below.

**Demand-driven CBNRM – the ideal:** In all case studies, with the possible exception of one of the Malawi cases, the Makuleke restitution claim and the NRM efforts of residents associations in the Fish River area, the move to involve communities in wildlife and forest management has largely been driven from the outside by state and/or donor agencies and NGOs. Because external agendas, not least biodiversity conservation, shape the philosophies, goals, institutions and processes behind these supply-led approaches, it could be argued that true community empowerment in these situations is an elusive ideal. However, where effort has been made to devolve full authority and control to community level, such as in Botswana and Namibia, a demand-driven movement is beginning to emerge. In Namibia increasingly more communities are applying, at their own initiative, for conservancy status. A similar situation prevails in Botswana, and the landmark Makuleke restitution case set in motion a whole series of restitution claims in national parks and other protected areas in South Africa.

**Conflicting policies – what is needed:** Whilst most countries do have policies that empower local people to manage resources, in many countries the policies may be empowering for one sector only (often wildlife) whilst command and control policies continue to apply in other sectors (often forestry resources other than wildlife). The principles of CBNRM need to be extended to cover all natural resources in a manner that ensures integration with, rather than further complicates, the already multifaceted institutional set-up. Namibia is attempting to do this by recognising conservancies as substitutes for Forest Management Committees in areas where the latter exist.

**Traditional authorities – achieving a balance:** Some balance needs to be achieved regarding the role and influence that traditional authorities have in CBNRM. In some instances, e.g. Zambia, chiefs continue to assert a disproportionate amount of power (although there are proposals to downplay this), whilst in other cases their exclusion from new NRM institutions has led to conflict and the stalling of progress with CBNRM implementation. In a number of cases local people themselves have chosen to elect their chiefs and
headmen onto the executive committees of the new CBNRM structures (e.g. Makuleke, some cases in Botswana and Namibia). This is despite the questionable legitimacy of these traditional authorities. In other cases these leaders serve in a non-executive capacity as, for example, patrons. The important point is that it is the community who decides whether or not traditional authorities are represented. With the exception of the Fish River study, it appears that hereditary leaders will continue to play an important role in CBNRM in the countries studied, with traditional/indigenous systems of control still applying to lower value resources. Indeed, the strong leadership provided by well-respected chiefs and headmen has been cited as one of the strengths of CBNRM in Malawi and Lesotho. CBNRM programmes need to look for ways to constructively incorporate the traditional leadership.

**Entrepreneurs – more bad than good?**: Entrepreneurs from both inside and outside the community have been highlighted in a number of the studies as posing a serious threat to effective community level management of resources. This particularly applies in the forest management cases in Malawi and Zimbabwe. These powerful actors tend to ignore local regulations and controls, undermining the authority of community institutions. Where CBNRM institutions have attempted to take action, they have been threatened. In these situations, government law enforcement agencies have been relatively ineffective in providing back-up support. More attention needs to be paid to this issue. Communities need to have strong legal rights over resources and recourse to the law in order to protect their resources. In some cases negotiated agreements may be required to allow access to resources to “outsiders”.

**New elites**: With any transfer of power there exists the danger of creating a new set of elites who use this power for personal gain and to enhance their standing and power base. This can occur amongst local government councillors at district level or the executive committees of community-based organizations at community level. In the Seronga area in Botswana, the Board of Trustees of some community trusts have begun to forge a much closer relationship with the private sector than with their community constituents. In Malawi, community members complained of the elitist attitudes of some representatives on the VNRMCs. Mechanisms to deal with these issues of power grabbing need to be built in the constitutions of the various bodies.

**Slow, incremental process**: The process of defining and registering community-based organizations and developing competent institutions, that are representative of the different interests amongst local actors and sensitive to the dynamics and power relations in the community, is long, slow and arduous with time horizons of up to five or more years. It is strongly argued in a number of the studies that any attempt to speed up this process would condemn the CBNRM initiative from the start by ignoring the importance of the social process. Donors and government agencies need to recognise that such processes do not happen over-night and require long-term commitment and on-going support.
**Flexible approaches:** CBNRM approaches must be flexible and adaptable to fit local contexts, complexities and needs. As is the case in Botswana and Namibia, each CBNRM organisation should be able to determine their own boundaries and membership, select their own management structures and procedures, and develop their own constitutions (beyond certain prescribed provisions to ensure accountability), by-laws, rules, sanctions and management plans.

**Socio-economic differentiation:** Highly stratified and differentiated communities with multiple interests pose a particular challenge in that such situations create varying incentives and disincentives for participating in CBNRM. Here, the role played by external facilitators is critical. All local actors, regardless of socio-economic background, need to be brought into the CBNRM process through equitable and collaborative negotiations. Differences and conflicts of interest need to be worked through, and collective stakes should be strengthened through a social learning process. Some of the case studies (e.g. Namibia, Makuleke) have demonstrated that differences of interest can be resolved through discussion, mediation, patience and unbiased support by external players.

6.3. **Conclusion**

In all the countries studied there has been progress towards CBNRM and a move away from previous, largely unsuccessful, centralised command and control approaches to natural resource management. In some cases the move to community-based management has been more successful in empowering local communities than in others. In most instances there is little evidence, with the possible exception of specific case studies in Namibia and Malawi, to demonstrate that devolved authority has resulted in more sustainable natural resource management. The assumption is that if true community control is in place then sustainable use and management will follow, but the links between local empowerment and sustainable NRM still require attention and further research effort.

In all the cases, the process has been complex and, at times, conflictual requiring much dedicated effort, commitment and flexibility by all stakeholders involved. It is clear that the path to successful CBNRM is not simple. However, the study has revealed a range of factors and conditions that may help contribute to the success of CBNRM initiatives and the empowerment of local communities. These include a real commitment by government to transfer power; integration across natural resource sectors; devolution to the lowest level possible; devolution of full rights not just decision-making authority and access to benefits; legal recognition of these rights and recourse to the law; inclusive local structures; dedicated facilitation (often by NGOs) that builds capacity and ensures representativeness and accountability of management structures; opportunities to generate income based on the natural resource base; a “slow but sure” process; and clarity around the mandates of and relationships to different stakeholders such as traditional authorities, local
government and line departments.

One clear pattern that has emerged is that the chances of CBNRM succeeding appear greater in situations where high value resources are involved, which have the potential to provide communities with an income stream (e.g. Botswana, Namibia, etc.) and thus an incentive to participate and comply with rules and regulations. However, where this is not the case, such as in the communal areas of South Africa, the way forward is much less clear-cut. Here, emphasis will have to be placed on the need for more sustainable management of resources used for everyday purposes rather than on the potential to earn income from the spillovers of high value resources such as wildlife. Thus, many challenges for the implementation of CBNRM still exist, and there are many lessons still to learn. Each situation is unique and influenced strongly by a variety of contextual factors. It is therefore important that we are not too prescriptive in determining what works and what does not. Possibly one of the most important lessons for policy makers and practitioners (and researchers) is the need to be flexible, and to recognize CBNRM as a dynamic process in which different issues, concerns and power plays emerge as the process unfolds and the system evolves and adapts to accommodate new institutions and the related power shifts.

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